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Summary
Corruption is a structural and a moral problem of m odem  societies. It undermines 
social development, democracy and people's wealth. The cost of corruption is about 
$1 trillion per year, and it is often paid by the poorest groups in society. To study 
corruption is, therefore, not only a scientific challenge but also a necessity in the search 
for social justice and in the context of improving quality of life.
In fighting corruption, policy makers often have to decide whether to shape an in­
tervention based on the individual or on the individual's perception of their environ­
ment. Moreover, campaigns against cormption need to be tailored to the social context 
m which they will be implemented. Policies to be designed to counteract corruption 
can, therefore, benefit of a tool to differ social settings with respect to corruption.
The current literature on corruption lacks a theoretical framework as well as tools for 
shedding light on the subject matter outlined above. The following research attempts 
to fill this. Qualitative and quantitative research evidence is used to identify social 
regularities brought about by corruption and, based on those observations, a set of 
social mechanisms are put forward. These are then used to design a model and a tool 
to gather first hand data. Finally a new set of analytic techniques to grasp the degree 
to which groups affect individuals' decisions complete the methodology. Moreover, 
to show the strong empirical link between the model and the data gathering method, 
a data collection exercise with 16 participants is illustrated.
This study proposes a new methodology for understanding how cormption emerges 
in small groups. More specifically, the extent to which group features affect individu­
als' decisions as to whether or not to uphold cormpt practices is addressed in the 
context of limited public resources.
The main result of this study is the development of the methodology itself, producing 
a set of values which are then interpreted to provide a measure of cormption. Such 
a measure quantifies the extent to which individuals' decisions are affected by their 
group. This contribution is particularly relevant for policy making, especially when 
it comes to deciding whether to design initiatives tailored to the individual or to the 
individuals perception of society.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter describes the topic of the thesis. The problem of corruption is intro­
duced and evidences from two international institutions are put forward to highlight 
the gravity of the phenomenon. A brief overview of recent studies on corruption is 
also discussed in order to present the difficulties found in addressing such a problem. 
Moreover, an account of those aspects often observed m corrupt practices are con­
sidered in order to put forward the definition used in this thesis. Finally, the research 
question is stated and an outline of the chapters of the thesis is discussed.
1.1 The research problem
At the time this study was carried out, between 2009 and 2012, newspapers repor­
ted stories of political corruption, scandals and bribes almost everyday. In Italy, for 
instance, corruption is so deeply embedded that politicians themselves are making 
a campaign against the legal system, showing the whole Italian population how to 
cheat. The legal system is seen as an obstacle to gain more power by the political class, 
now and then there is an attempt to introduce a new law to favour this or that indi­
vidual. Corruption is part of the culture, not exploiting the power given by a social 
position is seen as a symptom of either stupidity or incompetence. The urge to conduct 
a study on corruption comes from the curiosity to investigate a challenging problem 
as well as the necessity to understand how to intervene and modify this dramatic loss 
of moral values which is potentially catastrophic for the world over.
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The effects of corruption can be found both in the economic and in the social spheres. 
The World Bank (2004) has measured that the annual amount of bribes paid world­
wide is US $1 trillion.
Transparency International (2011) one of the most active world organisations in fight­
ing corruption clearly states that corruption is one of the principal causes undermining 
social development, democracy and attempts to reduce poverty.
To study corruption is a difficult task; data are difficult to gather and, if available, they 
are unreliable and masked.
Despite the complexity of the problem, within the last twenty years, academic research 
has made some interesting clarifications of likely causes, preparing the groundwork 
for designing anti-corruption policies and programmes.
Studies have been carried out in several disciplines: economics, political science, an­
thropology, psychology and sociology. In the realm of economics, the problem is 
tackled from both sides: macro, mostly referring to the correlation between GDP and 
corruption level (Wei, 2000); micro, investigating the processes involved in hierarchic 
organisations (Klitgaard, 1988). A relevant part of the research on corruption concerns 
the political organization of the state, and researchers have addressed the relation­
ship between different political regimes and levels of corruption (Amundsen, 1999; 
Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984). Cultural aspects as well as established norms (Bicch- 
ieri, 2006b) that might affect the corruption level in a society have been investigated. 
From the sociological point of view, corruption is thought to emerge from the conflict 
of many norms facing ambiguous situations (Bicchieri, 2006a).
A corrupt practice can take many forms: engineers come to our houses to fix the boiler 
get paid in cash and do not give receipts in order to avoid tax; politicians pay 20 euros 
for a vote; professors help to advance the academic career of one of their relatives. 
Moreover, what is meant by the word corruption ranges within a wide set of defini­
tions: a friend has been corrupted by punk rock music; oxygen has corrupted the film 
of one of Fellini's masterpieces; an unknown application has corrupted my system of 
files; and so on and so forth. A definition that captures all the aspects, meanings and 
usages of such a word seems to be impossible, and therefore it is necessary to specify
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in which context corruption is to be observed and studied.
In this study, corruption concerning political systems, policy formulation and the dis­
tribution of and access to resources is investigated. When corruption is found in the 
political sphere, there is no real intention to design laws or monitor mechanisms that 
might deter corrupt practices; policy formulation and legislation are adjusted so as 
to be of advantage to politicians and legislators (Doig and Theobald, 2000; Moody- 
Stuart, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Therefore, in order to fight corruption success­
fully, it is key to shed light on how corruption emerges and spreads within political 
spheres. The latter is often referred to as "grand corruption" (Doig and Theobald, 
2000; Moody-Stuart, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Moreover, in this study, only west­
ern representative democracies systems are considered. A representative democracy 
is a form of democratic government whereby citizens' interests are represented by 
elected officials in open elections (Dahl, 1989).
Core elements to observe corruption are a public resource and a "bureaucratic system" 
to manage such a resource. Here, "bureaucratic system" means a technique or a set 
of procedures to eliminate particularism among the population, as originally sugges­
ted by Weber (1958). Therefore, implementing or imposing a non-bureaucratic system 
to manage public resources is one of the core elements of corruption. In outsourcing 
goods or services, in judging a person in court, in selecting an individual among a set 
of candidates, in the act of exploiting public resources, as soon as the people involved 
are treated not in accordance with the "bureaucratic system" in place, then corrup­
tion is observed. Those chosen are not those who would have been chosen had the 
proper system been followed. Here, it is argued that this idea of corruption is a sort 
of discrimination. However, corruption is not instigated by race, age or gender, rather 
on mere gain. Therefore, in this work, corruption is understood as a discrimination 
process instigated by gain.
Corruption involves groups of people. On the one hand corruption is upheld by a 
network of people, it is used by public administrators, imposed with violence and in­
timidation by criminals, implemented by groups of managers or secret organisations. 
On the other hand, a single greedy individual or a group of people actually involved
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in a corrupt practice is an element of a corrupt practice, then there is also the rest of 
the population that has suffered from such a corrupt act. In cases where, for some 
reason, such a population put up with those corrupt acts, this will trigger social pro­
cesses that legitimate those corrupt acts, giving rise to more corruption (see Section 
3.2.1). Court cases, investigation reports and academic works are put forward to show 
how those social processes bring about two social regularities. Firstly, corruption is 
endemic, meaning: corruption is found at all level of a society. Secondly corruption 
is resilient, even after convicting and putting key corrupt individuals into jail, corrup­
tion re-emerges.
The sociological understanding of corruption proposed in this work, rather than identi­
fying those lawful or illicit practices or behaviours implemented or imposed by a non- 
bureaucratic system to manage public resources, aims to identify what triggers those 
social mechanisms that generate endemic and resilient corruption. It is not a result of 
tricking the law in some way or using different methods to bribe a judge that make 
corruption endemic and resilient, but the way a group of people adjust and adapt their 
behaviours after suffering a corrupt act.
The research question addressed in this study can be expressed as follows: given a 
number of people competing to access public resources, what is the extent to which 
group features affect group members' decision processes in upholding corrupt prac­
tices? In other words, is corruption a construct of that particular group? If yes, is it 
possible to express quantitatively the degree to which this happens? By providing an 
answer to these questions, an understanding of those social processes that legitimate 
corruption is provided.
Such an ambitious aim is accomplished by designing a data gathering method, a 
model to replicate the emergence of corruption and a set of analytical tools to study 
them. Due to a strong tradition in psychology and, more recently, also in economics, 
experiments appear to be the most appropriate methodology and perhaps the most 
effective way to gather sound firsthand data on individuals' behaviours. The idea 
is to design and run a preliminary test of a Role Playing Game where participants 
pick a role and interact to achieve a goal. By monitoring participants' behaviours the
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emergence of corruption can be observed and measured. As for modelling, agent- 
based approaches are the most suitable methodology to design, test and understand 
the emergence of corruption. Identifying involved entities, the interactions among 
them and unintended or normative mechanisms, are common practices in the craft of 
agent-based modelling (ABM). After calibrating and validating the ABM, simulations 
will allow for measuring the extent to which small group features affect individual 
decision processes in upholding corrupt practices. Also, in the literature, there are 
only a few examples of the proposed methodology, none of which has yet been peer 
reviewed. Therefore, it is a promising new field to explore, study and on which build 
new knowledge.
This work starts by providing insights into the state of the art research on corrup­
tion. Chapter 2 reviews the most relevant lines of thinking and results of research 
on corruption. As such, the main aim is to identify essential elements of the various 
approaches that have addressed causes and effects of corruption.
Academic research has shed light on likely general causes and effects. However, much 
work has to be done to better understand and tackle the problem. As recently pointed 
out by Rose-Ackerman, during the workshop held in Philadelphia in March 2006: 
Research on corruption and its control: the state of the art, "the next step in research on 
corruption should be toward the investigation of specific cases, in order to detect the 
various forms corruption takes place, both in the public and private sector". This 
study hence, will attempt to identify social mechanisms in a specific context in order 
to better tailor a social campaign against corruption.
In Chapter 3 how small group features shape corruption is introduced along with the 
research question. Those mechanisms that are thought to generate widespread cor­
ruption are put forward. Here, the two social regularities mentioned above, resilience 
and endemicity, as well as a set of group features that are significantly correlated to 
corruption are identified.
The concept of 'ideological field' is also proposed to introduce a formalisation of the 
above key features so that they can be modelled and tested.
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Agent-based modelling (ABM) is the method used to formalise the proposed under­
standing of endemic and resilient corruption. Chapter 4 introduces the theory behind 
such an approach. Its main feature: a tight relation between understanding and facts, 
a clear definition of individuals and their behaviours and the possibility to test and 
adjust hypotheses on likely causes makes this a solid and robust method to address 
the research question.
In Chapter 5 the methodology employed to collect data is discussed. Ideally such data 
should be gathered by direct observation of corrupt behaviours. This kind of empirical 
study hardly exists and it is not plausible to expect anything like this in the near future 
(Andwig et al., 2000). Most of the time independent researchers on corruption have 
no access to the transactions where corruption usually takes place. Thus, it is widely 
acknowledged that one of the major difficulties in corruption research is the lack of a 
solid empirical basis (Andwig et al., 2000).
One of the most reliable sources of information about corruption is court cases. How­
ever, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, such information does not capture the extent of the 
real phenomenon.
Another means to gather data on corruption is investigative journalism. Stories from the 
media, when they come to establishing facts, are also a precious source of information. 
However, those data are thought to be driven by external factors, such as giving prior­
ity to more spectacular stories, putting aside more common corrupt practices (Andwig 
et al., 2000). Sometimes it is even difficult to understand whether the perception of a 
certain level of corruption is based on facts or not.
Since 2000 a new approach to gather reliable measurement of corruption seems to be 
increasingly and successfully used, that is laboratory experiments. For example, ex­
periments to measure corruption in auction mechanisms (Klemperer, 2004; Milgrom, 
2004). Experiments are useful to test theoretical models: it is possible to carry out 
a rigorous test of the behavioural underpinnings the model and also, laboratory ex­
periments can be a substitute for field data that are often unavailable when studying 
corruption (Abbink, 2006). Experiments suit the needs of this study perfectly. Mon­
itoring the behaviour of subjects, manipulating the environment and, of course the
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relatively low cost of the experimental setting, are all features that allow for gathering 
solid and reliable data. In this study a Role Playing Game is designed and implemen­
ted. It can be used to measure and test those conditions that favour the emergence of 
corruption.
Chapter 6 provides a detailed description of the experiment platform. Pictures of 
the latter and its main functionalities are shown. Moreover a summary of the socio­
demographic characteristics of the 16 participants, used to test the platform and do a 
preliminary model calibration and validation, are shown and commented upon. Some 
general information about platform implementation is also provided.
Chapter 7 illustrates in detail the preliminary exercise to show the strong link between 
the proposed model and data gathering methodology. Both the results of the exper­
iment and the outcomes of model calibration and validation are shown. According 
to the results of several model simulations, an answer to the research question is 
provided.
Chapter 8 concludes this study. It will briefly go through all the main aspects of the 
work: from the original motivation to the actual topic; from the classical approach 
on understanding corruption to a more sociological one; from the identification of the 
original contribution to the field to the definition of the research question. Results 
are described and their implications annotated. Finally, the limitations of the current 
approach and ideas on how to overcome them are suggested, as well as proposals for 
further research and possible new challenges.

Chapter 2:
Causes and effects of corruption
2.1 Introduction
Most of the research on corruption carried out so far is based on comparative studies 
(Brunetti et al., 1997; Brunetti and Weder, 1998; Elliott, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 1995; 
Mauro, 1995; Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). These have offered useful insights that 
may clarify the extent to which the experience of one country could be transferred to 
another. However, since corruption is found in different social settings, these results 
are too general and difficult to apply in a specific context. Nowadays, as far as research 
on corruption is concerned, there is a shared feeling that points towards more specific 
socio-economic mechanisms that drive the phenomenon (Andwig et al., 2000), so that 
it will be possible to design specific steps and solutions, such as where to concentrate 
policy resources to fight corruption. The main aim of this chapter is to identify es­
sential elements of the various approaches that have addressed causes and effects of 
corruption and to point out in which direction lies the contribution brought by the 
study presented here.
Section 2.2 proposes a way to understand corruption. This brief description summar­
ises most of the points extensively treated in the following sections of the Chapter. 
Section 2.3 describes how democracy is seen as a way to reduce the level of corruption 
in a country. Section 2.4 identifies those norms cmd cultural features that are thought 
to affect the level of corruption. Section 2.5 gives cm account of organisational features
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that have been studied in order to understand the causes and effects of corruption. 
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Understanding corruption
It is widely accepted that corruption can be differentiated into two branches (Doig 
and Theobald, 2000; Moody-Stuart, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997): political or grand 
corruption and bureaucratic or petty corruption. Political corruption is when policy 
formulation and legislation are adjusted to be of advantage to politicians and legis­
lators (Doig and Theobald, 2000; Moody-Stuart, 1997). Bureaucratic corruption takes 
place at the implementation level of public administration, it refers to paying public 
officials small bribes to get goods or services quicker, and it is often seen to go hand- 
in-hand with political corruption and to be mutually reinforcing (Andwig et al., 2000). 
This categorisation differentiates corruption according to the source and the amount 
of money: for instance, a small amount from a private source is seen as bureaucratic 
corruption whereas a large amount from a public source as political.
With respect to research on corruption, whereas in the first decades after World War II 
many economists made a partly implicit assumption of social nature: agents were law- 
abiding, non-violent, neither cheating nor stealing; from the early 1980s the problem 
of Hobbes' "state of nature" was taken into account, namely, agents were predatory, 
greedy and cruel (Bowles, 1985; Hobbes, 1914). The contemporary body of literature 
on corruption, reviewed below, is mainly based on such a hypothesis.
The following part of this Section illustrates an understanding of the origins of cor­
ruption as well as how political corruption enriches the political class and therefore 
decreases the political will to fight corruption.
Platteau (1994) brings together the Hobbesian market theory emd the social order of 
market institution theory. He claims that based on the particular circumstances of the 
transaction, stealing, cheating or robbing is the dominant strategy. These strategies are 
not achieved if the traders know that the transaction will be repeated or if they know 
each other through some kind of family or friendship networks. So, Plateau points out
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that the first way to decrease stealing, cheating or robbing and build trust is to person­
alize the transaction. Since m odem  economies are wide and involve a large number 
of transactions, isolated and impersonalised encounters are a fundamental part of an 
economic development. Therefore, expansion in trade and changes that require meet­
ing new partners have a higher degree of risk, higher chances of losses and therefore 
will not happen in a society of deep mistrust. Platteau proposes the so called assurance 
game in order to overcome the problem of absence of trust in widespread anonymity 
scenarios. It is a two-person, one-shot game in which the payoffs are symmetrical for 
each player. Both players derive greater utility from mutual co-operation than from 
bilateral cheating. In the assurance game it pays to be honest if the other is honest 
too, the point here is to increase the cost of being the only one that cheats. So, when 
most people follow a set of moral norms, it pays to follow them. However, Platteau 
believes that internalising moral norms cannot be achieved in any simple way despite 
major efforts in the educational or other social systems. He points to Mezzogiomo^ as 
a case to show how low level trust may be sustained for centuries. Platteau conceives 
one more way to bring trust within anonymous encounters: the actors are monitored 
by a public institution which metes out punishment.
In this context Gambetta (1996) places the rise of the Sicilian Mafia. In an environment 
with a low degree of mutual trust, the Mafia may supply credible threats in advance 
to punish cheating. So, a trader may prevent the other from cheating. Of course, 
the Mafia itself can cheat, but since it is policing a large number of transactions, its 
reputation becomes central to the business. The side-effect of this apparent welfare or­
ganisation is that the mafia also taxes traders with no need for protection. This can be 
extended to situations where competition between violent organisations is observed 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Although the role played by corruption in sustaining vi­
olent rent competition games has not been explored (Andwig et al., 2000), this sheds 
light on one fundamental point: illegitimate income is gained not only through ser­
vices delivered but also through the power acquired via position in public or quasi­
public organisations (Andwig et al., 2000) such as mafias or the like.
^This term usually refers to South Italy.
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By studying African bureaucracies Bayart (1993) and Reno (1997) pinpoint another 
aspect. Their study focuses on networks between economic and political agents, and 
how those social relations could undermine the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Bayart 
affirms that state and civil societies are not distinct spheres but are deeply connected; 
this is part of what Bayard calls the reciprocal assimilation of elites. Reno talks about 
a shadow state, since this network regulates large informal economies. In conclusion 
Reno stresses that there is a hidden danger in applying economic reform in the pres­
ence of such a shadow state, since the effect could strengthen the power of the secret 
economic network instead of the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the elites 
use the state to maintain their political control and for accumulation of wealth and 
power (Fatton, 1992).
One of the main concerns in political sciences derives from the point stressed above. 
During the transition from both family-based and centrally planned economies to a 
capitalistic one, the society may be stuck in low-trust, low-activity state. This gives 
rise to networks where corruption might take place and seriously damages the socio­
economic development of the society (Andwig et al., 2000).
A model to replicate the theoretical scenario designed above has been proposed by 
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998). In their model agents in the private sector are dis­
honest. The society consists of producers and suppliers. A supplier provides the 
producer with h is/her output, and the producer promises to pay the former when 
he/she has sold the product on the market. The final product might be either of low 
or high quality, this is revealed during the process of production. If of high quality, 
the producer wiU receive a higher price not perceived by the supplier. To provide high 
quality the supplier has to make investment and gain the difference in value with the 
final product. However, this investment does not guarantee high quality of the final 
product. The result of this game is that the producer will always cheat, reporting low 
quality, even if it is high, consequently the supplier will never invest and the economy 
is stuck.
In order to find a way out, Acemoglu and Verdier introduce a government that pro­
tects the supplier's property. So, when high quality is detected the government en-
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sures that the supplier pockets the difference in price. Government employees are paid 
by a fixed tax on each agent. If there is a sufficient number of government employees, 
suppliers invest and the economy ends up in a higher productivity equilibrium.
Moreover, they propose a further refinement of the model: not all government em­
ployees are honest. They report low quality instead of high, when the latter is the case, 
and they pocket the difference in price instead of the producer; however, if caught 
he /she  loses h is/her wage and returns the amount he/she has taken to the supplier.
What seems to be relevant, as pointed out by the authors, is the role played by the 
public sector wage. With low wages, the model equilibrium is reached when all bur­
eaucrats are corrupted, but with high wages, some bureaucrats will become honest, 
the investment increases and the economy grows.
Finally, they adjust their model with two more refinements: bureaucracy size, the cap­
ability of the bureaucracy to inspect none, part or all of the transactions; and different 
talent in private sector activities over the agent population. These two new assump­
tions allow the authors to reach a particular conclusion with respect to anti-corruption 
policies. With a less-than-full-sized bureaucracy and increased wages for government 
employees, both the number of honest inspections and private investments increases 
as compared with the previous version of the model.
The striking point that emerges from the account of corruption outlined above, is that 
corruption can be thought of as one element of the accumulation strategy of the ruling 
elite (Andwig et al., 2000). If this is the case, there are as yet no methods to find a way 
out. The system seems to be self-enforcing and hard to modify. It is of paramount 
importance to provide an understanding of the mechanisms that bring about such a 
self-enforcing and resilient accumulation system of the ruling elite.
2.3 Democracy for deterring corruption
A relevant part of the research on corruption concerns the political organisation of 
the state. Johnston and Hope agree that any assessment of corruption must take a 
country's political dimension into account (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Johnston, 1997). 
Political scientists understand the causes of corruption in the deficiencies of political
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systems (Doig and Theobald, 2000). Extensive corruption is seen as a poorly func­
tioning state and ethical leadership failure. Such a political system lacks democratic 
power-sharing formulas, checks and balances, and accountable and transparent insti­
tutions of democratic governance.
Since the mid-20^^ century political scientists have been debating as to the causes and 
likely effects of corruption. Myrdal (1968b) claimed that corruption is caused by an 
incomplete or unfinished process of modernisation. Corruption was thought of as 
something to grease the wheels of modernisation which would eventually disappear 
as the state became more efficient (Andwig et al., 2000). On the contrary, Blomstrm 
and Hette (1984) suggested that corruption, amongst others, was the logical effect of 
the imperialist-capitalist penetration and forced underdevelopment caused by mul­
tinational corporations and Western governments in the Third World. Another point 
of view, proposed by several scholars (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Médard, 1986,1991), 
considers the state as a façade that hides deeply personalised political relations, clien- 
telism and corruption. Such a scenario is labelled as: "personal rule", "the politics of 
the belly", "prebendalism" and "kleptocratic". Key elements are: personal relations 
as the foundation of the political system, clientelism, presidentialism and very poor 
distinction between public and private. These factors enable both political and bur­
eaucratic corruption (Andwig et al., 2000). According to Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman 
(2000) such kleptocratic regimes are characterised by rentseeking behavior by officials 
at high level, excessive state intervention in the national economy, too big govern­
ments, privatisation that benefits the ruling elite, non-transparent and contradictory 
regulations on taxation and overly short-term investments. Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
have an extreme vision of the causes of corruption, they suggest, referring to African 
States, that the state is an empty shell and political disorder, of which corruption is 
one of the effects, is nothing else than a deliberate and profitable strategy.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a general agreement among political scientists as to the 
way to fight corruption, known as "The law of démocratisation". The latter maintains 
that the degree of corruption varies inversely to the degree that power is consensual 
(Friedrich, 1989). Recent research on the impact of regime type on the level of cor­
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ruption found that there exists a negative relation between the two, but it is not very 
strong. The level of corruption was significantly reduced solely in the case of deep 
democracy (Amundsen, 1999). For instance, it has been highlighted that democracy in­
creases the likelihood of exposure, therefore the chance for revealing corrupt officials 
is higher (Diamond and Plattner, 1996; Quah, 1999).
Fiowever, it is not clear whether or not démocratisation has any effect on reducing the 
level of corruption or vice versa (Andwig et al., 2000). Goldsmith (1999) noted that 
competitive politic scenarios might be a breeding ground for questionable political 
influence with respect to rising funds. Moreover, office-seekers might sell their polit­
ical influence to big companies or buy votes from groups of voters. Harris-White and 
White (1996) observed that in the Philippines and Thailand the process of démocrat­
isation has led to a higher level of corruption.
Since the early 1990s corruption was also seen to be not just a cultural, moral and 
historical issue but also a political problem (Galtung and Pope, 1999). Corruption 
seems to affect all the instruments available to a modem state to maintain stability, 
extract taxes, implement development policies and redistribute resources, therefore 
to transform the economy according to political priorities (Andwig et al., 2000). One 
of the most dangerous scenarios brought about by research on corruption outlined 
above implies the manipulation of political rules and procedure for private benefit. 
The danger lies in the lack of political will to face the problem: the power holders do 
not wish to change the system of which they are the main and sole profiteers (Amund­
sen, 1999). Some African States' leaders and bureaucrats are a sad example of such a 
scenario.
2.4 Cultural and normative foundation of corruption
Although economists and political scientists have taken the lead in recent research on 
corruption (Price, 1999), it is widely acknowledged that corruption is strongly embed­
ded in local cultures, institutions cmd social behaviours. De Sardan (1996) outlines 
several social norms and behaviours that facilitate the rise of corruption. These are: 
the fluid and always negotiable "rule of the game", many brokers and middlemen.
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gift-giving practice, networks of solidarity, collusion and extended predatory forms of 
authority.
Another stream of research (Bicchieri, 2006a) maintains that situations featuring two 
or many conflicting ethical norms might cause corruption. People tend to transgress 
if there is a conflict of two ethical norms or there is one norm that could be applied 
in different ways. By facing an ambiguous situation without ethical guidance, people 
are more likely to transgress. Therefore in situations with a lack of communication 
between individuals, unethical behaviour can flourish: for example, one of the out­
comes of this line of thinking can be observed when a corrupt practice is thought to 
be legal. According to Bicchieri (2006a), research on ambiguous situations, where the 
ethically correct path is unclear, is needed to understand corruption (see Section 3.3.2 
for a more detailed explanation).
Furthermore, several studies that are not directly aimed at fighting corruption, but 
more so at understanding complex social settings, can be used to understand the 
causes of corruption. Perhaps one of the most relevant is the Weberian rational-legal 
bureaucratic model (Weber, 1958). Bureaucracy was conceived as a tool for the realisa­
tion of complex and ambiguous environments. A key point in Weber's idea of bureau­
cracy is rationality. He suggests that bureaucracy is a rational-legal form conceived to 
foster the rationalisation of organisational tasks and goals. The wide adoption of this 
form has its roots in the intention to protect natural rights legally. Indeed, one of the 
main aims is to eliminate particularism. The bureaucratic organisation involves the 
following necessary criteria: the specification of jurisdictional areas, the hierarchical 
organisation of roles, a clear and intentionally established system of decision-making 
rules, the restriction of the use of bureau property by the bureau, the compensation by 
salary of appointed officials, and the professionalisation of the bureaucratic role into 
a tenured lifelong career. The idea of bureaucracy suggests that rules, norms, merit, 
regulations, and stability are paramount to the operation of government. Therefore, 
by implementing the bureaucratic model, interactions among social actors might be 
regulated and driven towards licit outcomes, cmd corruption might be decreased or 
even eliminated.
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Of course, there has been much controversy surrounding the rationality behind Weber's 
bureaucratic model. This is a western concept (Wood, 1994, pp 520). As reported by 
Price (1999) in an Indian case study, government employees are repeatedly confronted 
with demands not described in official rules. Ward (1989) even states that corruption 
"humanises" the workings of bureaucracy.
The complex issue social scientists face in dealing with corruption is well captured by 
Andwig (2000, pp 66):
[corruption] is a social act and its meaning must be understood with 
reference to the social relationship between people in historically specific 
settings. A transaction is now a legal one, now illegal, depending upon the 
social context of the transaction.
De Sardan (1996) claims that corruption has to be seen beyond the strict sense of the 
word, i.e., nepotism, abuse of power and the like. What seems to be a satisfactory 
alternative is a more m odem  view of the complexity of the social behaviors involved. 
It becomes relevant to evaluate people on their own practice. What seems to be a first 
achievement of the sociological approach is that an understanding of cormption has 
to be sought within a wider social cultural context.
Therefore it is necessary to differentiate this or that social context according to societal 
or more specifically group features. Moreover, a second relevant contribution appears 
to be the methodology proposed by Blundo and de Sardan (2000), where corruption 
can be understood if it is seen from the actor's point of view, through monitoring and 
observing participants. To conclude, in order to provide a sociological understanding 
of corruption it is necessary to study both cultural features and participants' beha­
viours within a specific group setting.
2.5 Organisational features for understanding corruption
2.5.1 Causes of corruption
As shown in Section 2.4, one line of thinking in economic realms directly links cor­
ruption to economic development. The arm's-length principle holds that in economic
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transactions with more than one actor, personal relations play no role. Based on this 
principle Treisman (2000) and Tanzi (2000) agree that since economic development 
increases education and depersonalised relationships, developed countries are less 
exposed to the misuse of public office. Corruption is seen as a break of the arm's- 
length principle (Myrdal, 1968a; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Paldam (2000) suggests 
another way to express the same understanding of the phenomenon, namely, honesty 
increases with the level of income.
Several scholars have drawn attention to another aspect that could be a determinant 
for corruption. This concerns the distribution of power between centre and periphery. 
There are basically two opposing schools of thought. In the late 1900s Proudhon and 
Vernon stated (1979):
[a centralised state] instead of serving its citizens and communities, ex­
propriates and crushes them. Soon corruption, embezzlement and laxness 
enter the system...[which] collapses into autocracy and immobility.
Accordingly, many other researchers suggested that decentralisation could reduce the 
impact of corruption (Enemuo, 2000; Oates, 1972; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Wunsch and 
Olowu, 1990). By contrast Banfield (1975) states that since potential corrupters have 
to control only part of the government, decentralised systems are more prone to being 
corrupted. From a case study in Tanzania it emerged that due to an extremely high 
level of decentralisation of the fiscal power, corruption was highly embedded in the 
local administrations (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000). Overall, this line of thinking does 
not seem to shed any further light on the problem.
A different approach was suggested by Wei (2000). He claims that high trade volumes 
could deter corruption. Wei defines a country's openness as the sum of two elements: 
firstly, natural openness, which involves unchangeable factors such as geography, lan­
guage and population size; secondly, residual openness, which includes trade policy. 
The former cannot be easily managed by public officials, whereas the latter is affected 
by their decisions. By testing his hypothesis he finds out that countries that are more 
"naturally" open manifest less corruption, furthermore he claims that this effect is
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even more relevant than the level of development. However, his analysis does not 
provide any clear policy implication, since "residual" openness, on which govern­
ment can exercise control, is only weakly related to the level of corruption (Andwig 
et al., 2000).
To summarise, organisational features that are thought to be important in order to 
understand the causes of corruption are: economic developments, wages of public 
officials and trade volumes. Contrarily, the centralization of organisational structures 
does not seem to provide any further understanding of the causes of corruption.
2.5.2 Consequences of corruption
Among the scholars that study corruption there is a line of thinking that argues that 
corruption is not economically damaging for a society. The argument put forward 
by these scholars is rooted in Merton's (1948; 1968) concept of latent functions of the 
political machinery. The ultimate idea behind his 1948 article was to prove how public 
officials gaining illicit profit due to their privileged position were meeting social needs 
not met by government institutions. Accordingly, the process of buying and selling 
political favours has been seen as a way to achieve political and economic advantages 
(Leff, 1989; Nye, 1967; P. Huntington, 1968). Samuel Hantington says (P. Huntington, 
1968):
in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with 
a rigid, over-centralised dishonest bureaucracy, is one with a rigid, over­
centralised honest bureaucracy.
In Contrast, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) suggest that the "grease" theory of paying 
bribes involves paying a higher cost. However, there is little evidence to prove either 
line of thinking to be right or wrong (Goldsmith, 1999).
In the same domain, Mauro (1995) investigated the extent to which corruption affects 
the rate of investments. He claims that corruption has negative repercussions on the 
ratio of investment to GDP. Other scholars support Mauro's findings (Brunetti et al., 
1997; Brunetti and Weder, 1998; Elliott, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 1995). By contrast.
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Wedeman (1997) points out that Mauro treats corruption as an "undifferentiated phe­
nomenon", implying that the effects of corruption depend also on its form and not 
just on its size. Campos et al. (1999) challenge Mauro's result by asking why East 
Asian countries with high levels of corruption can grow faster than other develop­
ing countries. The way they address such a question is by introducing the notion of 
"predictability", in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain 
those favors. They find that regimes in which corruption is more predictable have less 
negative impact on investments than others in which corruption is less predictable.
Although many studies (Mauro, 1995, 1997; Wedeman, 1997) have reported a strong 
correlation between GDP per capita and ranking on corruption indexes (see Section 
5.3), there is less agreement on the relation between corruption and economic growth. 
Lambsdroff (1999) sheds doubts on the robustness of the findings on this issue. He 
argues that since corruption affects mainly the accumulation of capital, a direct link 
between corruption and growth will not always be observed. However, substantial 
repercussions are observed as pointed out by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), who highlight 
three effects: higher public investment, lower government revenues and lower quality 
of public infrastructure. As far as public investments are concerned, assuming a high 
level of corruption, intuitively a higher level of illicit incomes is expected by fostering 
large projects rather than those focused on smaller social infrastructure. However, as 
yet there is not enough empirical evidence to support such a hypothesis (Lambsdorff, 
1999; Mauro, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
If political corruption directly affects the general quality of a government, then an­
other consequence can be seen in the way public organisations are ruled. An inter­
esting hypothesis originally put forward by Myrdal (1968b), and successively held 
by Rose-Akerman (1978) and Tanzi (1998), maintains that the scope of public sector 
regulations is deliberately enlarged by public officials in order to increase the private 
willingness to pay a bribe. Myrdal recalled a comment made by the 1964 Commit­
tee on the Prevention of Corruption in India to support the latter: it was observed that 
delaying the administrative process instead of speeding it up was a strategy to attract 
bribes. Similarly Winters (1996) noticed in Indonesia that the strongest opposition to
2.5. Organisational features for understanding corruption 21
tax reform came from tax officials, since they were the ones that had the most to lose.
Lambsdroff (1998) provides us with an interesting analysis of the effect of corruption 
on international trade. He affirms that for Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
South Korea there are advantages to trading with countries recognised to be corrupt, 
whereas Australia, Malaysia and Sweden report disadvantages. The difference can be 
seen in the exporter's willingness to pay bribes. So, he concludes, exporting coun­
tries have to be blamed as much as those importing. Another interesting aspect is 
put forward by Gatti (2000), who investigates the opportunities that might arise in in­
creasing the variation of import duties. By manipulating such a classification, customs 
officials might gain illicit income on the imported goods. The author also presented 
empirical confirmation. However, a weakness is acknowledged in the empirical re­
lation between trade barriers and corruption since only taxes are considered as trade 
barriers, whilst other tools are available such as inspections, clearances and the like 
(Andwig et al., 2000).
2.5.3 Roles and hierarchies
Insight into the economic theory of organisation is useful to unfold micro-economic 
explanations of corruption. Perhaps the most relevant work on the topic was proposed 
by Kiltgaard (1988), the principal-agent-client approach. Transactions are observed as 
the outcome of the interaction between three actors: an honest principal P, an agent A 
and a client C. For instance, in tax administration, A collects tax on behalf of P from 
C. Agents are assumed to be rational utility maximizers, therefore their decisions to 
behave honestly or illicitly derive from the calculation of potential gain or loss that 
might come from their behaviours. The core of the model is in the implementation 
of divergent objectives and asymmetric information between the actors involved. The 
principal's problem is to monitor opportunism and design an incentive scheme to 
foster honest behaviour. The agent has to exploit the information that only s /h e  can 
access in order to obtain maximum gain. The client wants to save money and pay less 
tax.
Most of the variables to reduce the problem of asymmetric information, such as: pay­
ment, monitoring, punishments, regulations, political and social environment (Rijck-
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eghem and Weder, 1997), fit neatly into the principal-agent-client model. However, 
there are at least two objections to this model: firstly, it does not take into account the 
existence of several principals competing among themselves, or the degree of family 
relationship or friendship among people; secondly the principal may him /herself be 
corrupt, contributing to a reduction in the moral costs connected with corruption. In 
such a scenario the principal-agent model framework breaks down (Andwig et al., 
2000).
As far as the relation between institutional set-ups (payments and monitoring) and 
corruption is concerned, it is acknowledged that in developing countries, the wages 
received by public sector employees are so low as to invite corruption (Chand and 
Moene, 1999; Mookherjee, 1997). The basic idea is that a rise in salary is like an increase 
in a fine for bribery, since it is what s /h e  will lose if s /h e  is caught. Empirical evid­
ence on the effects of wage incentives has been explored by Rijckeghem and Weder 
(Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). By considering the manufacturing sector in a sample 
of 28 countries, they observe a negative influence of the public sector salaries on the 
level of corruption. They claimed that doubling the wage will improve the corruption 
index of Transparency International by two points (it ranges between 0, indicating no 
corruption and 10. See Section 5.3.1). In countries where bureaucrats are well paid 
compared to the private sector, corruption seems to be less. Other scholars are less 
confident about the relation, pointing to different aspects that could be more relevant 
such as security of employment and meritocratic principles (Rauch and Evans, 2000; 
Treisman, 2000).
Basley and McLaren (1993) challenge Rijckeghem's and Weder's view. By maximising 
tax revenues net of wages cost, they relate the wage to both the fraction of potential 
employees who are corruptible in the pool from which they are recruited, and the 
effectiveness of monitoring dishonest behaviours. According to them, in order to de­
crease corrupt behaviour, civil servants' wages have to be set in accordance with a 
well-established ethic of loyalty and honesty within the civil service as well as there 
being an efficient way to measure it (McLaren, 1996). For instance, as defined by the 
authors, let reservation wage be the salary that a tax collector would earn in alternative 
employment, and efficiency wage is strictly above whereas capitulation wage is strictly
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below. So, the reservation wage is optimal with effective monitoring and a low fraction 
of dishonesty across the pool. The efficiency wage is optimal when monitoring is not 
effective and there is a high fraction of dishonesty. The authors claim that the capitu- 
altion wage is optimum for civil servants under condition of insufficient monitoring 
and high fraction of potential dishonesty within the pool from which employees are 
recruited. In this scenario just dishonest employees are attracted.
The principal-agent model sheds light on some of the fundamental aspects involved 
in bureaucratic corruption. However, there are at least two limitations: given similar 
wages and monitoring devices, it is not possible to explain the observed variations 
in corruption levels between public institutions; in many developing countries low 
penalties and wages are set, so based on the logic of the principal-agent model most of 
the civil servants would be corrupt, but this is not the case, surprisingly many behave 
honestly (Andvig, 1993).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the idea used by several scholars to explain variations in corrup­
tion levels. This is known as the multiple equilibrium model, and it is often referred 
to as a Schelling (1973) diagram. On the x-axis the number of corrupt officials is in­
dicated, and the payoff of a transaction is measured on the y-axis. The honest curve 
shows the payoff for a completely honest employee with increasing corruption. It is 
assumed that the more corruption, the smaller the payoff for an honest official.
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Figure 2.1: Multiple equilibrium model. 
Source: Andvig (1993)
The model has three equilibrium points A, B and C; D is the maximum payoff for 
corrupt behaviours. At A all are honest, their utility is above the corrupt option. At 
C, all are corrupted and it will not pay to be honest. These two equilibrium points are 
stable, small changes in the number of corrupted people will bring the system back to 
its initial state. At B, civil servants are indifferent to behaving honestly or dishonestly. 
B is unstable, if one person switches from honest to corrupt, then it pays to behave 
dishonestly, and ultimately all choose the corrupt option, and viceversa.
This model, although theoretical, might contribute to addressing the two observed 
phenomena mentioned above: it is possible to observe different levels of corruption 
with the same institutional set-up; small changes in the number of corrupted officials 
might have big effects on the corruption level.
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2.6 Conclusions
Ever since the early 1990s the Hobbesian market theory has been the groundwork to 
frame and understand corruption. Actors are thought to be dishonest. Therefore, in 
any transaction that is not based on previous relations a referee is needed. This creates 
a position of power during the transaction in which lie public or quasi-public organ­
isations such as mafias or the like, and it is there that corruption takes place. Such a 
power has generated an elite that by exploiting such positions maintains its control 
and accumulates wealth and power. Corruption can be thought of as one element of 
the accumulation strategy of such a ruling elite. The system seems to be self-enforcing 
and hard to modify. It is of paramount importance to provide an understanding of 
those social mechanisms that bring about such a self enforcing and resilient accumu­
lation system of the ruling elite.
In order to do so, the most relevant results from the social sciences with respect to cor­
ruption are proposed. It is acknowledged that economic growth and démocratisation 
have an effect on reducing the level of corruption.
From the research described above emerges an insightful guideline to address cor­
ruption: in order to provide a sociological understanding of the phenomenon, it is 
necessary to study both group features and participants' behaviours within a specific 
setting.
Economists have studied corruption extensively, nonetheless there is still much to be 
done. Main findings regard the identification of likely causes: decentralisation, salar­
ies, economic development; and likely consequences: rate of investments, economic 
growth, large and ambiguous public sector regulations, mtemational trade; and fi­
nally micro-economic explanations: payments, monitoring, punishments, regulations, 
political and social environment. This body of literature offers the most relevant and 
perhaps useful results to understand corruption.
In this study a sociological understanding of corruption is proposed. Therefore, the 
analysis will follow what previous research has identified as relevant in order to un­
derstand corruption, namely: small groups features and the determination of those 
social mechanisms that might cause corruption.
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Chapter 3
Sociological understanding of 
corruption
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a sociological understanding of corruption. This is a contribu­
tion to the body of research on corruption since it analyses those social mechanisms 
that generate widespread corruption, rather than identifying those legal or illicit prac­
tices or behaviours that single individuals are keen to adopt in order to gain illegal 
profit.
Court cases, investigation reports and academic works are presented to highlight how, 
given a set of group features, corruption is endemic and resilient.
In order to provide a sociological understanding of corruption as well as supplying 
useful tools to fight it efficiently, it is crucial to point out: firstly, the sort of social reg­
ularities that are brought about by corrupt practices; secondly, a way to differentiate 
group features in order to infer whether a certain group might favour and legitimate 
corruption more than another; thirdly, how those regularities affect and are affected 
by actions taken by individuals; and, finally, a formalisation of the above key features 
so that they can be modelled and tested. In this respect, a sketch of an agent-based 
model is proposed at the end of this chapter and will be more extensively described 
in Chapter 7.
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In Section 3.2 the research question is put forward by highlighting core conditions 
needed to observe corruption; pointing out social regularities brought about by cor­
rupt practices; and finally, identifying which task has to be addressed in order to ex­
plain such observations. In Section 3.3 an understanding of corruption is provided 
by combining specific group settings, normative and generative explanations. Finally, 
Section 3.4 concludes by summarising the main findings and their relevance to the 
topic.
3.2 The research question
The research question addressed in this work arises from several observed regularit­
ies. The research question can be summarised as follows:
• To what extent do group features affect individual decision processes in enga­
ging in corrupt practices?
Most academic research on corruption has pointed to illegal transactions between 
private and public sectors (Heidenheimer et al., 1989), or has studied the exploita­
tion of formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) for private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains (Nye, 1967). The soci­
ological understanding of corruption needed to answer the research question above 
considers several key aspects that have not been taken into account in previous re­
search. The alternative way of studying corruption proposed in this work is a first 
step towards an understanding of the effect that corruption has on society. Moreover, 
it is observed that the effect of corruption on society triggers social mechanisms that 
produce endemic and resilient corrupt practices, and therefore the perpetuation of a 
state of social decay. Social decay is understood as a general lowering of the qual­
ity of life; where, although taxes are paid to the Government, public services are not 
provided as expected and therefore citizens' quality of life is considerably reduced. 
Examples are: loss in health funds, where allocated funds do not reach clinics and 
hospitals; loss of natural resources, where ruthless management of public resources 
wastes primary goods; and many more. Unfortunately in a society, there are so many 
vital aspects that cem be affected by corruption that it is a threat not just for economic 
growth but also for the general quality of life.
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In this research, examples and observations from Italy, among others countries, are put 
forward to highlight stylised facts and features of corruption. Italy is, unfortunately, 
a very good case to observe. It is a western democracy, one of the biggest economy in 
the world, it has an effective and active legal system, and corruption is widely spread. 
In fact, consider Italy as an example of the effects of endemic and resilient corruption 
in a society. Mr. Bettino Craxi was an ItaUan politician, who was elected Secretary 
of the Socialist party in the early 1980s. He was Prime Minister between 1983 and 
1987 and one of the main personalities in the Italian political scene until 1994. In 1992 
he was convicted of several crimes in a major trial, named Tangentopoli (Bribesville), 
that involved almost the whole political body of those days and in 1994 he fled the 
country to avoid jaU. During the twenty years he was present on the political scene, 
Italian public debt almost doubled. In the 80s Italy's debt was in line with the richest 
European countries, around 60% of GDP, at the end of Craxi's political career it was al­
most double at 118%, where the average of same index for all European countries grew 
to around 80%^. In 2010, a substantial part of the taxes paid by the Italian population 
served to stabilise this debt at around 120% of GDP, by far the highest in Europe; this 
money could have been spent on things from which Italy's people could have bene- 
fitted, and not just used to alleviate the problems caused by the criminal management 
Italy had during those years.
In 2010, Italian politicians commemorated the ten years since Mr. Bettino Craxi's 
death. MP Mr. Sacconi remembered Mr. Craxi as "a political genius"^. Mayor of 
Milan Mrs Letizia Moratti wanted to name a square after Craxi^ and Senate President 
Mr. Roberto Schifani said: "Craxi was a sacrificial victim of the Tangentopoli tragedy"
4
Within Italian society there is a huge fracture between politicians and the population. 
Italian society perceives politicians to be uninterested in capturing, reporting and in­
terpreting popular opinion,and only interested m creating a thick shield to protect 
themselves from the law, no matter what the charge, no matter what the effect on the
^Source statistic: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=GOV_DEBT# 
^Source: La Stampa, 17th January 2010
^Source: La Repubblica, October 15th 2009 
^Source: II Giornale, 19th January 2010
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country. A further example is the so called lex ad personam. This is a latin saying that 
means a law made for a single person. This saying was created by the media after laws 
were introduced by the Xlll and XIV Italian Legislature to favour Mr Silvio Berlusconi 
in a number of court cases.
The account above is just one of many cases around the world where political corrup­
tion has brought distress and social decay to the whole of society. It is also possible 
to detect the lack of political will to fight corruption and make sure that convicted in­
dividuals pay for their illicit actions. Besides, the only aim of corrupt politicians is to 
enhance and protect their own businesses.
The definition of corruption put forward in Chapter 1 as well as the sociological un­
derstanding proposed in this work is a first step towards understanding those mech­
anisms that have brought about scenarios like the one described above. The idea of 
corruption as a discrimination process based on gain (Chapter 1) represents well the 
sort of corruption depicted above. The political class' choices and actions aim to evade 
the "bureaucratic system" to the point of them being tailor-made in order to satisfy 
their needs. The results of such manoeuvres help the people in charge to keep their 
power thus preventing others from stepping in and implementing different policies.
3.2.1 Regularities about corruption
3.2.1.1 Corruption is endemic
A third of Naples' suburbs' inhabitants (almost 4 million people) are involved in trials 
or are under security measures (Girolamo, 2009). Public prosecutor Antonio Clemente 
said (Bocca, 2006)
Naples' problem is not solely Secondigliano [a Neapolitan neighbour­
hood] or the common people that live in the quartieri [he refers to Quartieri 
Spagnoli, another Neapolitan neighbourhood], there is outstanding wide­
spread illegality over each level of the society.
Apparently, illegality is part of the culture in south Italy and it is found across all 
of society. Santa Maria Capua Vetere public prosecutor Mariano Maffei, during his 
^Direct translation from Italian.
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investigation into several instances of public outsourcing in 2007, claimed that out­
sourcing systematically to the most "sponsored" candidate or company as opposed 
to the most appropriate one has always happened and likely always will (di Case- 
rta, 2008). Even medical doctors are nominated by head physicians through political 
sponsorship (Stella, 2007). Most dramatically, although strict regulations and efficient 
monitoring systems exist in the Municipality of Naples it is almost impossible to fire 
civil servants convicted of bribery, fraud and Mafia affiliation (Scolamiero, 2007).
In an environment where public outsourcing is biased and there is no such thing as 
meritocracy, medical doctors can gain more and more responsibility as a result of their 
political networks instead of their knowledge and experience. Corrupt behaviour is 
not punished, so there is no reason why a politician should stop accepting a large num ­
ber of votes for a few favours, or criminals should stop exploiting these widespread 
and accepted immoral behaviours to increase their volume of business. Daily corrupt 
practices are the connecting point between politicians and criminal organisations. The 
European Commission (2008) itself engaged in a study to examine the links between 
organised crime and corruption. Although this study recognised the lack of research 
on the topic, it stated clearly that organised crime exploits widespread corruption to 
increase its volume of profit and control territories and markets.
The effect of corruption on a population and the consequent loop of self-sustaining 
corrupt practices can be found when considering the processes to embark on a polit­
ical career in Italy. According to prosecutor Roberto Scarpinato (1992), there are two 
different selection processes to access a public administrator career in Italy. Firstly, 
there is an institutional one, where the candidate goes through all the examinations 
and tests that are defined by the law. Secondly, there is a social one, where a poten­
tial public administrator along with always more accurate and severe anti-corruption 
monitoring procedures has to accept the possibility of dealing with continuous threats 
from criminal organisations or corrupt individuals. Such an undesired selection mech­
anism might either cut off "normal" people from a political career (Girolamo, 2009), 
or it might force the potential public administrator into adopting corrupt practices. 
Either way, since it unequivocally makes things far more complicated, and often more 
dangerous, it impedes likely talented politicians from following their own ideas that
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might move things in different and perhaps better directions. All the corrupt prac­
tices that are observed and performed during administrative activities, among others, 
make a sort of "unnatural" selection, which certain kinds of people can access and 
others cannot. These people are either directly related to criminal organisations or are 
inclined to corrupt practices. The real evaluation process for a public administrator 
does not only work according to agreed regulations or laws, but also according to 
some sort of tacit social mechanism generated by a consistent use of corrupt practices. 
Eventually, normal people with a normal morality are forced to give up their desire to 
engage with a career in public administration. Dealing with criminals and managing 
threats are additional aspects that are brought about by widespread use of corruption. 
This affects the people who want to engage in a political career favouring the main­
tenance of corruption. This would eventually lead to greater restrain amongst new 
public administrators (Girolamo, 2009). By iterating this reasoning, such a scenario 
will end up with a situation in which there is no room for "normal" people, leaving 
public officials or even criminal organisations to act as they will.
Franchetti (2000) observed these same public administrator selection processes in his 
study of Sicily dating back to 1876. Perhaps this historical lack of "normal" people 
within the institutions is the reason why part of the Italian political body, fortunately 
not all, is seen as thoroughly corrupt. Another, even more dangerous, social effect of 
corruption is that Italians do not feel surprised, offended, angry or capable of doing 
anything anymore, when it is reported that in several districts in South Italy, just a 
few people, and always the same ones, have access to public outsourcing. DDA^ Pro­
secutor Roberto Cantone's report dated 2003, concerning the investigation of several 
criminal actions in one of the districts of Caserta in the 1990s, found that the allocation 
of public works worth more than 150 million of the old Italian Lira (almost £62,000) 
were driven by corrupted practices towards companies led by the same people. And 
the latter is just one of the large number of reported cases (Anticorruzione, 2007b).
Corruption is a complex problem that needs to be investigated, not just by looking at 
the single act of deciding whether or not to accept a bribe for personal greed, but also 
at the kind of social dynamic that it creates and how this evolves and sustains itself.
® Anti-Mafia Department Direction
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3.2.1.2 Corruption is resilient
This deep root of corrupt practices within the Italian population, along with the gen­
eration of social mechanisms that sustain and embed themselves into the institutions, 
also generates high resilience. No matter how many key corrupt individuals are con­
victed, corruption re-emerges. When high profile political figures get involved in cor­
rupt practices, it is very difficult to fight and try to eradicate corruption from society. 
Records of political figures in collusion with criminal organisations in Italy date back 
more than 150 years. In 1869, a political election in Reggio Calabria was annulled be­
cause of clear evidence of political parties forced to trade with criminals (Forgione, 
2008). Fracchetti (2000) reported that, a few years later, in 1876, central figures of the 
Italian political body were strongly connected to several criminals. The chief of Police 
of Palermo, between 1898 and 1900, stated that local criminals were protected by sen­
ators and members of the Parliament (Lupo, 1993). In 1982, the Italian Government 
introduced the Law 416bis that recognises several crimes as corruption related.
It is not easy to fight corruption especially if one wants to do it seriously. The account 
below is an example of resilient corruption.
Between 1904 and 1915, Cesare Mori struck the strongest blow at the mafia, he almost 
set Sicily free of it. His work was so efficient that MP Nunzio Masi, Mori's biggest 
political enemy and later convicted of embezzlement, eventually managed to trans­
fer him to Florence (Girolamo, 2009). In 1915 Italy was at war and deserters from the 
whole national territory moved to Sicily to join the bandits kingdom. They occupied part 
of the province of Trapani, Caltanisetta and Agrigento militarily, and the Italian State 
decided to send Mori to solve the problem. He had one more opportunity. Mori came 
back to Sicily and in two years erased the bandits from the region completely (Petacco, 
1975). A third and perhaps even stronger blow to the mafia was ordered by the Italian 
dictator Benito Mussolini in 1925. Mori was assigned to lead the investigations. This 
time he had time and chance to carry out a more thorough investigation of the insti­
tutional root of the mafia and all the corrupt practices that were going on. Several 
institutional figures were charged. MP Alfredo Cucco, General Antonio Di Giorgio, 
up to the Home Sub-Secretary Michele Bianchi are some examples (Girolamo, 2009).
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The lesson leam t form Mori experience is that the work of police, prosecutors and 
civilians does not seem to reach the deep nucleus of this phenomenon. Corruption 
generates a social mechanism that efficiently attracts people to conform to corrupt 
practices. It did not really matter how strongly the system was attacked, nor how 
many criminals were convicted, corruption re-emerged and spread again over Italian 
society. Newspapers, TV news, blogs and all sorts of media report cases of collusion 
between politicians and the mafia (Morlino, 1996), and corruption is one of the tools 
they use to achieve their objectives. Moreover, only a few, and in some circumstances 
none, of those political figures are convicted.
3.2.1.3 Endemic and resilient corruption brings about social decay
When a sudden and likely dangerous natural or social event strikes a nation the Gov­
ernment calls a "state of emergency". The garbage crisis in Naples in 2008 and the 
earthquake in L'Aquila in 2009 are two examples of recent emergency situations in 
Italy. In such circumstances the Government can outsource to any company or per­
son without the need for a call for tenders^. This might sound reasonable, because 
there is no time to waste, and the main purpose is to bring things back to normality. 
One of the most dangerous outcomes of a close relationship between politicians and 
criminal organisations is managing these kinds of situations. Corrupt public officers 
that control such vital procedures might outsource to the most "sponsored" company, 
without considering the efficiency and reliability of the tender, thus putting at risk the 
well-being of the population. Often, the tender does not complete the job within the 
agreed time, and then asks for and obtains extra money to complete it. This asking for 
extra money at the end of the contract seems to be a strategy that regularly emerges 
from biased call for tenders. In 2011, although several million euros^ have been spent, 
in Naples there is still the garbage crisis^, and L'Aquila is still destroyed. This mafia­
like way to create new business has now been extended to normal events. Recently, 
the Italian Government widened the range of emergency situations. Today in Italy, 
the Pope visiting Assisi, the Italy-Russia summit, the G8 Italian Presidency in 2009,
^Law nr. 224 art. 5.1992.
®http;/ /  www.althesys.com/?s=rifiuti+napoli
h^ttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ en / pressroom/content/20110203IPR13103/html/Campania- 
waste-crisis-Italy-must-comply-with-EU-rules-before-release-of-funds
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the 2009 swimming world championship,and the celebration of 150 years of Italian 
unification are just a few examples of what by "state of emergency" the XVI Italian 
Legislature^® means.
One of the ultimate effects of corruption is a continuous lowering of the quality of life, 
purposely maintained to line the pockets of a few individuals.
3.2.2 The task to account for these regularities
Firstly, corruption is not observed in all western representative democracies; it is en­
demic in certain societies and rare in others. In order to understand corruption it is of 
paramount importance to understand what societal features favour the maintenance 
of such a phenomenon. There is agreement among various scholars that distinctive 
social features influence a wide variety of social phenomena (Hofstede, 1983; House 
et al., 2002). For instance, values and culture strongly influence personal behaviours 
(Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Rokeach, 1972). Moreover, cultural features may 
also affect individual perception of ethical situations (Scott et al., 1993). Therefore, dif­
ferent social features are expected to influence the existence of corruption (Seleim and 
Bontis, 2009). In section 3.3.1 a procedure to infer the extent to which corrupt prac­
tices are upheld based on group features is proposed. Such a procedure is based on 
empirical measures of individuals' practices and values.
Secondly, an understanding of why, although corruption is prohibited and prosec­
uted, it is widespread and tolerated, is a task to be addressed. It is of importance to 
investigate under what conditions an individual conforms to a corrupt practice.
Finally, the central aim of this work is to understand the dynamic produced by those 
group features that bring about corruption. Therefore, a generative explanation of 
corruption is the objective.
3.3 Explanation for corruption
3.3.1 Defining group features
In order to define a set of group features that can be used to infer the extent to which 
an individual conforms to corrupt practices, the concept of culture is employed. In this
“http://www.parlamento.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/34069.htm
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work, however, there is no attempt to put forward a culturally based understanding 
of corruption, rather, to propose a technique that allows for the definition of a set of 
group features significantly related to corruption. Those group features are formed by 
aggregating empirical observations of individuals' practices and values as discussed 
in Section 7.4.1. In this section, a brief description of the procedure employed to gather 
data about individuals' practices and values is illustrated, as well as which practices 
and values significantly correlate to corruption.
Data on individuals' values and practices have been gathered by the GLOBE Project 
(House et al., 2004). The GLOBE Project collected data from 18000 interviews over 61 
nations. The project shows that societal and organisational culture influences the kind 
of leadership found to be acceptable and effective by people within that culture^^.
The GLOBE project defines culture as follows: culture is a set of beliefs and values 
about what is desirable and undesirable in a community of people, and a set of formal 
and informal practices to support those values (Javidan and House, 2001). Beliefs 
are people's perceptions of how things are done in their country (House et al., 2002). 
Values are people's aspirations about the way things should be done (House et al., 
2002).
The reason why the GLOBE project is used is because, at present, its results are the 
only one that have been correlated with corruption. In a recent study Selein and Bontis 
(2009) compared the GLOBE dataset (House et al., 2004) with the Corruption Percep­
tion Index (CPI).
The GLOBE project (House et al., 2002,2004) identifies nine dimensions of values and 
practices: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, performance orientation, future ori­
entation, assertiveness, institutional collectivism, individual collectivism, gender egal­
itarianism and hum an orientation.
As mentioned above, Selein and Bontis (2009) compared the GLOBE dataset with the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). CPI has been conducted by a team of researchers at 
the University of Passau in Germany for Transparency International from 1996 to the
^^http://www.capacity.org/capacity/opencms/en/topics/leadership-development/selected- 
readings-project-globe-understanding-cultures-and-implicit-leadership-theories-across-the-globe.html
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present day (see Section 5.3.1 for a detailed description). Among policy makers, the 
CPI is the most widely disseminated index to measure country perception of corrup­
tion (Svensson, 2005). Its validity and reliability have been documented in Lancaster 
and Montinola (1997) and will be discussed in Chapter 5. Selein and Bontis' statistical 
analysis highlighted that the higher the level of individual collectivism practices, the 
higher the level of corruption; a moderate level of hum an orientation practices correl­
ates to a higher level of corruption; and the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance 
values, the higher the level of corruption.
Next a brief description of how these three dimensions were collected and some ex­
amples of the kind of values and practices they represent is provided, together with a 
replication of Selein and Bontis' (2009) analyses. For consistency, from now on features 
is used instead of dimensions.
Individual collectivism practices were measured through a set of four questions, fo­
cused on the degree to which institutional practices at the societal level encourage 
and reward collective actions (House et al., 2004). More specifically, the four questions 
assessed whether: group loyalty is emphasised at the expense of the individual, eco­
nomic systems emphasise individual or collective interests, being accepted by other 
group members is important, individuals or group members are valued more in soci­
ety (House et al., 2004). According to House et. al. (2004), societies characterised by 
high individual collectivism have the following features among others: individuals 
look after themselves or their immediate families, individual goals take precedence 
over group goals, a more nuclear family structure, and attitudes and personal needs 
are important determinants of behaviour. Within these societies family members and 
close friends have strong expectations of each other; they can break rules and legal 
procedures to meet such expectations (Seleim and Bontis, 2009). Moreover, it is very 
common to favour a close friend or family member in recruiting or allocating rewards 
and promotions (Javidan and House, 2001).
Human oriented practices were examined through a set of five questions, which meas­
ured the following societal constructs: being concerned, sensitivity towards others, 
friendly, tolerant of mistakes, and generous (House et al., 2004). According to House
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et. al. (2004), societies characterised by low hum an orientation have, the following 
features: self-interest is important, values of pleasure, comfort and self-enjoyment 
have high priority, power and material possessions motivate people, lack of support 
for others, predominance of self-enhancement, people are expected to solve personal 
problems on their own. These features are observed in societies that are economically 
developed, m odem  and urbanised (Kabasakal and Bodur, 2004).
Uncertainty avoidance measures the extent to which members of collectives seek or­
derliness, consistency, stmcture, formalised procedures and laws to cover situations 
in their daily lives (House et al., 2004). Four questions addressed the uncertainty 
avoidance value. According to House et. al., societies characterised by high uncer­
tainty avoidance have the following features: a tendency toward formalising their 
interactions with others, inhibit new product development but facilitate the imple­
mentation stage through risk aversion and tight controls, and show strong resistance 
to change. In such societies well-estabHshed norms, mles, policies and procedures 
are preferred, although these lead to some conditions that can promote cormption 
(Getz and Volkema, 2001). An excessive bureaucratic^^ structure might encourage un­
ethical behaviours, since people may perceive to work through informal channels to 
achieve personal goals (Getz and Volkema, 2001). A positive and significant correl­
ation between uncertainty avoidance and corruption was already found in previous 
research (Davis and Ruhe, 2003).
The correlation between CPI and individual collectivism practices is positive and sig­
nificant (Seleim and Bontis, 2009) with p  =  0.69, Figure 3.1^ .^ North and Central 
Furopean countries like the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Fngland and Austria lie 
on the top right comer of the plot with high individual collectivism and high CPI; 
Italy, Hungary and Greece lie on the bottom left comer with low perception of cor­
m ption (for a discussion about the interpretation of cormption indexes see Section 
5.3) and low individual collectivism; France, Slovenia, Spain and Portugal occupy the 
central part of the plot; uniquely Poland has a relatively high individual collectivism
^^Here the term bureaucratic is understood in its general meaning as a form of government.
“^Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are produced by using House et. a l 's  (2004) dataset. Also, note that higher
score of the Corruption Perception Index means lower corruption.
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Figure 3.1: CPI vs Individual Collectivism for some European countries
score and low CPI. In Figure 3.2 CPI and hum an orientation are opposed. The cor­
relation is positive and significant (Seleim and Bontis, 2009) with p =  0.49. Again, 
Italy, Greece and Hungary score the lowest for hum an orientation, along with Poland, 
Spain, France and Germany. The Netherlands, Finland, Austria, England, Slovenia 
and Portugal are at the top right comer of the plot.
Observing Figure 3.3, a strong negative and significant correlation, p — —0.82, between 
CPI and uncertainty avoidance values can be observed. North and Central European 
countries are at the top right comer of the plot with low uncertainty avoidance and 
high CPI; at the bottom right comer are Italy, Greece and Hungary along with Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and Slovenia.
Overall, individual collectivism and uncertainty avoidance are strongly correlated 
with CPI; whereas hum an orientation seems to be less correlated with cormption, 
although the link is significant.
Different scores on these three features might define a different propensity to mani­
fest cormpt practices. Therefore, strong nuclear families with relatively strong ex­
pectations from family members or friends, coupled with the expectation of problem-
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solving on their own and a positive aspiration to find third entities to deal with reality 
and its uncertainty, might be seen as those group features that coexist with corruption.
3.3.2 Normative explanation
A way to understand why corruption is so widespread and tolerated, despite its pro­
hibition and control by tight regulations, can be found by comprehending how one 
decides to conform to a corrupt behaviour. Evidence gathered through several prosec­
utions associated with the Italian "Bribesville" scandal showed that often the parties 
involved in corrupt deals were not endorsing the corrupt practices they nevertheless 
obeyed (Bicchieri and Rovelli, 1995). Whether or not to conform to a corrupt behaviour 
presents the individual with a choice between two conflicting norms. Understanding 
which conditions drive such a choice is an essential part of the awareness of the en- 
demicity and resilience of corruption. A possible way to shed light on such conditions 
would be to look at theories of norms.
Social norms might be thought of as behavioural expectations that individuals hold 
over time in a counterfactual way; that is, individuals maintain these expectations 
despite disappointments (Luhmann, 1987). At the social level, such behavioural ex­
pectations produce the high resilience that characterises normative expectations.
Although norms are related to expected behaviours at the social level, they are an 
emergent phenomena from the interactions at the individual level. For Coleman, so­
cial norms describe the typical micro-macro relationship of social phenomena. As he 
recognised (Coleman, 1990, p. 244), "the emergence of norms is in some respect a pro­
totypical micro-to-macro transition, because the process must arise from individual 
actions yet a norm itself is a system-level property which affects the further actions 
of individuals, both the sanction applied by individuals who hold the norm and the 
actions in conformity with the norm.". Therefore, individuals in interaction generate 
norms, but, once stabilised, they are a system property, which affects individual beha­
viour by restricting the possible actions that individuals have. However, the power of 
norms to limit these alternatives for action does not mean that individual behaviour 
is socially determined. This would break the individual identity which generates the 
diversity of beliefs and opinions we can perceive daily among people. Rather, the
42 Chapters. Sociological understanding o f corruption
social realm only motivates to follow the orientation given by the stabilised normat­
ive expectations, but individuals always have the possibility to accept or reject those 
orientations. Otherwise, individuals would lose their capability to accept what they 
observe in the social realm, even though their behaviour can trigger variations that 
move social norms (and the social system in general) in unpredictable and contingent 
directions (Luhmann, 1996; Mascareno, 2008; Salgado and Gilbert, 2008). Hence, the 
social dynamic or micro-macro link that Coleman identified can be explained in the 
following terms: in an upward direction, the process of interaction among individuals 
continuously creates both some stable patterns of normative expectations and vari­
ations in those patterns. Conversely, in a downward direction, the relatively stabilised 
normative expectations exert a conditioning effect on the individuals' actions.
Since norms define expected behaviours, they can serve to identify and differentiate 
social groups. Sociology has defined a social group as a number of individuals who 
share a feeling of unity or are bound together in relatively stable patterns of interac­
tion, behaviours and opinions (Scott and Marshall, 2009). These patterns are defined 
by normative expectations, which the group members should follow when they are 
facing some specific topic in the social realm (how to act according to some symbolic 
event in the social realm). If there is a group of individuals, we suppose they share 
some norm. Hence, groups are thought to be key in order to understand corruption. 
Ever since the seminal work of Moscovici and Zavallni (1969), groups are seen as 
polarisers of extreme opinions: group judgments are more extreme than individual 
judgments. In the work presented here, corruption within small groups is studied. 
Groups are differentiated according to the three features described in Section 3.3.1.
However, most of the research on the topic offers little help. There is no understanding 
of the conditions under which individuals are likely to follow a norm or, when several 
norms apply, what makes one of them key (Bicchieri, 2006a). The common view that 
one conforms to norms either because of external sanctions or because they have been 
intemalied flies in the face of much evidence that people sometimes obey norms even 
in the absence of any obvious incentive structure or personal commitment to what the 
norm stands for (Cialdini et al., 1991). In situations where corruption might take place 
there is a lack of sufficient information or objective criteria to decide whether to be­
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have according to the rules or to engage in corrupt practices. In such conditions one 
faces a situation that is ambiguous and open to several possible interpretations. Ac­
cording to Bicchieri (2006a), the latter might cause one to act on mistaken beliefs and 
consequently conform to what seems to be the majority's positions; and, by doing so, 
will provide further evidence for the validity of the wrong beliefs. One observes oth­
ers' corrupt practices and wrongly infers that those are others' real intentions. There­
fore, illusory private deviance will be experienced as real as people perceive the norm 
to have universal support (Bicchieri, 2006a). As reported during the Italian scandal 
"Bribesville", the latter is often observed when individuals conform to corrupt beha­
viours (Bicchieri, 2006a).
In order to understand how one decides to behave when facing ambiguous situations, 
Bicchieri's condition (2006a, pp. 11) for a social norm to exist is adopted. Bicchieri's 
condition is particularly useful for addressing and understanding why people uphold 
behaviour that they might dislike or condemn. Furthermore, it stresses an important 
assumption: individuals do not perceive society as such, they infer individual prefer­
ences by observing their socially constructed behaviours. Therefore, ego perceives the 
society by observing alter's behaviour; furthermore ego has no access to the actual alter, 
but just to its social facade. Individuals' choices are influenced by the preferences of 
others, but the knowledge of those preferences are inferred from observation.
Let R be a corrupt behaviour for a situation of type S, where S is a situation in which 
there are conflicting behavioural rules but also a potential for joint gain. R is a corrupt 
behaviour in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset of conditional 
followers Pcf Q P  such that, for each individual i C Pcf
1. Contingency: i knows that R exists and applies to a situation of type S';
2. Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in a situation of type S on the 
condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P  con­
forms to R in situations of type S
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(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P  ex­
pects i to conform to R in situations of type S
(c) or Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently large 
subset of P  expects i to conform to R in situations of type S, prefers i to 
conform and may sanction behaviour.
This condition has three key points. Firstly, the corrupt behaviour is upheld only if 
the set Pcf is sufficiently large. Secondly, a population P  might conform to the corrupt 
behaviour whereas another population P' does not. Thirdly, a wrong understanding 
of other behaviours might force one to obey a non-endorsed behaviour.
As the author claims, the "sufficiently large subset Pcf Q P" clause reflects the fact 
that, even among conditional followers of a norm, some individuals may not follow 
the norm because their empirical and normative expectations have not been fulfilled. 
Different individuals will have different beliefs about the size of Pcf and thus have 
different empirical expectations. If so, they will have different thresholds for what 
sufficiently large means. What matters to actual conformity is that each individual in 
Pcf believes that h is/her threshold has been reached or surpassed.
i decides according to a contingent and a conditional condition. The former guaran­
tees that one knows that corrupt behaviours are actually upheld. The latter is met 
when one observes both: a large part of the society conforms to the corrupt behaviour, 
and that the same large part expects it to conform to the same corrupt behaviour. 
These conditions maintain two fundamental aspects. On the one hand, it is true that 
corruption is widespread, but of course it is not found in all of the society where it 
is observed, so the proposed understanding guarantees that some parts of the society 
uphold a corrupt behaviour whereas others do not. On the other hand, it preserves the 
observed attitude, that is to not endorse the corrupted behaviour that is nevertheless 
obeyed (Bicchieri and Rovelli, 1995).
3.3.3 Generative explanation
A generative explanation of a social phenomenon allows the testing of whether a set of 
micro-specifications are sufficient to generate the observed macro regularity (Epstein,
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1996). This type of explanation seems tailored to answer the research questions of this 
study. Hence, understanding the endemicity and resilience of corruption will consider 
bottom-up mechanisms. Unlike game theoretical approaches, it does not investigate 
the structure of payoffs which can promote and sustain corruption over time. Rather, 
it simulates the dynamic by which individuals, placed in some specific group setting, 
end up engaged in corrupt practices and perhaps, more interestingly, holding norms 
that are not necessarily the ones in which they believe. In order to do so, the group 
features and the normative explanations presented above will be put together into a 
model where individual micro-specifications wiU be formalised. In chapter 7 such 
specifications and their operationaliation are carefully described.
3.4 Summary and conclusion
This chapter presents a new understanding of corruption. Grand corruption in re­
gimes of western representative democracies is the phenomenon under analysis. The 
theoretical approach presented here highlights the following aspects: firstly, the core 
elements to observe corruption are identified: a public resource and a bureaucratic 
system for allocating such a public resource; secondly, the following social regularit­
ies are observed: corruption is endemic, corruption is resilient, and endemic and re­
silient corruption bring about social decay; thirdly, by combining group features and 
a normative explanation, a generative approach is used as a task for understanding 
corruption.
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Chapter 4
Formalising the understanding of 
corruption
4.1 Introduction
This chapter shows that agent-Based Modelling is identified as the most appropriate 
tool for providing a sociological understanding of the endimicity and resilience of 
corruption.
In Section 4.2 several methodological issues that arise in tackling the research ques­
tion are identified. In Section 4.3 the definition of ABM, along with the theoretical 
background, are provided in order to show how ABM can cope with those m ethod­
ological issues. Furthermore, the impact of ABM on social sciences is also discussed. 
In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 the scientific understanding provided by an ABM approach 
and a formalisation of such an approach are explained. Limitations of the proposed 
methodology are discussed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Problems tackling corruption
The research question stated in Section 3.2 is repeated below:
• What is the extent to which group features affect individuals' decision processes 
in engaging in corrupt practices?
47
48 Chapter 4. Formalising the understanding o f corruption
This issue will be addressed following a sociological approach. Endemic and resilient 
corruption along with a state of social decay are seen as an macro-level character­
istic (See Section 3.2.1). The research question is addressed by describing a process 
where, from a starting level of corruption, the group changes to a new level. Here, 
such a group change is understood as a result of interaction among the components 
of the social system. Therefore, by tackling those issues a generative explanation is 
employed (Conte et al., 2001).
A few methodological issues arise when addressing the research question. Firstly, a 
tight relation is needed between a sociological understanding of corruption and facts, 
so that the outcome of a social mechanism can be tested against evidence of some 
kind. Secondly, individuals and their behaviours need to be carefully represented 
since corruption is brought about by those individual behaviours. Thirdly, a sound 
understanding, generally, is provided by many observations of the same phenomenon 
and by testing and adjusting hypotheses on likely causes. Corruption is a unique and 
hard to replicate phenomenon. Often, it is physically and spatially too large and lasts 
too long to monitor.
The modelling approach proposed in the current chapter is a computational method 
with which to explore and experiment whether a set of group features are sufficient to 
generate corruption.
4.3 Agent based modelling
Addressing the research question above by means of agent-based modelling would 
overcome the methodological issues highlighted in Section 4.2 (Parisi, 2008). A de­
scription of the method to be applied as well as the theoretical background on which 
the method is based are provided as follows:
4.3.1 Definition
ABM is a computational method that enables researchers to create, emalyse, and exper­
iment with models composed of autonomous and heterogeneous agents that interact 
within an environment in order to identify the mechanisms that bring about some 
macroscopic phenomenon of interest.
4.3. Agent based modelling 49
4.3.2 Theoretical Background
There is an increasing interest in ABM as a modelling approach in the social sciences 
because it enables researchers to build computational models where individual entit­
ies and their cognition and interactions are directly represented. In comparison with 
alternative modelling techniques, such as variable-based approaches using structural 
equations or system-based approaches using differential equations, ABM allows m od­
ellers to simulate the emergence of macroscopic or system regularities over time, such 
as ants' colonies, flocks of birds, norms of cooperation, traffic jams, or languages, from 
local interactions of autonomous and heterogeneous agents (Gilbert, 2008). The emer­
gent properties of an agent-based model are then the result of 'bottom-up' processes, 
the outcome of agent interactions, rather than a 'top-down' direction. In fact, the ab­
sence of any form of top-down control is the hallmark of ABM, since the cognitive 
processes, behaviours, and interactions at the agent-level bring about the observed 
regularities in the system or macro-level. For this reason, ABM is most appropri­
ate for studying processes that lack central coordination, including the emergence of 
macroscopic patterns.
Agent-based models involve two main components. Firstly, these models entail the 
definition of a population of agents. The agents are the computational representation 
of some specific social actors. Examples are: individuals, people or animals, organ­
isations such as firms or bodies such as nations or states. They are capable of inter­
acting with each other, that is, they can pass informational messages to each other 
and act on the basis of what they leam from these messages. Thus, each agent in 
the model is an autonomous entity. The artificial population can include heterogen­
eous agents, which is useful when the researcher wants to build a model of a certain 
phenomenon with different agents' capabilities, roles, perspectives or stocks of know­
ledge. Secondly, ABM involves the definition of some environment. The environment 
is the virtual world in which the agents act. It may be an entirely neutral medium with 
little or no effect on the agents, as in some agent-based models based on game theory 
where the environment has no meaning. In other models, the environment may be as 
carefully designed as the agents themselves, as in some ecological or anthropological 
agent-based models where the environment represents complex geographical space
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that affects the agents' behaviour.
One of the main objectives of ABM is to falsify, by experimental means, the hypo­
thesised mechanisms that bring about the macroscopic phenomenon the researcher 
is interested in explaining. Following the definition provided by Hedstrom (2005), a 
mechanism describes a constellation of entities (i.e., agents) and activities (i.e., actions) 
that are organised such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome. 
An observed macroscopic phenomenon is explained by referring to the mechanisms 
by which the phenomenon is regularly brought about. In ABM these mechanisms 
are translated as the model micro-specifications, that is to say, the set of behavioural 
and simple rules that specify how the agents locally behave and react to their envir­
onment (which includes, of course, other agents). Once the population of agents and 
the environment is defined, the researcher can implement the micro-specifications and 
run the computer simulation in order to evaluate whether these rules bring about the 
macro phenomenon of interest, over the simulated time. When the model can gener­
ate the type of outcome to be explained, the researcher has provided a computational 
demonstration that a given micro-specification (or mechanism) is in fact sufficient to 
generate the macrostructure of interest. This demonstration, called generative suf­
ficiency (Epstein, 1999), provides a candidate mechanism-based explanation of the 
macro-phenomenon. The agent-based modeller can then use relevant data and stat­
istics to gauge the generative sufficiency of a given micro-specification by testing the 
agreement between 'real-world' and the generated macrostructures in the computer 
simulation. On the other hand, when the model cannot generate the outcome to be 
explained, the micro-specification is not a candidate explanation of the phenomenon 
and the researcher has demonstrated the hypothesised mechanism to be false. There­
fore, agent-based models can be used to perform highly abstract thought experiments 
that explore plausible mechanisms that may underlie observed patterns. Finally, it 
can be said that the interest in ABM reflects a growing interest in complex adaptive 
systems by social scientists, that is to say, the possibility that hum an societies may be 
described as highly complex, path-dependent, non-linear, and self-organising systems 
(Macy and Wilier, 2002). The emphasis on processes and on the relations between en­
tities that bring about macroscopic regularities, both of which can be examined by
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ABM, accounts for the developing link between this theoretical perspective and ABM 
research.
4.3.3 Impact of ABM in the Social Sciences
ABM is a relatively recent scientific innovation in the social sciences (Squazzoni, 2010). 
However, this innovation has gained momentum after the seminal contributions by 
Gilbert and Doran (1994), Carley and Prietula (1994), Gilbert and Conte (1995), Casti
(1997), Epstein and Axtell (1999), Hegselmann, Mueller and Troitzsch (1996) Axel­
rod (1997), Conte, Hegselmann and Tema (1997) Liebrand, Nowak and Hegselmann
(1998) and the establishment of the JASSS- the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation in 1998.
The epistemological consequences of ABM in the social sciences can be summarised 
as follows: firstly modelling. This allows for precision, clarity and distinction, which 
are crucial to analyse complex social phenomena, whereas these properties are dif­
ficult to derive from unformalised narrative accounts (Hedstrom, 2005). Secondly, 
the generative condition holds (Epstein, 1999). As Squazzoni (2010, p 5) observed: if 
micro-specifications are theoretically plausible, the model is based on sound empirical 
grounds and the simulation results stable and robust against simulation parameters, 
then the micro-specifications in question are said to satisfy the criterion of 'generat­
ive sufficiency' with regard to the social outcome under scrutiny. Thirdly, changes 
and long-term dynamics are put at the very core of social science research. Finally, 
the modelling approach has had innovative consequences in that it has promoted a 
reconciliation of empirical evidence and theory (Squazzoni and Boero, 2005).
Furthermore, ABM has marked a shift of sociologists' attention "from factor to actor", 
as claimed by Macy and Wilier (2002). Computation is not used to solve systems of 
differential equations, nor to estimate statistical models from data, but to formalise 
models of agent interaction and micro aspects to understand such social outcomes as 
the emergence of norms or the diffusion of innovations (Squazzoni, 2010). Largely 
inspired by Schelling's (1978) Granovetter's (1978) and Coleman's (1990) lessons, the 
ABM perspective emphasises the idea that, by relating macro-level social outcomes 
to the motivations and interactions of micro-level agents, sociology can provide more
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informative explanations than by purely aggregated analyses (Bruch and Mare, 2006; 
Hedstrom, 2005; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998).
4.4 Providing Knowledge with ABM
In the following subsection a brief account of ABM from the computer science point 
of view is given. There are two main concerns: the problem of verification and the 
problem of validation of an ABM. The former concerns whether the computer simu­
lation works properly, namely, if it returns the correct output and this is discussed in 
Section 4.4.1. The latter, examined in Section 4.4.2, regards the reliability of the result 
and whether it is a sound description of the replicated social phenomenon.
4.4.1 Verification
Fetzer (1988) claims that programs, like scientific theories, have semantic significance 
that mathematical proofs do not possess; each line of code stands for other things 
for the user of those programs and theories. However, theories do not possess the 
causal capability of programs, which act on those machines on which they are loaded, 
compiled and executed. Table 4.1 reproduces the comparison made by Fetzer.
Mathematical
Proofs
Scientific
Theories
Computer
Programs
Syntactic Entities yes yes yes
Semantic Significance no yes yes
Causal Capability no no yes
Table 4.1: Proofs, theories and programs according to Fetzer
David et al (2005) emphasises that in the computer science realm the role of "program 
verification" is to ascertain the validity of certain output as a function of a given input, 
regardless of any interpretation given in terms of theory. The role of "program valid­
ation", David et al. stress, is to ascertain whether the execution of a program behaves 
according to the relative arbitrary expectation of the program end-users. Whereas, in 
order to understcmd the role of validation and verification in social simulation, one
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Social P henom enon   Interpretation
 Im plementation
Validation
Theoretical
RepresentationTO
Verification
Social Simulation
Figure 4.1: The doubly contingent character of theories in simulation
has to acknowledge the doubly contingent characteristic of theories, namely that the­
ories can be interpreted according to two different phenomena. Figure 4.1 shows a 
representation of this idea.
Let TO be a theory that represents a social phenomenon. This theory is then expressed 
in terms of a computer program. Programs are also symbolic representations which 
will be executed in a physical device, the computer itself. Hence, the implementation 
of a simulation implies an interaction between symbolic and physical processes that 
implement a casual relation between theory TO and the simulation behaviour. The 
final aim, David et al. point out, is to obtain a theory T1 that, although not contra­
dictory to TO, expresses something that TO does not. T1 is interpreted according to 
the observed features of a set of icons on the computer's screen. David et al. say 
that, in social simulation, there is no empirical justification to interpret the observed 
behaviour of the program. This suggests that the method of agent-based social simula­
tion highlights an intentional aspect in programming and interacting with computers. 
Moreover, the execution of a program presumes the construction of a new theory that 
should disclose something more than the theory that was considered in the first place. 
Then the role of the observer is to idealise something that should be accord with the
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Mathematical
Proofs
Scientific
Theories
Computer
Programs
Syntactic Entities yes yes yes
Semantic Significance no yes yes
Causal Capability no no yes
Intentional Capability no no yes
Table 4.2: Proofs, theories and programs according to David et al. 
specification's intended meanings.
David et ah acknowledge that program verification in social simulation is supported in 
the published articles by means of persuasive description. Hence, verification in social 
simulation is addressed by the textual and verbal description used for persuading the 
observers that the behaviours on the computer's screen stand for other things in the 
world.
Finally, David et ah conclude by adding an intentional capability to the comparison 
advanced by Fatzer, as shown in Table 4.2. They identify verification in social simula­
tion with the following processes:
• empirical verification is to exercise the construction of programs in order to 
achieve empirical adequacy between program execution and the causal mean­
ing of those programs.
• intentional verification is to exercise the construction of specification and pro­
grams in order to achieve experimental adequacy between program executions 
and the intentional meaning of those programs, always in the context of some 
limited community.
4.4.2 Validation
The problem of validation concerns two aspects: firstly, the balance between theor­
ies and observation and secondly, the development of methods for providing reliable 
observation of social phenomena.
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Kuppers and Lenhard (2005) state that the main characteristic of a simulation is the 
imitation of a dynamic. They also underline that validation constitutes a serious con­
cern even in natural sciences.
The first argument they put forward is that, in general, social simulations have no 
theoretical model that one could rely on. The knowledge produced seems to be con­
sidered valid if the simulation replicates some of the characteristics of the social dy­
namics known by experience. So, their main claim is that simulation modelling cannot 
be conceived of as a mode of calculation but as an attempt of imitation. Therefore, a 
successful criterion for validation is the adequacy of imitation of the phenomenon 
rather than any derivation from theoretical principles. They sustain this argument, 
giving an account of a case known as Arakawa's trick. In 1955, Phillips (1956) suc­
ceeded in simulating the dynamics of the atmosphere for the first time. This was a 
great success but it also exhibited an important failure: the dynamic of the simulated 
atmosphere was stable for a few weeks only. The decisive breakthrough was achieved 
by a different solution proposed by Arakawa (2000). He focused his work on the im­
itation of the dynamic rather than the solution of the mathematical system. In 1978, 
Jule Chamey conducted a competition of different models of atmosphere dynamic. 
He commented:
"[...] Only Arakawa's model had the aperiodic behaviour typical of 
the real atmosphere in extra-tropical latitudes, and his results were used 
as a guide to predictability of the real atmosphere. [... ]"
In order to guarantee the stability of the system, Arakawa had to introduce an as­
sumption that contradicted physical theory. He had to assume that kinetic energy in 
the atmosphere would be preserved. This is not the case in reality. Arakawa's de­
cisive breakthrough was not derived from a theoretical basis and was justified solely 
by the results of simulation runs that showed quasi-empirically that his system led to 
successful imitation.
Based on Arakawa's case, Kuppers and Lenhard state that the validation of the out­
come of a simulation cannot be judged on the validity of the mathematical model on
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which it is based. Only existing data or experience can be used to valuate computer 
simulation. They say:
"[...] simulation can achieve behavioural accuracy without being struc­
turally accurate. [... ] simulation model cannot be theoretically deduced 
nor derived by general principles. Simulation results have to be judged by 
experience."
One further issue regarding the comparison between simulation output and empirical 
observation concerns techniques or methods for measuring social phenomena. Moss 
and Edmonds (2005) point out that it is a characteristic of the natural sciences that a 
great emphasis is given to developing new methods of measurement compared with 
the development of abstract theory. Moreover, Chattoe (2002) claims that in the social 
sciences, techniques of m easurem ent/data collection are relatively poorly developed; 
social phenomena are not so much objectively measured as subjectively interpreted 
by the hum an mind. Moss and Edmonds state:
[...] a necessary condition for social science to be good science is that it 
coheres with directly observable evidence in as many ways as possible.
According to the so-called "analytical sociology" approach, the goal of a social sci­
entist is to explain an empirical phenomenon by referring to a set of spatially and 
temporally organised entities, namely agents, actions and interactions (Barbera, 2004; 
Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998); Boero and Squazzoni (2005) state that to build a 
sound micro-specification of a model and to validate macro results, empirical data 
are needed. They suggest different tools to obtain first-hand empirical data directly 
from the target: experimental methods, stakeholder approach, qualitative methods, 
and quantitative methods.
Experimental data are collected in a laboratory, in a controlled and fixed environment. 
The researcher has to possess reliable environmental data in order to design an exper­
iment to mimic the environment itself and then to focus on and test other issues of 
interest such as interaction among entities, behaviours and so on.
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The Stakeholder approach is that theoretical knowledge of model makers and empir­
ical knowledge of involved agents enrich each other directly on the ground. Relevant 
knowledge for model building and validation can be grasped by an intensive dialogue 
between planners, practitioners and stakeholders, who are all involved in investigat­
ing the same specific problem (Bousquet et al., 2003; Moss, 1998; Moss and Edmonds, 
2005).
Qualitative methods are interviews, questionnaires, archival data or empirical case- 
studies. Qualitative data are useful to introduce realistic rules of behaviour or cognit­
ive aspects at the micro-level of individual actions.
Quantitative methods are statistical surveys of the target. The data can be used to 
parameterise variables such as: size of the system, number of entities involved, feature 
of the environment, characteristics of the interactions and so on.
4.5 Formalising the computational social science approach
The following is an attempt to give a more rigorous understanding of sociological 
findings by means of social simulations. The aim is to identify the entities involved 
in the creation of knowledge acquired by means of computer programs that replic­
ate social phenomena. Since mathematics is the most synthetic and accurate way to 
furnish solid understanding, a correspondence between mathematical theorems and 
social simulation approaches is proposed. Namely, a sociological research question is 
framed in the same terms as would be used in mathematics.
scenario characteristics} => performance (4.1)
The way mathematics provides answers is shown in Relation 4.1. On the left-hand 
side are several pieces of information that characterise and bind the scenario that is 
investigated. On the right-hand side a certain attribute, a specific performance, is 
expressed. The power of mathematics allows us to create a logical relation between 
the scenario under investigation and a specific performance. The contrary is also true, 
namely, starting from a specific performance, it is possible to create a logical relation
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to a specific scenario. This twofold relation guarantees a sound understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation.
In order to frame a sociological research question addressed by social simulation in 
the same terms as maths, a certain scenario and a certain attribute or performance has 
to be defined. Let S be the social phenomenon to be replicated. Let M  be a model 
of the social phenomenon M  c  S. M  is a model, and since it does not capture all the 
characteristics of S, is a strict subset of it. Let m  G M  be a certain model setting, then 
m  e M  is a possible scenario that describes a social phenomenon. Let P  be the set of all 
the empirical observations of the social phenomenon under investigation, then p  G P  
is a performance, in other words an empirical observation of the social phenomenon. 
Now a language is needed to create some kind of relation between the scenario m  G M  
and the performance p G P . Let Sim be a social simulation that runs Vm G M  and 
3p G P  where it halts, then Sim (m) =  p is a social simulation to relate a certain 
scenario to a specific performance. Let us consider another setting of M , say m ', then 
the relation Sim (m') =  p ' > Sim (m) =  p Vm G M  means that the performance p ' of 
the setting m ' replicates the empirically observed social phenomenon better than all 
the possible settings of M, so Sim (m') provides a better understanding of the social 
phenomenon.
Which is the best description that one can provide of a certain social phenomenon by 
means of social simulation?
M Ç S  
m  ef m ' G M  
m ' 7^  m  Vm G M
m ' is a description of S
p ' is better than Vp G P  
Sim p ' is a performance that 
replicates the 
empirical phenomenon
(4.2)
Relation 4.2 is a way to provide an answer to that question. In Figure 4.2 the relation 
between a model and a performance through a simulation is shown.
It is also possible to infer scenario characteristics from performances. Let D be a model 
of all the empirical performances of the social phenomenon, D c  P . Then p  G D is a 
certain performance. Let Cal be a calibration process that can be performed in order
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Figure 4.2: From scenario to performance
to find the model m  e M  that best replicates p  G D. Then Cal (p) =  m i s a  calibration 
to relate a specific performance to a certain scenario.
M Ç S  
m  ef m ' G M  
m ' ^  m  Vm G M
m ' is the best understending of S
p ' G D Ç P  ÎS the best 
 ^ performance that
Cal replicates the
empirical phenomenon
The relation in 4.3 provides a formalisation of a social simulation approach. Figure
4.3 shows the link between a performance and a model through a calibration. This 
approach allows for an evidence-based approach to build knowledge about a social 
phenomenon. By building a relation between scenario characteristics and perform­
ances and from performances to scenario characteristics a correspondence between a 
social phenomenon and its impact in society is identified. The latter allows for a solid 
candidate understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.
There are two main issues of providing sound knowledge by means of social simu­
lation: designing models of both social phenomenon and social performances; and 
finding a suitable way to relate one to the other, and vice versa. To summarise, there
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Figure 4.3: Form performance to scenarion
are four aspects in approaching a sociological research question by means of social 
simulation:
1. modelling social phenomena
2. modelling social performances
3. designing a sound relation between social phenomena and performances
4. designing a sound relation between social performances and phenomena
The modelling approach proposed in this work follows the schema above. Corrup­
tion is understood (Chapter 3) and modelled (Section 7.5) by using existing academic 
results as well as empirical evidences. A model of social performances is built on 
first-hand observation (Section 7.4) and designed on the basis of previous approaches 
(Chapter 5). Furthermore, a sound relation between social phenomena and perform- 
cinces (Section 7.5.4) and between social performances and phenomena is provided 
(Section 7.5.2). In this way a solid sociological understanding of the emergence of 
corruption in small groups is provided.
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4.6 Limitations of ABM
Two issues might occur in tackling a sociological research question by means of ABM. 
The first is related to the uniqueness of a model that describes a social phenomenon, 
and the second concerns what and how to sample, measure and model a social per­
formance. With respect to the former, if there exist two models m  G M  and m ' G M ' 
that return the same outcome, Sim (m') — Sim (m) — p, which one would provide us 
with the most solid understanding of the social phenomenon under analysis? One of 
the most important features of mathematics is to discern whether a particular system 
is unique or not, and whether it has one, many, infinite or no solutions.
4.7 Conclusion
ABM is the method used here to provide a sociological understanding of endemic and 
resilient corruption. Its main features are: a tight relation between understanding and 
facts, a clear definition of individuals and their behaviours and the possibility to test 
and adjust hypotheses on likely causes, which makes this a solid and robust method 
to address the research question proposed here. ABM is a computational method 
that enables researchers to create, analyse, and experiment with models composed of 
autonomous and heterogeneous agents that interact within an environment in order to 
identify the mechanisms that bring about some macroscopic phenomenon of interest. 
Therefore ABM facilitates the provision of a candidate mechanism-based explanation 
of the social construction of corruption. The explanatory capability of this method has 
a limitation: it is difficult to discern the uniqueness of a model.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology employed to collect empirical data on cor­
ruption. A description of the empirical foundation of the research body on corrup­
tion is provided. There are several means by which information on corruption can be 
gathered. In Section 5.2 institutional data are discussed. By and large, court cases are 
the most reliable source of information. However, their reliability is affected by the ef­
ficiency of the judiciary system of the country under analysis. Police and journalistic 
investigations are also valuable sources of data with respect to measuring corruption. 
A different means to gather information on corruption is indexes. These measures 
are widely used for comparative analyses. Section 5.3 provides a review of the most 
important indexes available. Economists have developed experiments to test theories. 
Several scholars have used these techniques to address issues related to corruption. In 
Section 5.4 and 5.5 several experiments on corruption are presented and discussed. 
Section 5.6 describes the proposed approach to gather suitable data for providing 
reliable insight into the social construction of corruption. Section 5.7 concludes the 
chapter.
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5.2 Institutional data
As Andwig et al (2000) point out, data applied in research on corruption should be 
first-hand observations of corrupt acts carried out by unbiased observers who are, to a 
certain extent, familiar with the rules and routines of such acts. This kind of empirical 
observation hardly exists and this is not expected to change in the near future (Andwig 
et al., 2000). Mostly, corruption practices take place in large organisations to which 
researchers have no access, therefore information is indirect and rather unsystematic 
(Andwig et al., 2000). One of the major difficulties in delivering an empirically based 
study on corruption is indeed the lack of solid observations.
5.2.1 Court cases
The most reliable information about corruption is from court cases. Such informa­
tion is produced by the work of highly trained teams of public officials. Court cases 
report evidence of the actual corrupt acts, the people involved and frame the illicit 
behaviours within the legal system. These are facts and therefore fuUy reliable sources 
of information about corruption. Taking Italy as an example, the Italian Alto Com- 
missariato Anticornizione gathered court cases data related to corruption from 1996 to 
2006 (Anticornizione, 2007a). These data are shown in Table 5.1. Court cases are cur­
rently collected on an international basis too. For instance, the United Nation Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice office in Vieima has made efforts to make such data 
comparable across countries (Newman et al., 1999). However, despite the attempt 
and the courage of many public servants, the evaluation report on Italy delivered by 
GRECO^ pointed out the poor efficiency of the Italian judiciary system (GRECO, 2009). 
The GRECO Evaluation Team (GET) met with prosecutors, judges and police officers. 
Among their observations the one that struck the authors the most was to leam that 
a disquieting proportion of all prosecutions for corruption fail because of the expiry 
of the relevant time limit specified in the statute of limitations. There is still a high 
chance, which the GET did not quantify, of the limitation period expiring before the 
trial can be concluded. Based on such observations, the fact that in Italy from 1996
^The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was established in 1999 by the Council of Europe 
to monitor States' compliance with the organisation's anti-corruption standards.
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to 2006 the number of convictions over many corrupt related crimes consistently de­
creases, as illustrated in Table 5.1, does not reflect the real number of corrupt acts, 
rather the judiciary's efficiency.
Year Bribery
public
sector
Embezzlement Abuse 
of office
Exaction
1996 1159 608 1305 555
1997 991 508 920 271
1998 1002 470 839 329
1999 584 447 470 225
2000 988 547 336 291
2001 345 417 166 195
2002 495 389 113 194
2003 272 484 229 159
2004 239 325 115 195
2005 342 332 96 112
2006 186 210 45 53
Table 5.1: Number of convictions for corruption in Italy 1996 to 2006. Source: II fenomeno della 
corruzione in Italia. Mappa dell"alto Commissariato Anticorruzione. December 2007
5.2.2 Police investigation
Using Italy again as an example, methods have been developed with regard to the 
investigation of corrupt offences. Magistrates have developed several special invest­
igative techniques such as cooperative witnesses and full access to bank accounts to 
unveil instances of corruption (GRECO, 2009). Cooperative witnesses, or "pentiti", 
are mainly used to fight mafia-related crimes, where former mafia members collab­
orate with the investigation teams against their former associates. Tracking money 
flows through bank accounts is employed by investigators to check pentiti's testimon­
ies. GRECO's (2009) evaluation report on Italy also reported the conduct of corruption 
investigations. The prosecutor issues instructions to the police regarding the actions 
that need to be taken and controls amd supervises police activities. All police forces are 
trained in dealing with corruption cases because corruption is seen as a widespread 
and growing crime (GRECO, 2009).
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Along with the difficulties of conducting investigations against corruption and mafia­
like crimes, another issue that impedes efficient investigation is the principle of man­
datory prosecution (Article 112, Constitution). This means that all reports of crime 
not manifestly ill-founded must result in criminal proceedings. This results in a very 
large number of prosecutions and the numbers of magistrates and support staff are 
inadequate for the case load (GRECO, 2009). Moreover, the principle of mandatory 
prosecution causes the fact that in Italy corruption cases can involve up to 100 people 
accused in a single trial. In addition the time limit for prosecutions has been con­
sistently reduced over the recent years. These reductions vary according to the kind 
of crime. The italian Government is considering a law to reduce the time limit on 
corruption-related crimes to six years. GET reported that appeals may be pursued 
through all three instances at all stages of the process. As a result the Court of Cassa­
tion, that is the major court of last resort in Italy, has to deal with around 50000 cases 
each year. The time required to conclude a prosecution is at least six years and the ma­
jority take much longer (GRECO, 2009). All of this, as already said, force magistrates 
and police forces to close many promising investigations due to statute limitations. 
Therefore, valid data on corruption cannot only be based on court cases. In general, 
the validity of crime statistics is subject to similar problems, court records are not the 
product of a neutral fact-collecting process, but of activities geared first and foremost 
towards organisational aims and needs. Thus the statistics that are derived from them 
may tell us more about the organisation than about the true extent of crime (Maguire 
et al., 2007).
5.2.3 Investigative journalists
Journalists' public exposure has a twofold-effect: on the one hand, they have a large 
number of informants; on the other hemd, they have to handle data carefully to avoid 
the risk of being sued (Andwig et al., 2000). Similarly to the police they have much 
information that they carmot use. Stories from the media might also be important 
resources for social scientists.
Furthermore, the media is not only important for bringing forward facts about cor­
ruption, but also for forming public and scientific perceptions of corruption (Andwig
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et al., 2000).
Like court cases, media sources cannot be used to compare corrupt transactions across 
countries and time. Firstly, media tends to point to more spectacular stories giving 
less attention to more common practices. Secondly, an issue of press freedom arises. 
Whether or not to publish a story depends on media policies and the like, so the num ­
ber of stories on corruption that reaches the public cannot be considered as a rep­
resentative measure of corruption-related crimes. So, it is not possible to determine 
whether the perception of either an increase or a decrease in the world-wide level of 
corruption is based on facts (Andwig et al., 2000).
5.3 Corruption indicators
Corrupt acts known through courts and media are too few to constitute a represent­
ative sample of corrupt practices (Andwig et al., 2000). Since the mid-1990s quantit­
ative studies based on commercial indexes of aggregate country levels of corruption 
have flourished. The first and most influential is perhaps due to Mauro (1995). His 
work was an econometric analysis of the relationship between the corruption level 
and a country's growth rate. His data-set was obtained by constructing a corrup­
tion indicator. Mauro used Business International (BI), which in 1980 carried out a 
survey to assess commercial and political risk factors including corruption in 52 coun­
tries. Journalists, country specialists and businesspeople were asked whether business 
transactions involved questionable payments. BI is not the only organisation that at­
tempts to monitor corruption. Today, perhaps the most well-known is Transparency 
International "Corruption Perception Index" (CPI).
5.3.1 Corruption Perception Index
CPI is compiled by a team of researchers at Gottingen University headed by Johann 
Lambsdroff. The index ranks countries on a scale from 10 to 0, the former represent­
ing a totally honest country while the latter indicates a highly corrupt country. CPI 
estimates the extent to which public officials are believed to accept bribes, take illicit 
payments, embezzle public funds and commit similar offences. The 2009 CPI includes 
180 countries, and is calculated using data from 13 sources from 10 independent in­
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stitutions^ . There are two different types of sources. The first is opinion surveys 
of business people. The second is assessments (scores) of a country's performance 
as provided by a group of country risk expert analysts. Data are either donated to 
Transparency International (TI) by the institutions producing the data for the purpose 
of building this index or are available in the public domain. However none of these 
sources deals solely with corruption, it is only TI that does so. Hence, the TI index is 
constructed as a weighted average of different indexes from different organisations.
According to TI, a large sample of key figures' views on corruption is needed to pro­
duce an international macro-level comparative measure. Since none of the sources 
mentioned above has a sufficiently large sampling frame to produce sound comparat­
ive statements, TI proposed a composite index as the most robust means of measuring 
perceptions of corruption. TI argues that a combination of several sources is the major 
strength of the CPI. It is important to remember that TI is not interested in investigat­
ing specific acts of corruption, rather in broadening awareness of the damage caused 
by the phenomenon. Therefore, one of the main aims of CPI is to capture a great deal 
of variation in corruption across countries. Such variation might give rise to issues of 
validity of the measure. A study by Wilhelm (2002) attempted to address those issues.
^The institutions are:
1. Africa Development Bank- Country Policy and Institutional Assessments 2008 (AFDB 2008)
2. Asian Development Bank -Country Performance Assessment Ratings 2008 (ADB 2008)
3. Bertelsmarm Foundation- Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BF 2009)
4. Economist Intelligence Unit -Country Risk Service and Country Forecast 2009 (FIU 2009)
5. Freedom House -Nations in Transit 2009 (PH 2009)
6. Global Insights, formerly World Markets Research Centre- Country Risk Ratings 2009 (Cl 2009)
7. Institute for Management Development - World Competitiveness Report 2008 and 2009 (IMD 2008 
and IMD 2009)
8. Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong - Asian Intelligence 2008 and 2009 (PERC 
2008 and PERC 2009).
9. World Economic Forum - Global Competitiveness Report 2008 and 2009 (WEF 2008 and WEF 
2009)
10. World Bank - Country Policy and Institutional Assessments for IDA Countries (WB 2008)
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His work sought to assess CPI validity by analysing the significance of the correla­
tion between three measures of corruption and with real gross domestic per capita 
(RGDP) across countries. He considered CPI, black market activity and unnecessary 
regulations as measures of corruption. Wilhelm concluded that CPI is not only a valid 
measure of corruption but likely to be the most robust available for cross-country com­
parisons. He argued that CPI has a strong significant correlation with the other two 
measures; and that CPI explained over three fourths of the variance of the RGDP. Table 
5.2^ shows the CPI 2009 scores for European countries.
^Source: http://www.transparency.org
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Rank European
Rank
Country CPI 2009 Score
2 1 Denmark 9.3
3 2 Sweden 9.2
5 3 Switzerland 9.0
6 4 Finland 8.9
6 4 Netherlands 8.9
8 6 Iceland 8.7
11 7 Norway 8.6
12 8 Luxembourg 8.2
14 9 Germany 8.0
14 9 Ireland 8.0
16 11 Austria 7.9
17 12 United Kingdom 7.7
21 13 Belgium 7.1
24 14 France 6.9
27 15 Cyprus 6.6
27 15 Estonia 6.6
27 15 Slovenia 6.6
32 18 Spain 6.1
35 19 Portugal 5.8
45 20 Malta 5.2
46 21 Hungary 5.1
49 22 Poland 5.0
52 23 Czech Republic 4.9
52 23 Lithuania 4.9
56 25 Latvia 4.5
56 25 Slovakia 4.5
63 27 Italy 4.3
71 28 Bulgaria 3.8
71 28 Greece 3.8
71 28 Romania 3.8
Table 5.2: European Union CPI 2009 Score
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5.3.2 The meaning of an index ranking
Indexes are often misinterpreted (Lambsdroff, 1999). A country that scores the lowest 
is not the most corrupt in the world. Indexes do not cover countries where the re­
quired information is not available. Furthermore, it is difficult to say what a position 
in the rank implies. There is no standardised way of estimating the level of corruption 
(Andwig et al., 2000). So, for instance, a country that scores 3 is not twice as corrupt 
as a country that scores 6. Due to the uncertain quantification of corruption, the com­
parison of index values between countries is problematic (Andwig et al., 2000). Even 
comparing a country's score from two different years cannot indicate whether or not 
the level of corruption has increased. Indexes are useful to compare country's score 
from the same year, as well as provide a measure of the perception of the level of 
corruption.
5.3.3 Bribe Payers Index
TI also carries out a Bribe Payers Survey, which provides the basis for two indexes: the 
Bribe Payers Index (BPI) which indicates the tendency of exporting countries to win 
business through bribes; and. Bribery in Business Sectors which indicates the types of 
business most likely to pay bribes.
The 2008 BPI ranks 22 leading exporting countries according to the extent to which 
they are perceived to pay bribes to get contracts.
5.3.4 Global Corruption Barometer
Transparency International also releases the Global Corruption Barometer. The Baro­
meter is a public opinion survey that captures perceptions and experiences of corrup­
tion of more than 73,000 people in 69 countries. Some of the corruption issues ad­
dressed by the survey are: perception of corruption in the private sector, petty bribery 
in general and in different services, perception of most corrupted institutions/sectors, 
corruption denunciation and the use of complaint mechanisms, and perception of 
governments' effectiveness in the fight against corruption. Figure 5.1 illustrates an 
example of the measures included in the Global Corruption Barometer^. The most
^Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007, pp22.
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% of respondents wfio reported tfiis  to be the most corrupt institution
Figure 5.1: Single Institution perceived to be the most corrupt in Italy
corrupt institution as perceived by the Italian population is shown, more than 40% of 
respondents pointed to political parties. The observations provided by the Barometer 
are useful surveys that assess and monitor, year on year, general public attitudes to­
ward corruption in dozens of countries.
Different corruption indexes are available. They are very useful for raising aware­
ness within cormtries where corruption is widely spread and is purposely kept silent. 
Moreover, they are used to make comparative emalysis. Although they are of no use 
to assess how corruption varies over time within a country, they have the ability to 
capture and aggregate opinions about and perceptions of corruption from individuals 
in key positions in the cormtry of interest. Corruption indexes are an excellent proxy 
of the perceived level of corruption on a country basis.
5.4 Field experiments
Field experiments are rare, extremely expensive, and involve several institutions and 
many researchers. But they are very good for first-hand observations of corruption.
Olken (2007) conducted one of these experiments in Indonesia between September
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2003 and December 2004. Olken's experiment ran alongside the Kecamantan Devel­
opment Project (KDP), which is a national Indonesian government program funded 
through a loan from the World Bank. KDP finances projects in thousands of villages 
throughout Indonesia each year. The majority of these projects are to build roads or 
more generally infrastructures.
Olken wanted to test different strategies to increase the probability that corruption is 
detected. He examined three strategies: increasing external audits, increasing parti­
cipation in accountability meetings, and providing an anonymous comment form to 
villages. Experiments were performed in over 600 village road projects and monitor­
ing strategies were randomised.
Corruption was measured as missing expenditures, that is the discrepancy between 
official project costs and independent engineers' estimates of costs. Olken found that 
increasing government audits from 4% to 100% reduced missing expenditures by 8%. 
By contrast participation in monitoring and anonymous reports had little average im­
pact.
Field experiments have two positive features. They provide reliable first-hand data 
and they are exogenous interventions on society, therefore further observations can be 
made to estimate the long-term effects of such interventions. From a policy m aker's 
point of view those features are of great interest. However, as mentioned above, these 
experiments are extremely expensive and have significant logistical problem.
5.5 Laboratory Experiments
Laboratory experiments have been increasingly used by economists to understand 
implementation problems ranging from the design of labour markets (Roth, 2002) to 
auction mechanisms (Klemperer, 2004; Milgrom, 2004). Laboratory experiments allow 
the scientist to monitor the behaviors of subjects as well as to manipulate the envir­
onment, hence to address issues of causality in ways not possible in a field context. 
Abbink (2006) pointed out that experimental methods cem be applied for two pur­
poses. Firstly, in order to test a theoretical model, it is possible to carry out a rigorous 
test of the behavioural underpinnings of the model. Secondly, laboratory experiments 
can substitute field data that often are unavailable when studying corruption.
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5.5.1 Experiment on corruption
There is not, as yet, a large number of laboratory experiments on corruption. Although 
they seek an understanding of the different aspects related to corruption, they are 
mostly based on the large literature on trust games (for example Fehr et al., 1997,1993; 
Joyce et al., 1995).
In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged within the social sciences 
which explores the differences in the behaviour of men and women in various con­
texts. Following this consistent stream of research. Atlas et ah (2006) investigated 
gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. They implemented an experiment 
based on a three-person, sequential-move game. Player one represents a firm, player 
two an official and player three society. Players one and two have the ability to trade 
illicitly, and the third player has the ability to punish them. Based on experimental 
data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singa­
pore, they showed that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than 
men in Australia, there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards cor­
ruption in India, Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, their findings suggest that gender 
differences found in previous studies may not be nearly as universal as stated and 
may be more culture-specific.
Many scholars have noticed significant cultural differences with respect to whether 
or not corrupt practices are adopted. The first laboratory experiment that attempted 
to clarify this aspect was proposed by Cameron et al. (2009). By refining the design 
proposed by Atlas et. al (2006), they define culture as an individual's accumulated ex­
perience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment 
in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), 
India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, they found that there is a greater 
variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour than in the propensities to 
engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption 
indexes, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects 
in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the sub­
jects in Indonesia have a much lower toleremce of corruption than expected. Cameron
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et al. claim that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these 
two countries.
A different aspect of corruption has been recently studied by Buchner et al. (2008). 
They investigate bribery and public procurement. The experiment consists of a pro­
curement contract that is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in 
a low price and a bribe from the provider. Procurement is thus seen by the authors as 
a multi-dimensional bidding contest: the optimal price plus the bribe. In other words, 
the authors study the behaviour of the potential providers when facing a corrupt bur- 
eacracy, and not how bureacrats solve the conflit between their moral duties and their 
desire for bribes. They found that although bribes are lower than predicted, behaviour 
is qualitatively in line with the game theoretical equilibrium. When confronted with a 
corrupt bureaucracy, even framing bribes as socially detrimental, bidders are not pre­
vented from engaging in active bribery, at least when there is no threat of punishment.
Along the same lines is the experiment proposed by Jacquemet et al. (2005). They 
consider corruption behavior in a three-player game: Principal, Agent, Corrupter. 
The authors examine the effect of the reciprocity conflict that Agent faces when Prin­
cipal chooses a wage. If a high wage has been explicitly chosen by Principal, then 
Agent tends to be significantly less prone to accept bribes; if Principal has chosen low 
wages, then Agent reciprocates negatively and is more likely to be corrupt. The latter 
is known as the "delegation effect" (Abbink, 2006). Jacquemet et al.'s experiment sup­
ports the delegation effect. A well paid Agent tends on average to reciprocate less to 
the bribe proposals, and the level of corruption decreases.
The experiments presented above investigate different societal features, are built upon 
previous experiments and are viewed with interest by the community of scholars en­
gaged in fighting corruption. They, and a few others, are a promising tool to measure 
and help policy makers to understand better this complex phenomenon.
5.5.2 On the determinants of corruption
A different stream of laboratory experimentation on corruption looks at comparing 
experimental results with game theory-based predictions. These experiments can be 
divided into two categories: bilateral and unilateral settings.
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5.5.2.1 Bilateral settings
Abbink, Irlenbush and Renner introduce the moonlighting game (2000). This is an 
extension of the principal-agent game. The principal, say player A, gives money to 
the agent, say player B, to perform a task. B can either run away with the money, 
or perform the task. If the latter, it creates an economic surplus that is returned to 
A, then A decides whether or not to reward B. In the moonlighting game a verbal 
contract is introduced, player A and B agree on how to share the money. One-shot 
experiments were run with and without the possibility of an explicit but non-binding 
contract between the players. After an agreement on how to share the money, player B 
can still decide whether to return part of it to player A or not. The experimental result 
showed that retribution is much more compelling than reciprocity. Verbal agreements 
increase the probability of player A passing money, but evidence that they increase 
the reciprocity attitude of player B were not found (Abbink et al., 2000).
The same authors proposed a further extension of the moonlighting game. They meas­
ured the influence of the reciprocity relationship, negative welfare effects and high 
penalties when caught in a bribery game.
They designed an experiment to understand the influence of these three character­
istics separately. The experimental outcomes show that reciprocity fosters a bribery 
relationship, the perception of negative welfare effects do not affect bribers' and bri- 
bees' behaviours and, finally, high penalties significantly reduce corruption(Abbmk 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, Abbink tests the hypothesis that relatively well-paid public 
officials are less corruptible. His experiment confirms empirical evidence, that higher 
wages for public officials would make them more resistant to bribe offers (Rijckeghem 
and Weder, 2002).
5.5.2.2 Unilateral settings
Another set of experiments model corruption as a unilateral decision by a public of­
ficial, the latter deciding how much money to pocket from public funds. Two exper­
iments conducted by Frank and Schulze investigated officials' wages and the prob­
ability of detection as determinants of corruption (Frank and Schulze, 2000; Schulze 
and Frank, 2003). They found evidence that, with no risk of punishment, giving addi­
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tional wages did not reduce corrupt behaviour. However, with punishment, increas­
ing wages reduced bribes. The authors also observed that the percentage of corrupt 
participants was higher in the punishment setting. They suggested that introducing 
monetary incentives reduces the intrinsic incentives to behave honestly.
Falk and Fischbacher (2002) studied an experimental setting measuring to what extent 
it matters that other players also engage in criminal activities. The key feature of their 
set-up is that subjects are in various 'neighbourhoods' at the same time, some in which 
people steal a lot, and some where stealing is less present or absent. It is expected that 
subjects' decisions to steal are conditional on the behaviour of their group members. 
The authors observed that a large fraction of subjects can be classified as 'conditional 
norm violators', i.e., their propensity to comply with the norm that one should not 
steal increases as the level of stealing in their environment decreases.
The sample of experiments presented in this section is thought to be a useful tool to 
study the determinant of corruption in public procurement or other misuses of public 
funds.
5.6 RoIe-PIaying-Games for observing the social construction of corruption
Among the data collection methodologies described above, the one that seems to suit 
best the purpose of this study is experiment. Firstly, to buUd a corruption index re­
quires many years of interviews with key personalities in different countries. There 
are already several institutions actively engaged in such a process, and although there 
is still much to be done to improve corruption indexes, there are already many prom ­
ising alternatives under scrutiny. Collaborating in such research would have been ex­
tremely time consuming and unlikely to produce innovative and relevant outcomes. 
Secondly, field experiments are even more difficult to execute. They require strong 
links with institutions, the political will of the country where an experiment takes 
place, and a large sum of money. None of these apply to the conditions in which the 
current study was carried out. What seems to be the most promising method is to 
design an experiment. As shown in Section 5.5, many scholars have already adopted 
the same choice and the community of scholars interested in corruption has accepted 
and positively valued such an approach. However, there are several methodological
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issues about the external validity of experiments on corruption, or for that matter, of 
experiments in general. The experiment proposed here to measure the extent to which 
group features affect individuals' decisions on corruption is purposely designed to 
feed empirical insights into the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3.
5.6.1 Elements to assess the validity of an experiment
Harrison and List (2004) provide an excellent taxonomy of experiments within the 
social sciences. They classify experiments according to six factors that should be con­
sidered in assessing the external validity of an experiment. This classification is carried 
out by comparing field and laboratory experiments.
1. The nature of the subject pool is to be considered. Student subjects are seen as 
the standard subject pool by experimenters. Thus, going "outdoors" and using 
field subjects is seen as adopting a nonstandard pool.
2. The nature of the information that the subjects bring to the task plays an import­
ant role while in field experiments nonstandard subjects bring certain inform­
ation to their trading activities in addition to their knowledge of the trading 
institution, this information is of little importance in lab experiments.
3. The nature of the commodity. Commodities vary largely across different experi­
mental settings. They can be physical goods, actual services or abstractly defined 
goods. Harrison and List claim that the validity of an experiment is affected by 
the choice of an appropriate commodity.
4. The nature of the rules applied. The nature of the task that the subject is be­
ing asked to undertake is an important component of an experiment, since one 
would expect that field experience could play a major role in helping individuals 
to develop heuristics for specific tasks.
5. The nature of the stakes. Differences in stakes might have an effect on behaviour. 
The authors claim that valuations are taken seriously when stakes are in tens or 
hundreds of the actual currency unit whereas stakes below one currency rmit 
could easily engender imprecise bids.
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6. The nature of the environment that the subjects operate in. The environment 
might provide a context to suggest strategies and heuristics that a laboratory 
setting might not.
Based on the classification briefly described above, Harrison and List proposed the 
following taxonomy:
• A conventional lab experiment is one that employs a standard subject pool of stu­
dents, an abstract framing and an imposed set of rules.
• An artefactual field experiment is the same as a conventional lab experiment but 
with a nonstandard subject pool.
•  A framed field experiment is the same as an artefactual field experiment but with 
field context in either the commodity, task or information set that the subjects 
can use.
• A natural field experiment is the same as a framed field experiment but where the 
subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that 
they are in an experiment.
Harrison and List state that the validity of an experiment depends on choosing the 
correct experimental design for the phenomenon under investigation. Moreover, in 
drawing inferences from the result of an experiment, the implication of the design on 
the behaviour of the subjects should always be considered.
5.6.2 Designing an experiment to measure corruption in small groups
Most of the experiments on corruption reviewed above are conventional lab experi­
ments. They try to verify and test existing predictions based on the large literature on 
game theory. Therefore, abstractly defined goods, context-free scenarios and stakes in 
tens of actual currency seem reasonable experimental settings. However, an extension 
of the existing experiments on corruption is proposed in this research. Four issues 
arise: firstly, using a representative sample (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2005). Whether 
or not students produce enough variance to draw inferences needs to be addressed
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carefully. Harrison and Lasley proposed a statistical framework to address this issue 
(1996). They claimed that the "problem with students" is the lack of variability in their 
socio-demographic characteristics, not necessarily the unrepresentativeness of their 
behavioural responses. It is much easier to make an accurate prediction of the beha­
viour of a 26-year old when one has a model that is based on the behaviour of people 
whose ages range from 21 to 79 than it is to estimate the behaviour of a 69-year-old 
based on the behavioural model from a sample whose ages range from 19 to 27. The 
understanding of corruption proposed in this study needs a large socio-demographic 
range in order to observe how groups legitimate the use of corrupt practices. This 
is because the proposed understanding is based on group features, where a variety 
of beliefs, values and practices are considered relevant to understand their impact on 
individual decisions with respect to corruption. Therefore, standard pools cannot be 
considered as a representative sample to test and measure responses to corrupt acts 
unless participants have sufficiently different socio-demographic characteristics. In 
the study proposed here, see Chapter 6,16 participants were gathered from 5 different 
countries, both sexes, and ranging in age from 21 to 45 years old. Although this num ­
ber is not enough for statistical inference, the participants represent a good sample for 
testing the set analytic tools as well as the modelling approach proposed here.
Secondly, representative stimuli has to be considered (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2005). In 
particular, in economic experiments, it is common practice to reward subjects in pro­
portion to the payoff they have achieved in the experiment. This ensures that subjects 
make decisions carefully (Abbmk, 2006). Fortunately, this research does possess fund­
ing to reward subjects, £140. Therefore, considering a small number of participants 
for testing the platform, and according to Harrison and List (2004), since the stakes are 
in tens of pounds, subjects are thought to respond adequately. Participants' payoff is 
measured as an aggregation of their level of corruption (see Chapter 6 for a complete 
explanation of game rules). A ranking is produced at the end of each experiment, 
participants are rewarded according to their position within such a ranking, and it is 
worked out as illustrated in equation 7.1.
Thirdly, context-free experiments are good tests for theories, since there is no control 
for the context that subjects might themselves impose on the abstract experimental
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task (Harrison and Lesley, 1996). In fact, as Eckel and Grossman (1996) point out, 
within economic realms experimental procedures should be as context-free as pos­
sible, and the interaction among subjects should be carefully limited by the rules of 
the game. However, experience is acquired in the field and not in a laboratory (Har­
rison and Lesley, 1996). This means that if the context itself is relevant to the perform­
ance of subjects, then it is not the case that abstract, context-free experiments provide 
more general findings. Harrison and Lesley claim that lab experiments cannot always 
provide reliable insights into field behaviours. One should not assume that heurist­
ics or sophisticated characterisations that have evolved for familiar field settings do 
travel to the unfamiliar lab. If they exist in the field, and do not travel, then evid­
ence from the lab might be misleading. Eckel and Grossman agree that social factors 
need to be considered to explore the importance and the consequences of the context. 
Therefore, an experiment that aims to measure corruption in small groups needs to 
be context-dependent, since it is of interest to observe those factors that generate and 
legitimate corrupt practices. The context proposed here is constructions of the Lon­
don 2012 Olympic City. The latter comprises 20 independent tasks, called projects. In 
this fictional scenario participants are given one of two roles: politician or contractor. 
Politicians can invite contractors for projects and contractors can place bids. Corrup­
tion is expected to emerge when politicians select a contractor.
Finally, another issue is that typically, recruiting procedures avoid mentioning the 
nature of the task or the expected earnings. This is to decrease the chances of gath­
ering subjects with a specific interest or experience in a task. ContrarÜy, here it is 
claimed that subjects interested in the "res publica" should be particularly attracted. 
For, in reality, these are the ones who undertake a political or similar career, and who 
are the ones of interest in this study.
According to the taxonomy proposed by Harrison and List, the experiment might be 
defined as a framed field experiment where a nonstandard subject pool and field- 
context in the information set. Money is used as a representative stimulus.
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5.6.3 Role Playing Games on a social networking web site
The experiment proposed here aims to provide a tool to gain insight into the extent to 
which group features affect individuals' decisions whether or not to uphold corrupt 
practices. Data obtained from this tool will then be used as input for the Agent-Based 
Model (ABM) discussed in Chapter 7. Similar approaches have been successfully used 
in assessing negotiation processes in natural resources management plaiming (Bar- 
reteau et al., 2003; Etienne, 2003). The approach presented here can be seen as a role- 
playing-game (REG) and aims to exploit participants' interactions to test and sample 
the emergence, spread and sustainability of corruption. Participants are expected to 
log onto the game, pick a role and compete against others.
Key features of the experiment proposed here are: firstly, it provides participants with 
real time information on the group's as well as their own level of honesty. The former 
is calculated as shown in equation 5.1. Let p be a project upon which participants can 
uphold corrupt practices. For simplicity, when a participant is corrupt, such projects 
generate surpluses expressed in money. Then Sp is equal to 1 if project p has generated 
any surplus, 0 otherwise, is is the maximum number of projects that can generate 
surplus. In the current experiment, this is 20. sh captures the level of honesty of each 
member of the group participating in the experiment and it is of key importance for 
monitoring the experiment dynamic at aggregated level. Sh will be used for calib­
ration and validation purposes. It is updated in real time and shown to the players 
through the experiment platform, so that they can perceive the current level of cor­
ruption within their group.
sh = 1 - ^ = ' (5.1)ts
V y
The latter, individual honesty, measures the impact of each individual on the overall 
group honesty level and it is computed as shown in equation 5.2. isp is individual sur­
plus, and it is equal to 1 if project p has been run by the participant and has generated 
any surplus; 0 otherwise.
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The only difference between equation 5.1 and 5.2 are the terms Sp and iSp. h, honesty, 
is also updated in real time and shown to the participants, so that they can have a 
sense of their impact on the level of corruption within their group.
These two measures capture the overall group level of corruption and the individual 
one, so that participants can perceive the society and decide whether to behave ac­
cordingly or not.
Information on the subjects is available through a questionnaire. Before starting the 
experiment, participants answer a set of questions to assess their socio-demographic 
characteristics.
The game replicates an artificial society where participants can interact with each 
other. So, there is a set of rules that defines objectives and backgrounds, but the 
subjects will be free to behave and use whichever heuristics they believe are most 
appropriate for the proposed scenario. The rules of the games are carefully shaped in 
order to investigate the impact of group features on corruption and ultimately identify 
mechanisms to intervene or to predict likely evolution.
Games have been used for fun, for learning (Barreteau et al., 2003; Etienne, 2003; Mi­
chael and Chen, 2005), and for measuring social behaviours (Abbink, 2006; Harrison 
and John, 2004). Since the proposed experiment takes place over time, subjects are 
expected to try different solutions and make several decisions that might cause an un­
desired outcome in the first instance, and then adjust and modify them accordingly. 
Therefore, there is also some sort of learning process involved in the proposed exper­
iment. It might help to depict the social mechanisms that allow for a legitimation of 
corrupt practices. Monitoring and measuring what sort of heuristics are performed, 
and how these are defined will eventually provide an understanding of the generative 
causes for endemic and resilient corruption within the given settings.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the most appropriate way to gather data for shedding light 
on the impact of group featuers on individuals' decisions whether or not to uphold 
corrupt practices. After reviewing the methodologies and techniques used by insti­
tutions and scholars, a RPG experiment is proposed as the most reliable approach. 
This method gives an insight into the dynamics of the process of shaping corruption. 
Moreover, it provides a sustainable way to gather behavioural data over time as well 
as information on the subjects.
Chapter 6
Experiment
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes in detail the method used to gather data on the impact of group 
features on individuals' decisions with respect to corruption. As explained in earlier 
chapters, the aim is to measure corruption dynamically as well as to take a measure of 
the participants' practices and values.
The experiment is divided in two parts: a questionnaire and the actual experiment. 
The questionnaire takes place during the registration phase, when participants are 
expected to answer a set of questions, create a participant account and log onto the 
web application. Once all participants have successfully logged on, the experiment 
starts.
This experiment can be thought of as a game. The aim of the game is to build the Lon­
don 2012 Olympic City. Since corruption within small groups is of interest, 10 players 
are arbitrarily set as the maximum number of participants per game cind the experi­
ment is set to be no more than 60 minutes long. In the particular setting proposed here, 
the experiment takes place in a computer laboratory and involves a demonstrator. 
Two experiments were carried out with a total of 16 participants. The limitations of 
this particular setting in depicting corruption within a small group has been discussed 
in Chapter 5.
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In Section 6.2 the experiment's rules are described. The interface and experimental 
settings are discussed in Section 6.3 and 6.5 respectively. A brief account of the tech­
nology used to implement the experiment is given in Section 6.4. Participants' demo­
graphy is shown in Section 7.3. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Experiment rules
The web application presented here is a Role Playing Game. The latter is a game in 
which players assume the role of fictional characters in a fictional setting (Tychsen, 
2006).
There are two fictional characters: politicians and contractors, these roles are assigned 
at random during the registration phase; and there is one fictional setting: building the 
London 2012 Olympic City. The latter consists of completing 20 projects. A successful 
interaction between a politician and a contractor is needed to complete a project. Such 
an interaction consists of: contractors bidding for projects and politicians granting 
money. A project is a piece of work, such as building the Aquatic Centre or the Bas­
ketball Arena. Table 6.1 shows a list of the 20 projects implemented in this experiment. 
Projects names are listed in the column labelled as names. Each project has a duration 
as illustrated in the duration column. This characteristic doesn't have any particular 
use except for adding a sense of time to the game. Contractors earn a given amount 
of money for completing each project as shown in the profit column. Contractors can 
bid for projects by specifying a cost. There are three possible costs for each project, 
proxying for quality, low medium and high.
Contractors can bid for high-quality, high-cost projects, and are then free to decide 
whether to produce low-quality ones and pocket the difference or spend the total 
granted amount. This is the underlying mechanism for creating corruption on the 
contractor's side. Furthermore, participants can exchange money and politicians can 
adopt corrupt practices by accepting bribes from contractors. The experiment is 180 
fictional weeks long, each fictional week is 20 seconds long. This adds up to 1 hour.
The mechanic of the experiment is illustrated with four Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) diagrams. Namely, one class diagram, two use case diagrams and one se­
quence diagram.
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Figure 6.1 shows the class diagram.
There are two basic classes: Project and Player; and two subclasses of Player, Con­
tractor and Politician. Table 6.1 shows the projects' six fixed features^. Each project 
has a name, a duration in fictional weeks, a cost and a profit that is earned when the 
project is completed. If, for example, a politician P decides to issue a project to a con­
tractor C, the cost of the project proposed by C plus the profit are transferred to C. 
Each project can be carried out with three different costs expressed as: high quality, 
medium quality and low quality. There are five further project attributes that are set 
during the game. The status can be one of following five values:
1. closed: project not available.
2. bidding: project is available and contractors can place bids.
3. issued to x (a contractor): project has been issued to x (a contractor).
4. granted to x (a contractor): project has been accepted by x (a contractor). Money 
has been transferred.
5. completed by x (a contractor): project has been successfully completed by x (a 
contractor).
issued to features the name of the contractor, issued by features the name of the politi­
cian who has issued the project, available is whether or not the project is available, 
qualityBid is the quality required in the bid and the qualitylssued is the quality accepted 
by the politician.
The only function performed by a project is: checkJEnd_Of_Project. It checks whether 
the project has been completed, if yes it sets its status as completed.
^Projects' name and duration were loosely inspired by the London 2012 milestones: 
http:/ /  www.london2012.com/making-it-happen/progress-report/construction-milestones.php
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projectsSet: Array of
openProject( 
project: Project
issueAProject( 
project: Project, 
contractor: Contractor
Politician
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fromAccount:
String.
toAccount: String, 
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high: Integer 
status.lnteger 
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submitABid( 
project: Project, 
poIitician;Politlcian
rejectProject( 
project: Project, 
politician: Politician
payQualityWorkers( 
project: Project
Contractor
Figure 6.1: Experiment classes
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Name duration profit low medium high
Clear and clean sitel 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Clear and clean site2 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Tunnels and cabling 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Switch Tunnels and 5 100 7000 14000 28000
cabling underground
Build Temporary Road 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Build foundation 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Acquatic Centre
Complete Aquatic Centre 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Build roof Aquatic Centre 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Dug out 3 swimming pools 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Fit seats in the Aquatic Centre 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Build foundation Olympic Stadium 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Complete Olympic Stadium 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Build the roof of Olympic Stadium 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Fit seats Olympic Stadium 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Build the field of play in 5 100 7000 14000 28000
the Olympic Stadium
Build foundation 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Basketball Arena
Complete 20 400 15000 30000 45000
Basketball Arena
Build the roof of 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Basketball Arena
Fit seats 10 200 10000 20000 40000
Basketball Arena
Build the field of play in the 5 100 7000 14000 28000
Basketball Arena
Table 6.1; Projects
The second class that constitutes the experiment is Participant. It has 2 attributes: 
balance that is the money available and honesty. The latter has been defined in equation 
5.2.
Participants can perform two actions: send and receive messages and send and re­
ceive money. Each participant can be in either the Contractor subclass or the Politician 
subclass. If the former, it adds to its set of attributes a new one: projectsPortfolio. This 
is a list of completed projects. A contractor can perform four actions: submit bids.
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C hoose quality (money)
«Include!Select projects )
«include»
Submit bids
Send and Receive 
M essages
Negotiation «include»
Contractor
[include»
Accept projects 
^receive m oney! Send and Receive 
Money
\  «include!
Refuse projects
Pay material and workers 
(according to  quality)
Figure 6.2: Contractor
accept or reject projects and pay the cost for the execution of a project. If the latter, a 
list of issued projects, projectsSet, is added to its attributes. A politician can perform 
two actions: open projects and issue projects.
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate use case diagrams for contractors and politicians respect­
ively. These diagrams show what participants can do during the experiment. As far 
as contractors are concerned, when they submit a bid, they also perform two more ac­
tions: selecting a project and choosing a project quality. Contractors can also negotiate 
with other participants, which involves sending and receiving messages and transfer­
ring and receiving money. When contractors accept a project, they immediately pay 
the cost, according to the quality of the project. Politicians and contractors negotiate in 
the same way. However, unlike contractors, politicians can open a project by selecting 
it and they can issue a project by granting money to a contractor.
Figure 6.4 is a sequence diagram. It shows all the steps necessary for politicians emd 
contractors to complete a project. The sequence starts with a politician opening a pro­
ject, then participants that are contractors place bids for the opened project, a politician
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Select projects
«include»
Open projects
Send and receive 
m essages
«include»
Negotiation
«include»
Politician
Send and receive 
money
Issue projects
[Include)
Select Projects
«include»
.Outsource moneyj
Figure 6.3: Politician
issues the project to a contractor. If no project is issued, the sequence goes back to the 
starting point. If the selected contractor accepts the project, money is transferred to its 
bank account. If the selected contractor does not accept the project, the sequence goes 
back to the starting point. As soon as money is received by the contractor, the project 
cost is immediately paid out. This is an automatic procedure and is not controlled by 
contractors. The sequence ends.
6.3 Experiment interface
In this section the experiment interface is described. Figure 6.5 shows a screen capture 
of the interface for a politician.lt has seven elements.
1. On the top-left comer the logo of the experiment's fictional setting is displayed. 
The logo and the background of the interface ware designed by Yaniv Mazliah 
and supervised by Dr. Ya'akok Gal from the Department of Information Systems 
Engineering at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
2. On the right-haind side of the logo the title of the page is shown.
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Figure 6.4: Project
6.3. Experimen t in ter face 93
Available Projects
Game Status
Kane. 1^ 1 
Rde. pc^  Üciæ 
W eeks 0  
Ss ia ïK æ  2S79 
S o c W  Hcs?esïy: 1 
H onesty 1
• Projecis(3) 
Bids(0) 
M aail) 
Bank
c le a n  sS e2
D u ra tio n
1U
P r o m  {€)
2UÜ
P t a r c s s n
la o i
Q u a B y ( € )
1 U K (t}
T u n n e l s  a n d  
c a b lm g
5 1 0 0 b b l 2 8 k  {€)
T u n n e l s  a n d  
c a s fm g  
u n d e rg r o u n d
5 1 0 0 b d d in g
Bu m
T e m p o ra ry
R o a d
5 1 0 0 b d d m g
B und
fo c n d a b o n
A d o u a tic
2 0 4 0 0
Hints
Shon sweraiittos Q  
S h e a . ' ^  
Shiwpaytrtb' □
P r c e s t  D u  r a to n  is  i r
P jsS 5  s  t h e  m o n e y  
c c s it ra c Jo r  g a in s  if 
h e 's h e  m a n a g e s  to  
a a l a p m i K i
P r c ie c f  c a t)  b e  r e a l i ie d  
in 3  d e fe re n t  q u a l ib e s ,  
Q v a B y  is  e x p r e s s e d  m 
m o n e y , t h e  h ig h e r  th e  
gua .'S y  th e  m o re  
e x p e n s w e  a  p r o je c t  « ,  
T h e  h ig h e r  t h e  C h ian tv  
th e  h a p p ie r  i s  th e  
s o c ie ty .
S ta S iS  m S s h o w  5  
d if fe re n t m fo rm ab o r.-
o p e n  c t« k  o r  it  to  o pen  
p n jje c ts  a n d  s la d  th e  
W d ih g  p h a se
Figure 6.5: Experiment interface
3. Next to it, on the top-right corner an element called Game Status is located.
4. Just below the logo, there is a menu for navigating the platform.
5. To the right of the menu, the page content is shown.
6. Just below Game Status an element called Hints is displayed.
7. The final element is the footer, at the bottom of the page.
Designing the experiment interface has been as challenging as designing the actual 
experiment mechanics. As mentioned in Section 6.2 this experiment can be thought of 
as a Role Playing Game. Often these kinds of games offer participants many different 
actions and ways of interacting with others. Game interfaces can be very complicated, 
and often a lot of time is required just to understand platform functionalities. Unfortu­
nately, in the setting proposed here, participants had only 15 minutes to become fully
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Game Status
Name: Iab1 
Role: politician 
Weeks left: 0  
Balance: 2570 
Social Honesty: 1 
My Honesty: 1 
Logout
Figure 6.6: Status
familiar with the interface. Therefore, a balance between allowed actions and interface 
simplicity was sought.
Two pilots were run before accomplishing the final interface. The first version was 
too complicated and participants spent their time trying to understand how to com­
plete a single action rather than focusing on their strategies. The second version was 
simple enough to be understood in a few minutes, but it was too static and required 
participants to continously refresh the web page. The final version was improved by 
adding asynchronous updating of several elements, so that it maintained its simplicity 
and at the same time managed to show real time changes during the experiment. Par­
ticipants' comments at the end of the experiments evaluated the interface positively, 
stressing its simplicity and completeness. A description of each interface element fol­
lows.
6.3.1 Status
As shown in Figure 6.6, general information on the current status of the experiment 
is presented. This section is asynchronously updated so that changes in the game are 
shown without refreshing the page. Participants' nicknames and roles as well as the 
number of weeks left to the end of the game are displayed in the first three rows. Next, 
participants' balance and honesty are shown. Here, a new measure is introduced: social 
honesty, which is defined in equation 5.1.
6.3.2 Menu
There are two different menus according to participant roles. Figures 6.7 emd 6.8 show 
the menus for contractors cind politicians respectively. All menu elements are asyn-
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• Projects(3) 
Issued Projects(l)
Maü(0)
Bank
Figure 6.7: M enu for Contractors
• Proj^ts(3)
Bids(0)
Mail(l)
Bank
Figure 6.8: M enu for Politicians
chronously updated if there are available projects, unseen bids, issued projects, or 
new mails. The respective element turns bold and displays the number of new items 
in rormded brackets. Both contractors and politicians can check the status of projects 
by pressing Projects, manage mail by pressing Mail, or check their balance by clicking 
on Bank. Contractors can monitor issued projects by clicking on Issued Projects and 
politicians can observe bids by clicking on Bids.
6.3.3 Page content
Page content is the most complex element of the interface. It shows the content of 
several pages tailored to each participant, and it is asynchronously updated.
6.3.3.1 Projects
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show what contractors and politicians respectively see when they 
are on the Projects page. Politicians are presented with a table. There are 6 columns
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Tunnels and 
cabling 5 100 labi 28k (€}
Switch 
Tunnels and 
cabling 
underground
5 100 bidding
BuM
Temporary
Road
5 100 bidding
Build
foundation
A cquatc
Centre
20 400 f open I
Figure 6.9: Projects for Politicians
that show for each project: name, duration, profit, if and which politician has issued it, 
the cost and the status. In the status column, politicians can monitor the status of each 
project. Here they can open a project by pressing the open button. After that, projects 
change status and display bidding, which means that contractors are now bidding for 
projects. Figure 6.10 shows the contractors' view. The only difference from the politi­
cians' page is that contractors can select, for each project, a Politician and a Quality and, 
by pressing the button Bid in the Status column, they can place bids.
6.3.S.2 Bids
Once bids have been placed, politicicms go to the Bids page. Figure 6.11 shows a screen 
capture of the page content. Again, politicians are presented with a table. This shows 
bid details, project name, the contractor who has placed the bid, the asking cost and 
the time of submission. For each bid there is an issue button. By pressing it, politicians 
can issue a project. This then initiates the asynchronous update of the project status in 
the Projects page, from biddmg to issued to x (a contractor).
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Figure 6.10: Projects for Contractors
Name Contractor Cost (€) Time
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Figure 6.11: Bids
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Figure 6.12: Issued projects
6.3.3.S Issued Projects
In the case that a contractor has been granted a project, s /h e  can go to the Issued Pro­
jects page (Figure 6.12) . Here a new table shows the details of the granted projects: 
project name, the politician that has issued it, the profit for completing it, and the 
asking price. The Quality column is of key importance. Here contractors can decide 
whether to pay the entire granted amount or a different one for carrying out the pro­
ject. The last two buttons either start or decline a project. If the former, in the Projects 
page, the project status is updated asynchronously from issued to x to granted to x. If 
the latter, the status is updated to bidding and a new bidding phase starts. Finally, the 
project status is set to completed after the project duration.
6.3.3.4 Mail
Participants c£m send mail and money to each other. They can do so by going to the 
Mail page. The page presents itself as shown in Figure 6.13. It is a table that, for 
each message, shows the name of the sender, the subject of the message, if and how 
much money has been transferred and when the message was sent. Bold texts indicate 
unread messages. Participants can read them by pressing Read and reply to them by 
pressing Reply.
Both for replying to a message and sending a new one, participants are presented 
with a page as shown in Figure 6.14. Money can be sent together with a message to
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Com pose new mail ] ( Check sent mail
From Subject Money Time
lab16 XX 100 12:06:37 ( Read | { Reply
I want project X, here is the money!
Iab16 XX 500 12:06:26 | Read | | Reply
Figure 6.13: Read mails
the selected participant.
6.3.3.S Bank
By clicking on Bank participants are redirected to a new page where they can check 
their money movements. The page looks like Figure 6.15. The balance is shown in 
large font and just below it a table shows the participant's money flow.
6.3.4 H ints
The decision to create this element within the interface came after two rmsuccessful 
pilots of the experiment. Participants were generally struggling to grasp the platform 
mechanics and experiment rules. By navigating this new element, hints on three as­
pects of the experiment are provided.
By ticking the first tick box, as Figure 6.16 illustrates, general rules about the experi­
ment are shown, and information on how to win the game, how to make money and 
change honesty value are described.
Hints on the current page are displayed by ticking the second tick box. This is useful 
for participants who do not remember how to interact with the system. Figure 6.17, 
for example, shows hmts on the Projects page.
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To
la b ie  (contractor)
Subject
M essage
Money
Send Message
Figure 6.14: Send mails
Balance: 26
ln(€) Out (€) Time
To lab? 7 11:30:55
From tab10 30 11:28:49
To lab5 1 16:20:54
To lab? 1 16:19:34
To lab10 90 16:16:0?
To lablO 5 16:17:04
To tabs 200 16:15:28
From lablO 300 16:03:11
Figure 6.15: Bank
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Hints
Shew»’ gereral rules 
Shew,' page hints Q
Show players list 0
The winner of the 
game is the one that 
gains more money and 
makes the society 
happier than the 
others.
You make money by 
completing projects 
and make the society 
happy by increasing 
the quality of the 
projects.
Check out your 
username, role, weeks 
left to the end of the 
game, your balance 
and happiness on the 
top right corner of the 
page.
Happiness ranges from 
0 to 1. When happiness
Figure 6.16: Hints for experiment rules
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Hints
Show general rules Q  
Shiow page hints 
Show players list Q
Project Duration is In 
weeks.
Profit is the money 
contractor gains If 
he/she m anages to 
start a project.
Project can be realized 
in 3 different qualities. 
Quality is expressed in 
money, the higher the 
quality the more 
expenspye a project is. 
The higher the Quality 
the happier is the 
society.
Status will show 5 
different information:
open: click on it to open 
projects and start the 
bidding phase, 
bidding: Contractors are 
bidding. Check whether 
Bids In the menu turns 
bold, it also shows how 
many bids you have 
recived. Click on it to 
choose who to issue a 
project to.
issued ’o x: Project has 
been issued to x. 
granted to x : Project has 
been accepted by x 
Money has been 
transfered, Project starts 
and will last for Duration, 
completed by x. Project 
has been succesfully 
completed by x.
Figure 6.17: Hints for current page
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Hints
Stow gereral rules Q  
Stow page hints 0  
Stow players list
labi (politician)
Iab14 (contractor) 
lab15 (politician) 
Iab16 (contractor) 
labi 7 (contractor) 
lab 18 (contractor) 
Iab19 (contractor) 
!ab20 (contractor)
Figure 6.18: Hints for players
The last tick box, if ticked, shows a list of participants and their roles, see Figure 6.18 
for ctn example.
6.4 Experiment implementation
The experiment was run on a Apache 2.2.4 Linux/SUSE server located at the Uni­
versity of Surrey. PHP 5.2.4 is used to implement server side functions such us user 
registration and login as well as managing the data system. MySQL 5.0.45 is used to 
implement the database and store participants' actions. On the client side, HTML, CSS 
and the Prototype JavaScript class are used to produce the asynchronous interface.
6.5 Experiment setting
This section describes how the experiment has been carried out. After gathering parti­
cipants in a computer laboratory, a demonstrator introduces the experiment. A train­
ing session then starts, where participants become familiar with the experiment inter­
face and rules. The demonstrator shows all the features of the platform. After train­
ing, a registration phase begins. Participants answer a questionnaire and then define 
a nickname. When all participants have registered the actual experiment starts. At the 
end of the experiment prizes are awarded to the participants.
In order to motivate participants £5 is given to all of them. Moreover, since this is
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presented as a game, the winner gets an extra £25. The experiment was sponsored by 
and hosted at the School of Engineering and Digital Arts at the University of Kent, 
supervised by Dr. Jimmy Ang and demonstrated by Mr. Panote Siriaraya.
6.5.1 Experiment introduction
During the introduction to the experiment the demonstrator welcomes participants 
and gives a 10 minute talk about the game. This talk covers the following issues:
• checking web access
• enabling Java-Script on the preferred browser
• describing the experiment scenario as follows: Olympic City 2012 is a Role Play­
ing Game. Roles are: politicians and contractors. Politicians have the ability to 
open projects and invite contractors to bid for them. Contractors have the ability 
to bid for projects and complete them. Completing the Olympic City means to 
terminate 20 projects. The winner of the game is the one with the highest score.
• introducing the next phase: training. Participants are provided with a temporary 
account to log on the system so that they can become familiar and play with the 
interface.
• Introducing the following phase: experiment. Participants are asked to log out 
and create a new account. The latter is the one to be used for the game.
6.5.2 Training
The training session is 15 minutes long. The demonstrator invites participants to go 
to the following website: h ttp ://socnt04.soc.surrey.ac.uk/NewGame/pages/ emd log 
in using the provided accounts. Once all participants have successfully logged in, the 
demonstrator briefly explains interface features and experiment rules. A number of 
task needs to be tested:
• ask politicians to open a project.
• ask contractors to bid for a project.
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• ask politicians to issue a project.
• ask contractors to accept or decline an issued project.
• ask participants to send and read an email.
• ask participants to transfer money.
The last point to be covered by the demonstrator is to explain the scoring system to 
the participants. That is the combination of two rankings: amount of gained money 
and personal level of honesty. This is key so that they can decide on their strategy.
Therefore, participant scores are obtained by combining a participant's balance and 
honesty as shown in equation 7.1.
6.5.3 Questionnaire
The questiormaire is taken from the study carried out by House et al. (2002) as de­
scribed in Chapter 3. It is divided into three parts, which measure individual collect­
ivism practices, hum an orientation practices and uncertainty avoidance values. All 
questions present a 7 points scale. Table 6.2 illustrates four questions for measuring 
individual collectivism.
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strongly strongly
agree desagree
In this society, leaders encourage
group loyalty even 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
if individual suffer:
Individual Colective
interests interests
The economic system
in this society is designed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
to maximize:
strongly strongly
agree desagree
In this society, children
take pride in the individual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
accomplishments of their parents:
strongly strongly
agree desagree
In this society, parents
take pride in the individual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
accomplishments of their children;
Table 6.2: Individual collectivism practice
Table 6.3 shows five questions for measuring hum an orientation practices and in Table
6.4 questions for measuring uncertainty avoidance values are listed.
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very 
concerned 
abuot others
not at all 
concerned 
abuot others
In this society, people are generally: 2 3 4 5 6
very 
sensitive 
towards others
not at all 
sensitive 
towards others
In this society, people are generally: 2 3 4 5 6
very
friendly
not at all 
friendly
In this society, people are generally: 2 3 4 5 6
very 
tolerant of 
mistakes
not at all 
tolerant of 
mistakes
In this society, people are generally: 2 3 4 5 6
very
generous
not at all 
generous
In this society, people are generally: 2 3 4 5 6
Table 6.3: Human orientation practice
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strongly strongly
agree disagree
I believe that orderliness
and consistency should be stressed, even at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the expense of experimentation and innovation;
strongly strongly
agree disagree
I believe that societal requirements and
instructions should be spelled out in detail 1 2 • 3 4 5 6 7
so citizens know what they are expected to do:
has a lot is missing
to be a lot of
thankful for excitement
I believe that a person w ho
leads a structured life that 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
has few  unexpected events:
almost all very few
situations situations
1 believe that society
should have rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
or laws to cover:
Table 6.4: Uncertainty avoidance values
All answer scores, except those for question 2 for individual collectivism and question 
2 for uncertainty avoidance, are reversed, so for instance, 1 becomes 7 and 7 becomes 
l.The value of each cultural dimension is worked out by calculating the mean of parti­
cipant answers. The meaning of each cultural dimension is discussed in Section 3.3.1.
6.5.4 Game
The demonstrator logs into the game as the administrator and sets the number of 
politicians and contractors for each game (a minimum of 2 politicians and 4 contract­
ors). The demonstrator checks that all participants have logged out from the training 
account gmd started the registration process. Once all participants have successfully 
registered, the demonstrator starts the game.
6.6. Conclusion 109
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has described the methodology used for gathering data on the social con­
struction of corruption. A web-based application was presented, which can present to 
users personalised information updated asynchronously. The participants in the ex­
periment are trained before the actual measure is taken, so that they are aware of ex­
periment rules and familiar with platform functionalities. The experiment's fictional 
setting is to build the London 2012 Olympic City. Participants are put into two roles: 
politicians and contractors. 20 projects need to be completed in order to build the 
Olympic City. Only a successful interaction between a politician and a contractor can 
complete a project. Participants' performances are monitored throughout the exper­
iment and an aggregate score is calculated at the end to produce a ranking. Each 
participant was paid £5 for taking part and the ones at the top of the ranking was 
awarded a £25 prize.
Sixteen people took part in the experiment. They were divided into two groups, both 
with 2 politicians and 6 contractors. The experiments were carried out successfully. 
The data collected can be analysed to shed light on the impact of group features on 
individuals' decisions with respect to corrupt practices. In the next chapter the data is 
analysed and a model for building an understanding of the effect of society in deciding 
whether to uphold corrupt practices is also presented.
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Chapter 7
Experiment results and modelling
7.1 Introduction
This chapter describes experiment results along with a description of an agent-based 
model (ABM). Two experiments have been carried out, the first one is used to calibrate 
the ABM and the second one is used for ABM validation. In Section 7.2 a model to 
replicate and formalise the proposed understanding of corruption is proposed. In 
Section 7.4 an analysis of the experiment is provided in order to capture its dynamic. 
In Section 7.5 an ABM to replicate experiment outcomes is described along with a 
set of simulations for calibrating and validating it. Section 7.6 illustrates simulation 
results and provides a preliminary understanding of corruption within small groups. 
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Model building
The modelling approach proposed here is known as agent-based modelling (Gilbert, 
2008). According to an ABM approach to social science research, modelling the struc­
tural properties of social systems and exploring their spatio-temporal development 
via computer simulation are crucial steps to providing generative explanations of 
complex social outcome (Epstein, 2006; Squazzoni, 2009). In Chapter 4 a comparison 
of different analytic tools that could have been used for modelling is discussed along 
with the reasons for choosing an ABM approach.
I l l
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Creating a model where many conflicting norms can exist at the same time and in­
dividuals can conform to norms that they do not endorse entails a careful design of 
the diversity of the agents as well as replicating what Coleman (1990) described as an 
"upward and downward social dynamic".
In order to understand corruption and to respond to the two issues mentioned above, 
the concept of 'ideological field' is proposed. This concept demands the clarification 
of the two terms involved in the name. On the one hand, the notion of ideology is 
strongly associated with the Marxist tradition in sociology (Larrain, 1979), and al­
though there are several definitions in the literature, here the concept is used in its 
more general sense as a body of normative expectations shared by a social group. On 
the other hand, following Bourdieu (1985, p. 724), a social field can be described as "a 
multi-dimensional space of positions such that every actual position can be defined 
in terms of a multi-dimensional system of co-ordinates whose values correspond to 
the values of the different pertinent variables." As a co-ordinated system, the field 
expresses all the possible values one individual can have.
In order to be meaningful, the field should be interpreted, firstly against some relev­
ant topic in the social realm and secondly, according to some proper measurement, 
applied to a set of individual located in the field which indicates the proximity of the 
individuals located in the field to the topic. By defining these two elements (the topic 
and the proper measurement), each agent can be located within the field and identified 
with its corresponding value. When some individuals are within the ideological field 
they define a group, and by defining its normative expectations through the aggreg­
ation of its members' practices and values, group differences can be highlighted. For 
this reason, an ideological field can describe the different groups or clusters of norm­
ative expectations that exist in a given social setting, and at the same time maintain 
individual practices and values.
7.2.1 The purpose of a model
A key feature of the ideological field is that it represents and distinguishes in a neat 
and clear way the complexity of the upward amd downward social dynamic, so that 
individuals' practices and values and group-driven actions can be implemented and
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measured without generating confusion. Individuals perceive the current state of their 
groups as well as maintain and adjust their own practices and values. The ideological 
field allows for the simultaneous measure of how groups' and individuals' states vary, 
and therefore different measurements can be taken and an assessment made on how 
one affects the other.
7.2.2 Introducing a corruption ABM
7.2.2.1 Environment
Figure 7.1 shows a view of the ideological field, known from now as the honesty field. 
This consists of a two dimensional surface over which agents are given the ability to 
move. The surface is circular with each location denoting a particular propensity to 
adopt corrupt practices, or honesty level. The centre of the circle represents the highest 
propensity to adopt a corrupt practice, and there the honesty level is equal to 0. At the 
edge of the surface the circle is the highest level of honesty so no corruption prac­
tices are adopted. The agents thus move not in a representation of physical space, but 
rather in propensity to conform to corrupt practices. Therefore, an agent's movement 
in the honesty field from one location to another stands for its change from one hon­
esty level to another. Whilst individuals' honesty levels are measured as the distance 
from the centre of the field, the group's honesty level is measured as the area of the 
polygon obtained by lines joining all the individuals within the field. The reason why 
a circle is used to represent the field is two-fold. Firstly it is an intuitive way of visu­
alising individuals' honesty levels and at the same time their groups' honesty levels. 
Secondly, it allows for reducing the impact of the number of individuals in measuring 
the group's honesty level. Given the set of regular polygons that have the same outer 
circle, it is possible to associate a coefficient for each polygon so that its area can be 
corrected to the one of the circle. In this way, honesty levels of groups with different 
numbers of individuals can be compared.
7.2.2.2 Agents
Agents represent individuals. They have an internal state that stands for their own 
practices and values. The latter expresses the individual's opinion on whether or not 
to uphold illicit behaviours. This is inferred by three agent attributes that represent
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Figure 7.1: The ideological Field
individual collectivism practices; human orientation practices; and rmcertainty avoid­
ance values. Agents' rules of action are selected with reference to the values of these 
three features.
7.2.2.3 In teractions
Agents have senses that allow them to perceive their group. These perceptions are 
essential when the agents apply the Contingency and Conditional conditions (see Sec­
tion 3.3.2) in order to decide to which norm to conform.
7.3 Experiment data
Two experiments have been carried out. 16 people took part and were divided into 
two separate experiments. Participants in the first experiment are identified by the fol­
lowing nicknames(age) and roles. Politicians: Nawin(27) and testerl3(29). Contract­
ors: Takashi(34), smoke_sky(25), Hibino(31), kent_01(25), Taksin(21) and David_C(35). 
There were 6 males and 2 females, all from Thailand. Table 7.1 shows the final ranking 
of experiment 1. kentOl is the winner.
Participants scores are worked out as follows: let balance be the amount of money and 
honest}/ be the participant level of corruption (see equation 5.2). Firstly, two separate 
rankings are produced, both ordered from highest to lowest. Let rbp and rlip be the
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rank of participant p in the balance and honesty rankings respectively, and np be the 
number of participants. The higher the position in the two rankings the higher the 
score.
.core, =  1 -
np^
(7.1)
Name Score Balance Honesty
kentOl 0.94 100600 0.81
David_C 0.92 1400 1
smoke_sky 0.91 400 1
Hibino 0.91 400 1
Takashi 0.89 200 1
testerl3 0.87 15416 0.92
Taksin 0.86 25400 0.89
Nawin 0.84 51416 0.77
Table 7.1: Participant ranking, experiment 1
Participants in the second experiment are identified by the following nicknames(age) 
and roles. Politicians: okey2010(32) and scy7(33). Contractors: happyl3(29), Sport- 
Builders(26), sweetypie(43), DickChaney(32) and merrychristmas(27). They were 6 
males and 2 females, including 4 British, 1 American, 1 Indian, 1 Thai and 1 Taiwanese. 
Table 7.2 shows the final ranking of experiment 2. sweetypie is the winner.
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Name Score Balance Honesty
sweetypie 0.97 10900 0.97
scy7 0.97 3940 1
DickChaney 0.94 1000 1
SportBuilders 0.92 800 1
DarthVader 0.91 600 1
okey2010 0.91 2340 0.97
happyl3 0.89 300 1
merrychristmas 0.87 0 1
Table 7.2: Participant ranking, experiment 2
The sample ranges from 21 to 43 years old, come from 5 different countries and both 
sexes are represented. Unfortunately, the sample is not large enough to run any re­
gression analysis, but it is diverse enough to run preliminary tests of the analytic tools 
developed in this work for inferring behaviours that concern corrupt practices.
As a preliminary test, two experiments have been run, since one is needed for model 
calibration and the other for model validation. The purpose of this is firstly, to show 
the strong relation between the proposed methodology and empirical observation; 
secondly, to illustrate analytic techniques to investigate the complexity captured by 
the experiments.
7.4 Experiment results
The experiment analyses presented here aim to find a set of features that can be used 
to design an ABM. Namely, the definition of a set of agents, an environment where the 
agents are embedded, and a set of interactions among agents and between agents emd 
their environment. A four-fold process is needed to design such ABM. Firstly (Section 
7.4.1) individual practices and values, as described in Chapter 3, are aggregated in a 
value called the honesty level. This value captures the propensity of an individual to 
uphold corrupt practices. Secondly (Section 7.4.2), participants' honesty levels are fur­
ther aggregated in a new value called the social honesty level, which captures the hon­
esty level of the whole group. This value allows for the definition of the environment.
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Thirdly (Section 7.43), participants' interactions are identified and quantified, which 
allows for the definition of the interactions. Finally (Section 7.4.4), a set of strategies 
is derived from participants' actions, which is a key aspect because it allows for the 
definition of agents' rules.
7.4.1 Aggregating group features
As shown in Chapter 3 there are significant relationships between three group fea­
tures and the corruption perception index (CPI): CPI is associated with low individual 
collectivism practices, moderate hum an orientation practices and high uncertainty 
avoidance values. Each of these three features ranges between 1 and 7. In order to 
infer the initial corruption level of a certain group, they need to be aggregated to a 
unique value. This value is worked out by: firstly, transforming each group's features 
in a range between 0 and 1 as shown in equations 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. The results are 
then aggregated as shown in equation 7.5. i, ho and ua are individual collectivism 
practices, hum an orientation practices and uncertainty avoidance values respectively. 
Because there is no previous work that relate these three features to corruption, linear 
functions have been arbitrarily chosen.
Since low individual collectivism can be related to low honesty, ti, transformed indi­
vidual collectivism practices grow linearly with individual collectivism practices as 
illustrated in Figure 7.2(a).
«  =  i  (7.2)
the, shown in Figure 7.2(b), is transformed hum an orientation practices. It decreases 
from 1 to 0 when hum an orientation practices increase from 1 to 4 and increases from 
0 to 1 when hum an orientation practices increase from 4 to 7. The idea that moderate 
hum an orientation represents low honesty is therefore captured by the.
the — <
—^ ho -F  ^ ho < — 4
(7.3)
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Individualism
§
s
I
§
H um an O rientation
s
s
U ncertainty A voidance
(a) Individualism (b) Human Orientation (c) Uncertainty Avoidance
Figure 7.2: Cultural measures transformation
tua stands for transformed uncertainty avoidance values. It steadily decreases from 
1 to 0 when uncertainty avoidance values increase from 1 to 7. This is because high 
uncertainty avoidance is thought to be related to low honesty.
1 , 7
tUQ — ——MU +  — D 0 (7.4)
Finally, ti, tho and tua are aggregated as shown in equation 7.5. The resulting hon­
esty level, h, ranges between 0 and 1 and captures the corruption propensity of an 
individual.
h —
{ti +  tho +  tua)
(7.5)
This definition differs from the one presented in Section 5.6.3 . This is because an 
honesty level is required for initialising the agents. Group features are used as a proxy 
for the initial corruption level of each agent as well as for the group as a whole. This is 
of key importance so that simulation outcomes can be compared with the initial state 
of the model, and therefore build an understanding of the dynamic produced during 
model runs. Once the simulation starts, honesty is measured as shown in equation 7.6. 
This is the same honesty as measured during the experiment, equation 5.2. ts is the 
total number of projects that can generate surplus, isp is the individual surplus and 
it is equal to 1 if project p has been issued by or granted to the participant, and has 
generated any surplus; 0 otherwise.
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t s
\
(7.6)
7.4.1.1 Visualizing honesty level
A useful way of visualising the aggregation proposed above, without losing the con­
tribution of each group feature is shown in Figure 7.3. A participant that has a low 
honesty level, that is, a high corruption propensity, has group features as shown in 
Figure 7.3(a): very low individual collectivism practices, moderate hum an orientation 
practices and high uncertainty avoidance values.
In contrast, high individual collectivism practices, low uncertainty avoidance values 
and either low or high hum an orientation practices represents a participant with a 
high honesty level as illustrated in Figures 7.3(b) and 7.3(c) respectively.
These representations will come in useful when comparing participant actions and 
their group features.
7.4.2 Defining honesty space
In the Section above an aggregated measure for honesty levels based on group features 
was presented. As previously mentioned in Section 7.3, two experiments were carried 
out. Let's call them experiment 1 and experiment 2. The following analysis considers 
experiment 1, in fact this is the one used for model calibration.
Here, the small group of participants is represented as a circle, as illustrated in Figure 
7.4. Group members lie at equal distance inside the circle. The distance from the 
centre of the circle identifies participants' honesty, so if, for instance, a participant has 
an honesty level equal to 0.2, it will be located on the segment from the centre to the 
participant's name at radius 0.2. The closer to the centre the lower the honesty level of 
the participant.
Social honesty level is defined as the area of the polygon obtained by joining parti­
cipants' honesty levels.
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(a) Low honesty
(b) High honesty
Individualisni 
Human Orientation 
Uncertainty Avoidance
(c) High honesty
Figure 7.3: Visualizing honest}/
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Figure 7.4: Honesty space
In Section 5.6 a different definition of social honesty  was already provided. Although 
the two definition apply to the same phenomenon they are measured differently. Here, 
this is an operational measure and it is coherent with the model. The one proposed 
before was only a proxy for allowing participants to observe the current social honesty 
level during the game.
Figure 7.5 shows the initial social honesty level for experiment 1. It is equal to 0.41. Tliis 
value comes from the aggregation of individual features, namely from participants 
answers to the questionnaire. The red area within the honesty circle represents the 
polygon defined by each honesty level.
Figure 7.6 shows the social honesty  level at the end of experiment 1. It is equal to 0.67. 
This value is derived from participants' actions at the end of the experiment.
The two politicians, Nawin and testerl3, started at around 0.3, and both finished at an 
ho7testy level of 0.6. As far as the contractors are concerned, kentOl and Taksin both 
started at an honesty level just above 0.4 and both finished at 0. All the others except for 
David_C, started with an initial honesty level of around 0.3, and all of them finished at 
honesty  levels equal to 1. For some participants their honesty level decreases, whereas
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Initial socia l h on esty  level
h o n e s ty  level =  0 .41  
t e s t e r l  3
s m o k e _ s k y
Figure 7.5: Initial social honesty level
Final socia l h onesty  level
h o n e s ty  level =  0 .6 7  
t e s t e r l  3
s m o k e _ s k y - i  Taksin
Figure 7.6: Final social honesty level
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for others it increases. In particular, kentOl and Taksin, who were the ones with the 
highest initial honesty level, concluded the experiment with the lowest honesty level. In 
order to understand how participants moved from their initial level of honesty to their 
final level requires a deeper investigation of the experiment. The next two sections 
attempt to address and identify likely participants' actions and interactions.
7.4.3 Participants' interactions
The experiment allows participants to interact in four different ways. Firstly, they 
can exchange messages. Secondly, contractors can submit bids and politicians receive 
them. Thirdly, politicians can issue projects and contractors complete them. Finally, 
contractors can bribe and politicians can receive bribes. In order to analyse each inter­
action, four direct networks are generated. Node represent participants and are visu­
alised as suggested in Section 7.4.1.1, that is, showing group features. Nodes labels 
are coloured and sized based on participants' roles. Small and black coloured fonts 
represent contractors whereas big and blue coloured fonts represent politicians. Links 
stand for the existence of an interaction between two participants and are coloured 
using a grey scale. The darker the colour the higher the frequency of the interaction.
7.4.3.1 Messages
Figure 7.7 illustrates all the messages exchanged during experiment 1. There are no 
"horizontal" messages. Participants with the same role do not communicate. There 
are only "vertical" messages. It is clear, therefore, that politicians Nawin and testerlS 
are central within the network. Moreover, all contractors communicate with Nawin, 
whereas Hibino and smoke_sky did not exchange messages with testerl3. Group fea­
tures do not seem to add much information to this network, since it is clearly driven 
by participants' roles.
7.4.3.2 Bids
In Figure 7.8 all the bids from contractors to politicians are shown. Except for kentOl, 
who submitted bids evenly towards the two politicicms, all the other contractors pre­
ferred one politician to the other. Only smoke_sky submitted a bid to only one politi­
cian, Nawin. Also in this network, group features do not seem to add any information.
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M essages
humanOrientation
uncertaintyAvoidance
tester 13
Nawin
Takashi
smoke_sky
15
N u m b e r  o f  M e s s a g e s
Figure 7.7: Messages
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Bids
humanOrientation
uncertaintyAvoidance
Nawin
tester 13
Hibino
Takashi
smoke_sky
*
N u m b e r  o f  B id s
Figure 7.8: Bids
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7.4.3.S Projects
Figure 7.9 shows projects issued by politicians to contractors. Nawin has issued 12 
projects whereas testerlS issued 8. David_C has received 5 projects from Nawin and 
1 from testerlS and is the contractor that has completed the greatest number of pro­
jects. Nawin has issued to all contractors except Hibino, testerlS to all but Taksin and 
smoke_sky. testerlS seems to have issued projects to contractors with similar indi­
vidual features.
7.4.5.4 Bribes
Bribes are described in Figure 7.10. There have been 6 bribes in total: 2 from Taksin to 
Nawin, 2 from kentOl to Nawin and 2 from kentOl to testerlS. Nawin, as shown by its 
cultural measure is the most bribe prone politician, s /h e  has taken 4 bribes out of the 
12 projects issued, SS% of aU cases. testerlS has taken 2 bribes out of 8 projects issued, 
25%.
7.4.3.5 Money flows
In Figures 7.11 and 7.12, money flows for politicians and contractors are shown re­
spectively. Salary constitutes a small part of the money gained by politicians. The 
logarithmic scale shows a difference of 10® between money granted and salary and 
of around IC  ^between received bribes and salary. Their greatest income comes from 
bribes. As for contractors, kentOl has spent less money than Taksm on bribes, even 
though s /h e  has bribed more times. Moreover s /h e  has been granted by far the 
highest amount of money. All the other participants have paid out exactly the amount 
that they were granted.
7.4.4 Dynamic strategies
In the section above participants' interactions are identified and quantified. In order 
to define a set of strategies able to capture all the actions performed during the ex­
periment, an aggregation of the four direct networks shown above is necessary. An 
attempt at doing so is shown in Figure 7.13. The latter illustrates the intensity and 
the kind of interactions between all participants. This plot can be thought of as a 
matrix, where rows are participants from which interactions start and columns are
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participants to which interactions end. Row and column names identify each par­
ticipant and the names' font size and colour their roles. As above, small and black 
coloured fonts represent contractors whereas big and blue coloured fonts represent 
politicians. For instance, Taksin has placed a bid with testerl3 almost 15 times (row 
Taksin, column testerl3 and blue bar). Figure 7.13 is very useful for detecting parti­
cipants' strategies. Let us start by observing the two politicians.
Nawin has granted projects to all contractors but Hibino, and has also exchanged 
messages with all of them. However, testerl3 has issued a project to Hibino without 
receiving or sending any message.
As far as contractors are concerned, kentOl has sent messages and bribes to the two 
politicians, but David.C and Takashi have only exchanged messages. Taksin has 
bribed Nawin but not testerl3 and exchanged messages with both of them. smoke_sky 
and Hibino have sent messages to Nawin only.
The same three strategies for each role are can be observed. Politicians issue projects 
to contractors that:
• Strategy 1: place bids
• Strategy 2: place bids and exchange messages
• Strategy 3: place bids, exchange messages and receive/pay bribes
From now on, these three actions are referred to as Strategies with capital S. Given 
the constraints of the game, these three Strategies are almost all the participants can 
do. The only other action that was allowed, but has not been performed by any of the 
participants, is to send horizontal messages, that is between participants with the same 
role. Therefore a further simplification of the ABM can be made by not implementing 
horizontal messages.
7.4.4.1 Actions over time
The experiment allows for continuous monitoring of participants' activities, and it is 
therefore possible to track whether or not participants have changed their Strategies
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Figure 7.14: Participants' activities over time
over time. Figure 7.14 illustrates a cumulative count of each action during the game. 
The number of messages exchanged increases steadily over time whereas bids happen 
only at the beginning of the game. Projects and bribes are allocated and paid through­
out the experiment. In order to detect changes in Strategies over time it is necessary 
to associate each action to a participemt.
A first attempt to do so is shown in Figure 7.15. Here, as time passes, projects are 
issued from politicians on the right-hand side of the plot to contractors on the left- 
hand side. kentOl has been granted most of h is/her projects at the beginning of the 
game, contrarily David_C towards the end. Moreover, smoke_sky has been granted 
projects during the central part of the experiment. These three contractors have been 
granted 15 out of 20 projects, and since kentOl has consistently bribed the two politi­
cians, whereas neither smoke_sky nor David_C have ever done so, it is clear that the 
two politicians have somehow changed their actions by preferring Strategy 3 at the 
beginning and Strategy 2 towards the end. This observed changing of Strategy is 
known as caution shifts (Stoner, 1968). During the experiment, group's members inter­
actions have caused a shift from the riskiest Strategy (Strategy 3) to a more cautious
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one (Strategy 2).
A more complete visualisation of the dynamic of the game is suggested in Figures 7.16 
and 7.17 for politicians Nawin and testerl3 respectively. Actions are represented with 
points of different shapes and colours. Black squares are granted projects, red circles 
are sent and received messages, green triangles are paid bribes and purple circles are 
placed bids. Two politicians can be observed changing from Strategy 3 to Strategy 2 
over time. testerl3 at around time =  720 has issued 3 projects receiving no bribes 
but just messages and bids from kentOl and only bids from Hibino. Towards the 
end of the game, around time — 2160, s /h e  has received 2 bribes from kentOl and 
issued three projects to kentOl, Takashi and David.C respectively. As far as Nawin 
is concerned, up until time =  1000 s /h e  has issued three projects and received two 
bribes from kentOl. From time — 1000, to just above time — 2200, s /h e  has issued 
11 projects receiving only 2 bribes from kentOl. Therefore, whereas testerl3 at the 
beginning of the experiment was more bribe accepting, s /h e  was less so at the end 
of the experiment. Nawin, however changed h is/her Strategy from being more bribe 
accepting at the beginning to less so the end of the experiment. In order to understand 
whether this change from Strategy 3 to Strategy 2 by the politicians was driven by 
group actions, and ultimately by group features, an agent-based model is proposed.
7.5 An agent based model
The agent-based model aims to provide an understanding of whether participants' 
decisions were driven by their groups' actions. From the analyses proposed above, it 
has been shown that the two politicians have changed between Strategy 3 to Strategy 
2 during the game: Nawin, by adopting corrupt practices at the beginning and not at 
the end, and vice versa for testerlS. Contractors were consistent in maintaining the 
same Strategy during the game: kentOl and Taksin tried to bribe politicians (Strategy 
3) whereas the others never did (Strategy 2 and 1).
As stated in Section 3.2, the research question is as follows: to what extent do group 
features affect individuals' decision processes in engaging in corrupt practices? Agents' 
specifications as well as environment features and interaction are defined. Moreover, 
a set of parameters to test different model behaviours is also proposed. The latter is
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a key aspect. These parameters represent model hypotheses, and by timing them it 
is possible to replicate a wide range of model performances. These parameters also 
have a meaning, and the model will be interpreted and understood by finding the set 
of parameters values that best fit experiment 1.
Four parameters are proposed in this version of the model. Firstly, a parameter for 
setting how locations within the honesty space are translated into one of the three 
Strategies presented above. This allows for calibrating the model's initial state. Secondly, 
two parameters for designing agents' group interactions are defined. These allow for 
setting agents' sensitivity to social honesty as well as how much groups affect agents' 
decision processes. Finally, a parameter that captures agents interaction is required. 
This will allow for setting how agents select partners.
Section 7.5.1 discusses model features and how they are built according to both the 
theoretical understanding of corruption proposed in Chapter 3 and the data from ex­
periment 1. Section 7.5.2 illustrates model parameter calibration. Experiment 1 results 
are used to identify a set of model parameters that best fit its outcomes. Finally, in 
Section 7.5.4, model validation is discussed. Validation is carried out by loading ex­
periment 2 participant practices and values into the model, and performing an average 
of 30 runs of the ABM. A measure of the goodness of fit of the simulation results to 
the data from experiment 2 provides model validation.
7.5.1 M odel descrip tion
The model features a set of agents, an environment in which they can move and a set 
of interactions. Agents represent experiment participants, the environment captures 
both their honesty level, as their distance from the centre of the honesty space, and 
the social honesty level, the area of the polygon within the honesty space. How agents 
behave and respond to the environment is described as interactions.
7.5.1.1 Environment
The environment is shown in Figure 7.4. Agents are located as shown in Figure 7.5. 
The greater their honesty level the less corrupt they are. Every action they perform 
might affect their position within the environment and, consequently, the overall social 
honesty level. Initially, the environment is divided into 3 areas. These three areas
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are used to translate agent locations within the honesty space into the agent Strategies 
described in Section 7.4.4. A ring between radius rj =  |  and =  1 (areal), a ring 
between radius =  |  and =  § (area2), and a circle at radius rs =  |  (area3) 
represent Strategy areas. If an agent is in area3, then it will implement Strategy 3; 
if in area2. Strategy 2; finally if it is in areal. Strategy 1. The idea is that based on 
the location of each agent within the environment, a Strategy is identified. The most 
transparent way of a contractor applying for a call for tenders is simply to place a bid 
and hope that it is the best one (Strategy 1). Sending messages to a politician (Strategy 
2) is a less transparent way of applying for a call for tender than simply placing a bid. 
Both sending messages to and bribing a politician (Strategy 3) is the most corrupt way 
of responding to a call for tender.
The above allows for the initial setting of a Strategy for each agent according to their 
location within the honesty space. area3 covers the lowest levels of honesty and, there­
fore, agents that are located within this area can send messages to and bribe politicians. 
Agents in area2 can send messages to politicians, whereas agents in areal are the most 
honest ones and only place bids.
By increasing the frequency of interactions among contractors and politicians, the level 
of transparency for placing a bid decreases. So for instance, if there are 2 agents A and 
B located in area2, they both can send messages to a politician. But, if A is more 
insistent and sends a greater number of messages than B to the same politician, A is 
considered to place a less transparent bid than B.
Agents' positions within the environment are not only a proxy for their Strategies, but 
are also used for setting their Strategy frequencies. That is the rate of occurrence of 
that particular Strategy between two participants. These frequencies range between 
0 and 1, and are set according to agents' positions relative to each area. For example 
if an agent is in areal, its position between the inner and outer circle of areal defines 
its strategy frequency. Let inner bound (iba) and outer bound (iba) be the inner circle 
radius and outer circle radius of area a respectively, and h, is the participant honesty 
level. Moreover, let bid, mes and bribe be bid frequency, message frequency and bribe 
frequency respectively. Equation 7.7 shows how to set each strategy frequency. Each
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area varies one frequency at a time, areal affects bid frequency but both message and 
bribe frequency are set to 0. area2 sets bid frequency at 1, bribe frequency at 0, and 
message frequency changes according to the agent's honesty level. In area3, both bid 
and message frequencies are equal to 1 and only bribe frequency varies. For all areas, 
the closer to the inner bound the higher the frequency of the affected agent state.
mes =  0 
bribe =  0 
bid =  1
intensity =  <
areal
bribe =  0 
bid — 1 
mes =  1
area2 (7.7)
areaS
The environment has a state, area adjustment (aa). This varies between 0 and 1, and 
changes the inner and outer bound of all the areas. The inner bound of area3 is the 
centre of the environment and the outer bound of areal, rf =  1, is the farthest outer 
bound. So, in order to change the three areas only two radiuses need to be adjusted, 
and rg. Equations 7.8 and 7.9 show how area adjustment affects the shape of the envir­
onment. As area adjustment, increases area3 grows and area2 and areal are squeezed 
towards the farthest outer bound.
r |  =  l - 3 aa (7.8)
This parameter allows for cultural measure calibration, so that participants' Strategies
140 Chapter 7. Experiment results and modelling
and their honesty levels can converge^.
7.5.1.2 Agents
There are 8 agents, since experiment 1 has been run on 8 participants. Agents are iden­
tified by five variables. Firstly each agent has its own honesty level, ranging between 
0 and 1. Secondly, as it has been shown in Section 7.4.4, agents can choose between 
three different Strategies. As contractors, they can either place bids, or place bids and 
send messages or place bids, send messages and pay bribes. As politicians, they can 
issue a project if they receive either only bids, or bids and messages, or bids, messages 
and bribes. For each Strategy, each agent has a Strategy frequency. Therefore, there 
are three more agents' states: bid frequency, message frequency and bribe frequency. 
Thus, agents have the following variables:
1. honesty level
2. Strategy
3. bid frequency
4. message frequency
5. bribe frequency
Agents have the ability to move inside their honesty space. These movements are 
driven by their honesty levels. At the end of each simulation step, the latter are updated 
using equation 5.2. Agents can only move back and forth along a radius, since their 
position is identified only by the distance from the centre of the honesty space. Agents 
have their own directions, and they are located at even distances from each other 
around the circle. At every simulation step, agents move to a point with a distance 
from the centre equal to their honesty level.
Although agents move in one dimension only, the honesty space is two-dimensional. 
The second dimension captures the social honesty level of the entire group.
^obi=l, ib3=0, ob3=ib2=r\, ob2=ibi=r2
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7.5.1.3 Interactions
As discussed in Section 3.3.2 agents uphold corrupt behaviours only if corruption ex­
ists and it is perceived that a sufficiently large set of other agents are doing so. In order 
to operationalise this, two new environment variables are introduced: social se n s itiv ity  
(ss) and honesty  increm ent (hi). These both range between 0 and 1 and they capture the 
agents' ability to perceive the society and its social h onesty  level (sh ), and the amount 
by which to change their own hon esty  level respectively. At the end of each simulation 
step, agents have a probability P  (s s )  of adjusting their own honesty  level h according 
to what aU the others are doing. So, if P  (s s )  is met, agents' hs are updated according 
to equation 7.10.
h t+ i =  <
ht — h i h >  sh
(7.10)
ht +  h i h <  sh
Three different agents' interactions are defined. Each interaction is divided into three 
phases. Phasel: contractors select a politician; phase2: politicians choose a contractor; 
and phase3: a politician-contractor couple is formed and a project is issued from one 
to the other. The model defines three different kinds of phase2, keeping phasel and 
phase3 always the same. For each of the three kind of interactions, in phasel contract­
ors select a politician at random and place a bid for a project; in phase3 one of the two 
couples is selected at random.
In phase 2, there are three possibilities. For random interaction, the two politicians 
select a contractor at random among the ones that have placed a bid with them. For 
the equal Strategy interaction, the two politicians select one of the contractors that has 
submitted a bid and has the same Strategy. For equal frequency interaction, the two 
politicians select a contractor among those that have submitted a bid and have the 
same Strategy and have the closest strategy frequency. To summarize:
1. random interaction:
• phasel: contractors select a politician at random and bid
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phase2; politicians choose one of the contractors at random that has placed 
a bid
phaseS: between the two couples (politician-contractor), one is selected at 
random
2. equal Strategy interaction:
• phasel: contractors select a politician at random and bid
• phase2: politicians select one of the contractors that has placed a bid and 
has the same Strategy
• phase3: between the two couples (politician-contractor), one is selected at 
random
3. equal frequency interaction:
• phasel: contractors select a politician at random and bid
• phase2: politicians select a contractor that has placed a bid to them and has 
the same Strategy and has the closest frequency
• phase3: between the two couples (politician-contractor), one is selected at 
random
In the event that no couple is found, the same step is repeated up to 20 times. The 
simulation is stopped if, after 20 repetitions of the same step, no couple is found. This 
happened few times and only at the extremes of the parameter ranges.
7.5.2 Model calibration
Each simulation is 20 steps. At the end of each simulation step a project is allocated. 
A parameter space search is run in order to find a set of parameter values that best fits 
the data experiment 1. Table 7.3 shows the parameters' names and their range. There 
are four parameters, which define 6930 possible scenarios.
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Name Range Increment
Interaction [random, equal strategy, equal frequency]
social sensitivity [01] 0.05
honesty increment [0.01 0.1] 0.01
area adjustment [110] 1
Table 7.3: Parameter space
The goodness of fit is measured at the end of each simulation as shown in equation 
7.11. It is the sum, for each of the 8 agents, of the differences between agent honesty ah 
and the honesty ph of the corresponding real participant.
8
f i t  == Y^abs {ah -  Ph) (7.11)
p = i
For each model parameter setting, fit is computed as the average of 30 runs. Thus a 
total of 30 X 6930 = 207900 simulations were performed. Of all these runs, the best 
average fit was achieved with a value for goodness of fit of 1.519 Figure 7.18 shows a 
histogram of the average fit for each distinct set of parameter values
The best fit reproduces, on average, an error of 0.19 for each participant. This figure 
is obtained by dividing the best fit by 8, the number of participants. Therefore, the 
model is able to replicate experiment 1 results with, on average, an error of 0.19 (20%), 
of the final honesty level of each real participant. Table 7.4 shows the parameter setting 
that produces the best fit. It is always difficult to assess how good a fit is. According 
to the measure proposed here, the absolute best fit would be equal to 0, the absolute 
worst equal to 8, that is the number of participants. For instance, all participants 
end with honesty levels equal to 0 and the model predicts their honesty levels equal 
to 1. Here, for each participant, the model returns f i t  =  1.519, that is closer to the 
absolute best fit than the absolute worst. In order to have a better sense of the goodness 
of fit produced by the model proposed here, we can consider a single participant, 
say Nawin from experiment 1. S /he finished the experiement at honesty level around 
0.6. Given Nawin's group features and assuming that the error is equally distributed
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Simulation results
Figure 7.18: Simulation result distribution
between agents, the model is able to predict that her/h is final honesty level will range 
between 0.6 ±  0.19.
Name value
Interaction equal frequency 
social sensitivity 0.5
honesty increment 0.07
area adjustmen 9
Table 7.4: Best parameter setting
Among the three different type of interactions, equal frequency interaction is the best. 
Moreover, social sensitivity is equal to 0.5 and an honesty increment value is equal 
to 0.07. Area adjustment is equal to 9, meaning that the three areas that make up the 
environment are squeezed towards the farthest outer circle of the honesty space.
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7.5.3 Model dynamic
A further assessment of the model's goodness of fit can be obtained by observing its 
dynamic. As mentioned above in Section 7.4.4, at the beginning of the experiment 
politicians were more prone to accepting bribes whereas towards the end they issued 
projects to contractors that did not offer bribes. This switch in Strategies is a key as­
pect, and it is fundamental that the model is able to replicate such a change over time. 
In order to compare the dynamic from the model to the one observed in the experi­
ment, the outcome of a new single run with parameters set as shown in Table 7.4 is 
illustrated. Figure 7.19 shows the final level of social honesty for a single run of the 
model and for experiment 1. The model produces social honesty equal to 0.53, where 
the observed social honesty is 0.67. Comparing Figure 7.19(a) and 7.19(b), one can see 
the simulated agents performed almost identically to Hibino, kentOl, Nawin, testerl3 
and David_C. A bigger gap is found between the performances of the simulated agents 
and those of Taksin and Takashi. In Table 7.5 the simulated model dynamic is shown. 
The table is a list of the 20 projects that also shows, for each project, the politician that 
has issued it, the contractor that has been granted it and the Strategy implemented 
in the transaction. As expected the model approximately replicates the observed dy­
namic. At the beginning the two politicians issued 5 projects employing Strategy 3 
(bid, messages and bribes). Then, the following 15 projects were issued using Strategy 
1 (only bids). The event that apparently triggered this switch within the group can be 
noted by observing Table 7.5 for projects from 6 to 9. David_C was granted 4 projects 
in a row with Strategy 1 and this caused the entire group to agree on the Strategy to 
employ for the future. This is very similar to what was observed in the experiment, see 
Figures 7.15 and 7.16. This switching mechanism was triggered by smoke_sky instead. 
The latter was issued h is/her second, third and fourth project employing Strategy 1. 
After that, most of the transactions employed the same Strategy. The agents' ability 
to perceive their group social honesty and change accordingly over time is a key as­
pect of studying the emergence of corruption in small groups, and the single run of 
the model proposed here successfully replicated it. Moreover, the observed changing 
from Strategy 3 to Strategy 1, due to a single extreme individual within the group, has 
already been observed by Van Swal (2009) with respect to group polarisation, and it is
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a key point to understand corruption within small groups.
Project Politician Contractor Strategy
1 Nawin Takashi 3
2 Nawin Taksin 3
3 testerl3 KentOl 3
4 Nawin KentOl 3
5 Nawin smoke_sky 3
6 testerl3 David_C 1
7 testerl3 David_C 1
8 Nawin David-C 1
9 testerl3 David-C 1
10 Nawin smoke_sky 1
11 testerl3 Taksin 1
12 testerl3 Taksin 1
13 Nawin Hibino 1
14 Nawin David_C 1
15 testerl3 smoke_sky 1
16 Nawin smoke_sky 1
17 Nawin David_C 1
18 Nawin Tasking
19 Nawin David_C 1
10 testerl3 Taksin 1
Table 7.5: Model dynamic
7.5.4 Model validation
To validate the model, it was initialised with data from experiment 2. Figures 7.20 and 
7.21(b) show initial and final social honesty levels at 0.47 and 0.86 respectively. Also, 
in experiment 2, an increase in the social honesty level is observed. Here okey2010 and 
scy7 are politicians. All participants increase their honesty level to 1 during the game, 
except for the two politicians and the contractor, sweetypie. okey2010 increases from 
just above 0.4 to just below 0.8; scy7 increases from just below 0.4 to just above 0.4; cmd 
sweetypie from above 0.4 to just above 0.6. Figure 7.21(a) shows a single run of the 
model initialized with participants from experiment 2. Notably, all participants' hon-
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Figure 7.19: Comparing a single model run with experiment 1
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Figure 7.20: Initial social honesty level experiment 1
esty levels are almost perfectly replicated, and only merrychristmas and DarthVader 
have honesty levels greater in the experiment than in the model replication.
In order to validate it, the model is set using the parameters shown in Table 7.4. As 
before,/if is the average over 30 simulations computed as shown in equation 7.11 and 
is measured at the end of each run. fit is equal to 1.968. It reproduces, on average, 
an error of 0.24 for each participant. As before, within the range from 0 to 8, best and 
worst fit respectively, 1.968 is closer to the former than to the latter.
After calibrating the model, and showing a relatively small error after validation, it 
is reasonable to propose a preliminary interpretation of the model initialised with its 
best parameter setting.
7.6 Results
The model presented here, although simple, is a reasonably good replication of the ex­
periment. It has been calibrated and validated, returning an error, on average, of 0.24
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Figure 7.21: Comparing a single model run with experiment 2
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for the individual final honesty level for each participant. This model is able to cap­
ture, given the initial honesty level of the fictional group reproduced in the experiment, 
its final honesty level. The results obtained can be listed in three points. Firstly, this 
model constitutes a first attempt at transforming group features into honesty levels. 
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 describe a simple method of transforming, in this case three 
but in general as many as needed, individuals' practices and values into a common 
environment. Then, through calibration the model is timed so that it replicates parti­
cipants behaviour better than all the other possible settings. Area adjustment equals 
to 9 means that the best transformation of group features into honesty space is by hav­
ing =  0.83 and r® =  0.92, inner and outer bound of area2 respectively. Therefore, 
at the beginning of each simulation, all agents are located in areaS, where Strategy 3 is 
implemented (see Section 7.4.4), they can all bid, send messages and use bribes. The 
latter is consistent with what was observed in experiment 1 (see Section 7.4.4.1). At 
the beginning of the experiment the two politicians accepted bribes, whereas towards 
the end they were less prone to do so. This shows that the method of transforming 
group features into an honesty space successfully replicates what it is observed in the 
experiment.
Secondly, this model provides a generative explanation of the effect of small groups on 
individuals' decisions whether to engage in corrupt practices. Agents select a Strategy 
according to their position within the honesty space, they can change their position of 
±  honesty increment every social sensitivity. Model calibration returns 0.07 and 0.5 re­
spectively. For every other simulation step, each agent checks the social honesty level 
and moves towards it by ±  0.07. Considering that the honesty space radius is 1, in 
10 steps of 0.07 each agent can cover almost the entire honesty space. By interpreting 
these values an answer to the research question can be provided. The model result 
suggests that experiment participants were checking the overall social honesty with 
a probability equal to 0.5, and adapting their decisions towards what the group ap­
peared to do. The extent to which participants moved towards the social honesty level 
is ±  0.07. As mentioned above, in the 20 simulation steps (projects in the experiment) 
participemts could cover almost the entire honesty space) therefore it is possible to claim 
that the degree to which the artificial group replicated in the experiment affects parti­
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cipants' decisions is rather high. As far as adopting corrupt practices is concerned, the 
perception of the social honesty level constitutes a fundamental aspect in the process 
of deciding whether or not to uphold corrupt behaviour.
Thirdly, the best interaction is the one that involves selecting partners with similar 
Strategy frequencies. It is the most accurate and it narrows down agents' choices dra­
matically. In fact, it allows agents to interact with agents very similar to themselves, 
and maintain that interaction until something changes. This has also been observed in 
the experiment. Section 7.4.4.1, where politicians issued projects to those contractors 
that seemed to act similarly to themselves.
7.7 Conclusion
The model presented here adds a generative explanation to the understanding of cor­
ruption within a small group. The generative explanation proposed here permits the 
identification of a set of micro-specifications that are sufficient to generate the experi­
mental outcomes. The research question put forward in this study is: to what extent do 
group features affect individuals decision processes in engaging in corrupt practices? 
In order to answer this, as a preliminary test and to show the empirical foundation 
of the proposed model, two experiments with 8 participants each have been carried 
out. Group features are measured at the beginning of each experiment: this is used 
to initialise agents and their environment. By analysing participants' Strategies and 
their evolution over time, a set of rules is identified and used for defining agents. 
A normative understanding of how participants might uphold corrupt practices has 
been used to design interactions between agents and their environment. The model is 
calibrated with one of the two experiments, and validated on the other. Validation re­
turns a reasonably small error, allowing for a preliminary model interpretation. Three 
results are highlighted. Firstly, this model defines an innovative method for trans­
forming and calibrating group features into a common environment. Secondly, the 
parameter values that return the best fit can be seen as quantitative measures of the 
impact of group's features on participants' decisions as to whether or not to uphold 
corrupt practices. Thirdly, it identifies a Strategy where participants select partners 
very similar to themselves and, more importantly, change them as Strategy change
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over time.
The current approach has, however, two limitations. Firstly, two experiments with 
only eight participants each might seem too few, to build solid model interpretations. 
However, the proposed approach is still strongly empirically-based and it is simple 
enough to have a complete understanding of the processes undertaken by the model. 
Secondly, honesty level is measured in two different ways at the beginning and at the 
end of a simulation. Even though this solution has been shown to work, it might not 
be the best one. Of course, model reliability would increase if the honesty level was 
measured using the same method both at the start and at the end of a simulation. In 
that case, neither of the two methods proposed here could be used. It is pointless to 
run the very same cultural measures at the end of the experiment, and there is no 
participant history at the beginning of the experiment to derive their honesty level.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Although corruption is acknowledged to cause great damage to society as well as the 
economy, only recently have scholars begun to study corruption.
The first framework proposed to understand corruption was the Hobbesian market 
theory. Actors are thought to be dishonest, and a third actor is necessary to guarantee 
the parts involved in a transaction. This third actor holds a position of power, and it 
is there that corruption is thought to take place.
A different approach to understanding corruption takes into account the political sys­
tem, where economic growth and démocratisation are seen to have an effect on the 
level of corruption of a society. Also, since power holders do not often wish to change 
the system, the central aspect of political will for fighting corruption is put forward as 
a key aspect.
Perhaps, the largest body of literature on corruption comes from economics. Main 
findings range from the identification of likely causes and consequences to micro- 
economic explanations. From these studies several new aspects are brought to at­
tention, such as sector regulations, institutional decentralization, employees' salaries 
and so forth.
There is not, as yet, a sociological understanding of corruption as such, or, in other 
words, a way to measure the extent to which being part of a group affects individuals' 
decisions about whether to uphold corrupt practices. This is an essential aspect and it
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needs clarification. During the "Bribesvüle" scandal in Italy, many convicted individu­
als stated that they did not endorse the corrupt practices they nevertheless obeyed, as 
if there was a social pressure forcing them to uphold such practices. This is a key point 
in the fight against corruption. In this study a sociological understanding of corrup­
tion is proposed. More specifically the research question proposed here is as follows: 
to what extent do group features affect individuals' decision processes in engaging 
in corrupt practices? Notably, individuals' practices and values are introduced as an 
explanatory factor and are used for differentiating group features. However, those 
practices and values are used only as a proxy for measuring individuals' perceptions 
and expectations within their group and are not assumed a priori as a canonical idea 
of culture would imply.
A solid analysis and understanding of corruption should be empirically-based. Unfor­
tunately, data on corruption are difficult to gather. Many scholars have claimed that 
this, true for many social sciences, has been a major limitation to the development of 
the study on corruption. Institutional data, such as court cases, police investigations 
and journalist investigations are very insightful and provide a sense of the actual level 
of corruption within a society. However, for various reasons, it can only capture part 
of the real phenomenon and, therefore, is not useful for the kind of study proposed 
here. A different source of data is corruption indicators such as CPI. The latter is 
formed by combining opinion surveys from business people and assessments (scores) 
of a country's performance as provided by a group of country risk expert analysts. 
CPI is very useful: even though it only provides corruption perception levels and not 
actual corruption levels, it has been shown that CPI can be safely used as a proxy for 
assessing them. Perhaps the most reliable source of data on corruption comes from 
field experiments where, in collaboration with local institutions, researchers monitor 
and measure how the community behaves in a corruption-related domain. However, 
to build a field experiment takes years and money and it is way beyond research stu­
dents' abilities and available infrastructures.
In this study, a new method to produce reliable first hand-data, that could capture 
enough of the complexity to be able to detect the emergence of corruption in small 
groups, is introduced. The data gathering method employed to accomplish such a
155
task is a laboratory experiment. This is a role playing game, where participants adopt 
a role and interact with each other in a fictional scenario. The experiment platform 
is a sophisticated web application where participants can monitor and perceive their 
group as well as build relationships and negotiate. This data gathering methodology 
is thought to be the best for the purposes of this study. Firstly, it facilitates the meas­
urement of specific group features. Secondly, it monitors, over time, every action per­
formed by experiment participants, capturing a high degree of complexity underneath 
the emergence of corruption. The experiment design is carefully tailored to the aim 
of the study, so that experiment analyses might shed light on participants' behaviours 
and attempt to answer the research question.
Participants were trained before the actual experiment started, so that they felt familiar 
with the web application interface and could focus on their game strategies. The ex­
periment's fictional setting is to build the London 2012 Olympic City. Two roles were 
available, politicians and contractors. Twenty tasks, called projects, were required to 
build the Olympic City. Only a successful interaction between a politician and a con­
tractor could complete a project. Participants were paid £5, and the one that won the 
game £30. 16 people took part. They were divided into two experiments of 8 people, 
with 2 politicians and 6 contractors each. The measurements taken captured a rather 
high degree of complexity. Text messages, participants' negotiations and actions were 
recorded over time.
The data gathered during the experiment were analysed and interpreted, producing 
a generative explanation using agent-based modelling. Due to the binding relation 
between understanding and facts, a clear definition of individuals, environment and 
interactions and the possibility to test and adjust hypotheses, this is an excellent method 
to address the research question of this study. Ultimately, such a method provides a 
candidate mechanism-based explanation of the emergence of corruption. As a pre­
liminary test, the data gathered through the experiments have been used to calibrate 
the model as well as validate its performances. Although the gathered sample is not 
enough for the interpretation and generalization of model results, it constitutes a good 
example of the potential of the methodology proposed and it provides a demonstra­
tion of the strong empirical link between model results and interpretation.
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The measures of group features taken at the beginning of each experiment are used 
to initialise model agents and environment. The analyses of participants' actions and 
their evolution over time provided the definition of a set of rules for ABM agents. 
The interactions between agents and their environment was derived by the proposed 
normative understanding of how participants might uphold corrupt practices. The 
model was then calibrated on one of the two experiments, and validated on the other. 
Model validation provided an idea of the degree of model interpretation reliability. 
The good fit indicated that the model was sound and reliable.
The model setting that best replicated the experiment results suggests that being part 
of a group plays a fundamental role in shaping individuals' decisions whether or not 
to comply with corrupt practices. This might sound trivial to some, but it is very dif­
ficult to find empirical evidence, let alone a quantitative value, that could capture the 
extent to which a specific group, defined by its group features, affects individuals' de­
cisions in upholding corrupt practices. This study provides such a quantitative value 
in terms of the set of parameter values that best fits the experiment results.
The impact of the present study can be summarised in the following four points: 
firstly, data gathering. The idea of using games as data collection methods is relat­
ively new. Role playing games are powerful tools for gathering data about corrup­
tion. Although the study did not collect evidence to support this claim, it is expected 
that participants feel themselves part of the proposed fictional context, and behave 
according to the role they are using. This not only guarantees participants' full aware­
ness of their actions, but also allows them to build strategies and develop negotiation 
mechanisms otherwise not detectable.
The web application described here can be developed further. It can be easily trans­
ferred to well-established social platforms such as Facebook.com. In doing so, the 
participant gathering process might be greatly improved. Facebook users might in­
vite one another to participate in the game, thereby almost eliminating the problem 
of recruitmg experiment participants. Furthermore, Facebook will add c in  extra layer 
of complexity to the data sampled during the experiment. Users' profile information 
(e.g. nationality, gender, education, who knows who, etc...) will facilitate the detec-
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tion of how the participants' true social network is formed. This is indeed a key point. 
By providing a generative explanation of corruption, existing networks amongst the 
subjects might play a fundamental role. Experiment representative stimuli will also 
be improved as participants will be expected to behave according to their current so­
cial life since they will play alongside their own friends and possibly unknown par­
ticipants too. Facebook eliminates anonymity and conditions its users to reveal their 
true identity, subjects are expected to make careful decisions as these carry their true 
identity.
Secondly, an innovative method to transform individuals' practices and values is presen­
ted. Beginning with significant correlations between CPI and those practices and val­
ues, a numerical method for aggregating them is proposed. This permits a relation 
between levels of corruption and group features to be formed. The proposed aggreg­
ation can be easily extended to other realms. For instance, instead of corruption one 
might want to investigate different crimes, such as burglaries or sexual offences and 
create a simple and powerful relation with group features.
Thirdly, the first-hand data gathered during the experiment were analysed and inter­
preted using a theoretical approach that is a novelty within the realms of corruption 
studies. The theoretical contribution to understand corruption is three-fold. Firstly, 
it is claimed that corruption exists if a public resource and a non-bureaucratic sys­
tem for allocating such a public resource exists. Secondly, two social regularities are 
identified: corruption is endemic and corruption is resilient. Thirdly, a generative 
approach is used to measure the degree to which group features affect individuals' 
decisions whether to uphold corrupt practices. This generative approach is supported 
by a cultural and a normative explanation. The former enables the constructions of 
different groups in which individuals are embedded, the latter provides mechanisms 
to understand how participants perceive the group. The combination of these two 
explanations along with a generative understanding of corruption, provides a theor­
etical framework to address the research question. Therefore, in a group where public 
resources are available and are allocated according to a set of rules corruption might 
emerge. Depending on the features of such a group, corruption manifests itself in 
different ways. By observing Italy as an example, corruption presents two macro reg-
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ularities: it is endemic and resilient. The former means that corruption is present in 
the lowest to the highest layers of the society; the latter means that it is very difficult 
to change its current status, even though successful action has targeted and reduced 
corruption levels, as after a certain period of time the level of corruption returns to 
its original. The latter entails firstly the definition of specific group features; secondly, 
the design of social mechanisms through which individuals recognise and adapt to 
their perception of the group; and finally the dynamic generation of those bottom-up 
processes that best replicate the phenomenon.
Fourthly, it provides a quantitative measure of the extent to which group features con­
tribute to the emergence of corruption. The output of the model presented here pro­
duces a set of parameter values, which are then interpreted to provide a quantitative 
measure. Within the fictional society produced during the experiment, participants 
were continuously matching their own decisions to those made within the group. 
After calibration, the best model setting was the one that allowed agents to mimic 
their perception of the group. Therefore, a quantitative formulation of the extent to 
which the fictional society affected participants is expressed by the model parameter 
values. This means that it is possible to quantify the extent to which individuals de­
cide according to their own values or shared ones, which is useful especially when it 
comes to policy making. Long-term strategic decisions on whether to aim for a so­
cial policy tailored to the individual or to the individual's perception of society are 
key in shaping anti-corruption policies. Therefore, assessing the extent to which the 
corruption level of a particular group is more or less socially constructed might be of 
great importance to the design of social policies against corruption. Furthermore, this 
approach can be generalised. The extent to which other kinds of crimes or social phe­
nomena are or are not driven by group features can be assessed. The same framework 
proposed here can be used to answer questions that seek to understand and express 
quantitively the impact of group features on shaping observed social phenomena.
The strongest limitations of the study proposed here can be summarised in three 
points. Firstly, experiment validity. This is a key issue since it strongly affects the 
reliability of the model interpretation. Although the experiment described here was 
designed according to the most up-to-date findings within experimental economics.
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the number of participants and their socio-demographic variety were not large enough 
to apply statistical inference. Agent-based model calibration and validation is used in­
stead. It is acknowledged that only 16 participants are too few for building an under­
standing of corruption, and so only a preliminary demonstration of the methodology 
can be proposed. In order to generalize observation taken during experiments, more 
participants and more experiments are needed. Experiment replication is the ultimate 
way to test experiment external validity. Conducting several experiments with differ­
ent participants over again, and in some case, using different data gathering methods, 
wül allow for assessing the goodness of the experiment for generalizing its results 
on other people. Again, in this study there was not enough money to do so and ex­
periment external validity is not assessed. However, it has been a fundamental part 
of the study since the two experiments proposed here, have been used to define the 
necessary techniques to calibrate and validate the agent-based model.
Secondly, participants' honesty levels were measured in two different ways. At the be­
ginning of each model simulation they were derived from the questionnaire, whereas 
at the end they were computed as a function of what was gained from corrupt prac­
tices. Even though this two-fold method of measuring honesty levels might not be the 
best one, it is a working solution of a difficult problem. It is almost impossible to de­
rive participants' past histories in order to be able to measure initial honesty levels as a 
function of what was gained from previous corrupt practices. It is not possible to state 
whether these two measures would differ in representing the same object. Further 
study and perhaps new methods are needed to tackle this issue.
Thirdly, the link between the understanding of corruption proposed in the model and 
the two macro regularities observed in Italy, corruption is endemic and resilient, is 
only qualitative. The model does not describe any social mechanisms that drive such 
regularities. Court cases and Institutional reports form the ground on which the link is 
built. A quantitative understanding of how the impact of group features on individu­
als' decisions with respect to corruption generates endemic and resilient corruption is 
absent. Due to a lack of experimental participants, the result presented here cannot be 
extended.
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As previously mentioned, the most natural further development of this study is to 
transfer the web application onto Facebook. This might partially overcome the two 
limitations above. Gathering participants might take longer but would be expected 
to gather a large number of participants with no effort for the researcher. Another 
interesting aspect in moving the experiment platform onto Facebook is that the exper­
iment time could be extended from a maximum of 1 hour to weeks. This would not 
only make the experiment more realistic, as the effects of decisions would take time 
to present themselves, but would also partially overcome the limitation of measur­
ing honesty levels with two different tools. Let's assume that after the London 2012 
Olympic City fictional scenario, a new one is proposed to the participants. It would 
then be possible to measure honesty levels with the same tool from the previous scen­
ario.
To conclude, the study proposed here is innovative in its methodology and in its res­
ults. It represents a first step towards the definition of a new tool for considering group 
differences and a quantitative value to express the impact of those group features on 
individual behaviours. Groups are classified according to a set of features, individu­
als have the ability to perceive their groups and act accordingly. These, together, are 
aggregated in a quantitative value that stands for the capacity of a certain group to 
affect its members' actions with respect to a certain social phenomenon.
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